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Constitutional Judicial Review and Political Insurance

Tridimas, George (2010) Constitutional Judicial Review and Political Insurance. European Journal of Law and Economics, 29 (1). pp. 81-101. [Journal article]

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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-009-9112-z


Considering constitutional judicial review of policy, the power of courts to annul legislation, as a political insurance mechanism to protect against losses from adverse election outcomes, the paper analyzes three questions: First, under what circumstances a political ruler, who wins an election and the right to propose measures of policy, subjects those measures to the checking powers of an independent judiciary. Second, the net expected gains of a political ruler from granting binary choice to the reviewing judiciary rather than open choice. Third, the equilibrium degree of policy review power granted to the judiciary. Differences in the policy preferences of competing politicians, the judiciary and the status quo, the probability of winning an election and the probability that the judiciary confirms legislation passed by the incumbent emerge as the main determinants of judicial review and its political independence.

Item Type:Journal article
Keywords:judicial dispute resolution; constitutional judicial review; judicial independence; political insurance; binary choice / closed agenda
Faculties and Schools:Ulster Business School
Research Institutes and Groups:Institute for Research in Social Sciences
ID Code:12609
Deposited By: Professor George Tridimas
Deposited On:13 Apr 2010 13:07
Last Modified:17 Oct 2017 15:49

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