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Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence

Tridimas, George (2011) Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence. In: CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHOLOGIES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROLLING THE STATE. Springer, pp. 153-169. ISBN 978-1-4419-6783-1 [Book section]

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As successful markets are founded on the rule of law and monetary stability, the paper investigates whether judicial independence (JI) and central bank independence (CBI) are positively correlated. After analysing and comparing the meaning, rationale and institutional arrangements for JI and CBI a more nuanced pattern of similarities and differences emerges. Estimation of the statistical significance of the coefficient of correlation between JI and CBI for an international sample shows that there is no significant correlation between indicators of legal independence but a significant correlation between indicators of actual independence.

Item Type:Book section
Keywords:Central Bank Independence; Judicial Independence; Judicial Review of Policy; Delegation; Credibility; Rule of Law; Accountability; Political Insurance.
Faculties and Schools:Ulster Business School
Research Institutes and Groups:Institute for Research in Social Sciences
ID Code:17434
Deposited By: Professor George Tridimas
Deposited On:09 Mar 2011 16:11
Last Modified:17 Oct 2017 15:56

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