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The Political Economy of Power–Sharing

Tridimas, George (2011) The Political Economy of Power–Sharing. European Journal of Political Economy, 27 (2). pp. 328-342. [Journal article]

[img] Microsoft Word (Refereed Journal Article) - Accepted Version

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.10.002


The paper analyses why office-motivated political rivals may agree to cease conflict to control the government and share power on the basis of an election outcome under proportional representation. As the outcomes of conflict and elections are uncertain, for each rational player the choice depends on which setting secures the highest expected net payoff. Adopting the methodology of the economics of conflict, I show that the factors of crucial importance are attitudes to risk, the comparative effectiveness of the adversaries in contesting election relative to a war, the size of the benefits from office, how the benefits are shared in a power-sharing agreement, and the proportion of the benefits destroyed by fighting.

Item Type:Journal article
Keywords:Power-sharing, consociational theory, post-civil-war democratisation, non-majoritarian institutions, proportional representation, risk aversion, split-the-surplus formula
Faculties and Schools:Ulster Business School
Research Institutes and Groups:Institute for Research in Social Sciences
ID Code:16057
Deposited By: Professor George Tridimas
Deposited On:17 Nov 2010 13:18
Last Modified:17 Oct 2017 15:54

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