INFINITIVAL CLAUSES IN ANCIENT GREEK: OVERT AND NULL SUBJECTS, THE ROLE OF CASE AND FOCUS.

BY
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Declaration

I declare that this dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the result of collaboration with others except where specifically stated in the text. I also declare that it does not exceed the limit of 80,000 words.
Infinitival clauses in Ancient Greek: overt and null subjects, the role of Case and Focus.

Christina Sevdali

Abstract

This thesis investigates the properties of Ancient Greek (AG) infinitival clauses and their subjects and how they can be accounted for within a generative framework. AG infinitives appear in many syntactic environments and they also have a variety of morphological forms, whose interpretation as temporal or aspectual is debatable. Moreover they license overt subjects in accusative case (Accusativus Cum Infinitivo-AcI) and they can also exhibit Control, where there is no accusative case detectable on the null subject and instead it appears with the case of its controller from the main clause (Case agreement across copula-CAAC). The main questions that this thesis addresses therefore are: (a) what licenses accusative, when accusative is present (instances of disjoint reference and emphasis, as well as non-controlled null subjects), (b) what disallows the availability of accusative in cases of control/CAAC and (c) whether this interchange relates to other properties of AG infinitival clauses, morphological/semantic or what. The analysis we will put forward goes against others in the literature, which reduce AcI to an instance of Exceptional Case marking (ECM) or relate it solely to the alleged temporal properties of the infinitives. Instead we argue for a series of things: (a) that all infinitival clauses are CPs, (b) that there is a split between two types of CPs however, based on their discourse properties: normal C*Ps, strong phases (in Chomsky’s, 2001 sense) that have a contrastive focus feature vs. CPs, weak phases that do not have this feature and consequently no discourse domain. The latter are instantiated as Control infinitives where there is also no availability of accusative for the infinitival subject. In order to relate the two properties we argue for the following: a morphologically rich non-finite T can value the Case of its subject. Whether it will actually do so depends on the existence and the feature content of the infinitival C: if C has a contrastive discourse feature, then it can consequently inherit the Case feature to non-finite T, which in turn can value the Case on the subject DP. If on the other hand, infinitival C does not have a discourse feature, then Case on the infinitival subject cannot be valued from within the infinitival clause and the latter is a weak phase, a domain transparent to operations from outside, where CAAC obtains. According to this analysis the EPP feature of non-finite clauses, when it exists, is
related to discourse and it is neither a formal syntactic feature nor solely a PF feature. In the last part of this thesis we extend our analysis to other constructions that exhibit the interchange between overt subjects with case and null subjects with and without case as well as Control, namely Latin AcI, AG absolute participles and Modern Greek *na* clauses etc. We show that both in the finite and the non-finite domain, discourse features giving rise to two types of Cs, play a bigger role in syntactic operations than often assumed.
‘And also, a thing is interesting because of thinking about it and not because of it being new.’

Christopher Boone

In Mark Haddon’s ‘The curious incident of the dog in the night-time’
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<td>Acc</td>
<td>Accusative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AcI</td>
<td>Accusativus Cum Infinitivo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adv</td>
<td>Adverb</td>
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<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Ancient Greek</td>
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<td>Agr</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
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<td>ASC</td>
<td>Absolute Small Clauses</td>
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<td>Aux to Comp</td>
<td>Auxiliary to Complementizer</td>
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<td>BP</td>
<td>Brazilian Portuguese</td>
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<td>C*P</td>
<td>Complementizer Phrase</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(strong phase)</td>
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<td>CAAC</td>
<td>Case agreement across copula</td>
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<td>Comp</td>
<td>Complementizer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Complementizer Phrase</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(weak phase)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dat</td>
<td>Dative</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Determiner Phrase</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECM</td>
<td>Exceptional Case marking</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Portuguese</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPP</td>
<td>Extended Projection Principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FQ</td>
<td>Floating Quantifier</td>
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<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Government &amp; Binding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen</td>
<td>Genitive</td>
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<td>Imp</td>
<td>Imperative</td>
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<td>Imprf</td>
<td>Imperfective</td>
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<td>Indic</td>
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<td>Inf</td>
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<td>Infl</td>
<td>Inflection</td>
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<td>LF</td>
<td>Logical Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDA</td>
<td>Lond Distance Agree</td>
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<td>MG</td>
<td>Modern Greek</td>
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<td>NcI</td>
<td>Nominativus Cum Infinitivo</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>Nom:</td>
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<td>NSL:</td>
<td>Null subject Language</td>
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<td>Opt:</td>
<td>Optative</td>
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<td>Present</td>
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<td>Prf:</td>
<td>Perfective</td>
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<td>Prtcl:</td>
<td>Participle</td>
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<td>Pst:</td>
<td>Past</td>
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<td>Sg:</td>
<td>Singular</td>
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<td>Subj:</td>
<td>Subjunctive</td>
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<td>T:</td>
<td>Tense</td>
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<tr>
<td>TP:</td>
<td>Tense Phrase</td>
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<tr>
<td>v*P:</td>
<td>verbal Phrase (strong phase)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voc:</td>
<td>Vocative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vP:</td>
<td>verbal Phrase (weak phase)</td>
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I thought that this would be the only part of this thesis that I wouldn’t have a
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Στους γονείς μου Σωσώ και Λάμπρο,
με όλη μου την αγάπη.
Chapter 0: Introduction

This thesis is about Ancient Greek infinitives and their subjects. Our goal is to present in detail the distribution and properties of infinitival clauses in Classical times and account for some of its intricacies in a generative framework. This very brief first chapter will give an overview of the thesis and will also outline some of the basic theoretical assumptions that underlie our work.

0.1 Thesis overview

In the first chapter we will give an overview of infinitival syntax from Government & Binding (GB) to Minimalism. We will start off with Control theory and Chomsky’s 1981 PRO theorem, and then go through attempts to modify it from within GB. These are all reductionist attempts, which try to reduce Control to Binding (Manzini, 1983), equate it to pro-drop (Huang, 1989, 1992) and Case theory (Bouchard, 1984 and in a different way Chomsky & Lasnik, 1993). We will then move on to discuss Control theory within Minimalism, starting off with Landau, 2000, who argues that Control theory and PRO exist and should be retained with some amendments. On the other hand, there is also Hornstein, 1999, who attempts to reduce Control theory to movement (effectively equating it with raising) and Manzini & Roussou, 2000, who attempt to reduce Control into attraction of features. We will conclude this section with a brief presentation of the long-standing debate of whether control is better understood in terms of a syntactic mechanism or as a semantic property of predicates.

In the final part of the first Chapter, we will look into the two most prominent theories of overt infinitival subjects in English, namely exceptional Case marking (ECM) and Kayne’s 1983 for-deletion analysis. The apparent shortcomings of all these theories when faced with the AG data that we want to account for, follow from the fact that they are designed to account for languages like English, whose infinitival syntax is quite different from AG. Most issues that will be central in our discussion simply do not arise for English.

In Chapter 2, we give a thorough presentation of the situation in AG. We start off with a brief introduction on AG grammar in general and then we present the morphological properties of the infinitives. Afterwards we present the syntactic properties of AG infinitives, starting with the Accusativus Cum Infinitivo (AcI) construction, where infinitival clauses have overt subjects in the accusative Case
when they are distinct to that of the main clause, or when they are emphatic. This latter use will be of central importance to our analysis of AG infinitives since we think that it provides some real insight in the character of AG infinitives in general. We move on to present the situation with controlled infinitives, which we argue exhibit case agreement across copula (CAAC), where the null infinitival subject seems to copy the Case of its controller from the main clause. Since CAAC is a syntactic operation, we pursue the idea of it ever failing to apply and thus giving rise to AcI for locality reasons. We conclude that this is not the case and CAAC is an Agree-type operation, which is constrained within phase boundaries. All examples of alleged locality AcI are reduced to cases of contrastive infinitival subjects. We then move on to present non-controlled null infinitival subjects, which are marked with accusative and are of two kinds: arbitrary and referential. The latter kind, which are unique to AG, give support to the idea that accusative infinitival null subjects are *pro*, an idea which is further supported by the existence of object drop in AG. After briefly presenting the rest of the distribution of infinitival clauses we move on to discuss ‘apparent’ nominative infinitival subjects, as presented by various grammars. In the final section of Chapter 2 we argue that all these cases are better understood as instances of raising and agreement mismatches. Finally we argue that control examples that do not obey CAAC can be reduced to instances of non-obligatory control, leaving CAAC as the sole mechanism to express obligatory co-reference between the infinitival subject and an argument in the main clause.

Chapter 3 gives an overview of previous analyses of infinitives with overt subjects, which would be the ones that could be extended in AG. We start off with analyses for Latin and ECM analyses, where we give arguments against them based on existing literature and specific AG examples. We then move on to more recent approaches based on Rizzi’s, 1982 influential Aux to Comp analysis. In this section we discuss Raposo, 1987 for European Portuguese Inflected infinitives and Ceccheto & Oniga, 2001 for Latin. Section 3.4 discusses two more analyses for other Romance languages and dialects: Ledgeway, 2000 for Southern Italian dialects and Sitaridou, 2002 for Spanish, Sardinian and European Portuguese. We finish off this Chapter with analyses that are specific to AG and we discuss some of the problems they run against.

In Chapter 4 we outline our own analysis for AG infinitives. Our main point is that discourse factors like focus play an important role in the licensing of subjects in
non-finite structures. We start off by defining the notion of contrast and emphasis we will use and we also discuss some analyses that deal specifically with the properties and interpretation of null subjects in null subject languages (NSLs) and argue that they are not freely interchangeable with overt ones instead they are regarded emphatic. In a similar vein, we argue that a contrastive feature on the left periphery of AG non-finite clauses regulates the overtness of their subjects, while the actual Case feature is realised as accusative and not nominative because it is related to defective, non-finite T. We discuss some AG particles (ge, i) and we argue that they are a means of morphological focus marking that cannot co-exist with accusative infinitival subjects, because the latter are already focused. We furthermore argue that all AG clauses are CPs, and the evidence we use for that includes co-ordination of infinitives with finite clauses, the existence of adjunct infinitival clauses with overt complementizers, as well as the fact that AG infinitives denote mood distinctions. This last point is further supported with the existence of the declarative and final infinitives, the double negation system of AG that carries over to infinitives, the potential infinitive and the infinitive instead of an imperative. Finally we also give some evidence based on Binding theory and we argue that only pronouns and not anaphors can function as infinitival subjects since AG infinitives are CPs and therefore binding domains. In the last part of this chapter we outlined the difference between AcI and control infinitives: the former are strong phases C*Ps defined as such due to a contrastive feature on their C, which also licenses their subjects and are opaque for operations from the outside. Control infinitives on the other hand are CPs weak phases, with no discourse features on their left periphery and therefore transparent for operations like Agree to operate from outside, which subsequently leads to CAAC. Null infinitival subjects are distinguished through their Case properties: controlled null subjects are purely anaphoric PROs, which copy the Case of their controllers, while null accusative subjects are pros that are referential and arbitrary. Finally since CAAC is observed in both control and raising, we argue that both infinitives are weak phase CPs, whose difference lies on the semantics of the main predicates.

In Chapter 5 we discuss three other constructions and argue that their properties can also be accounted for in terms of their C discourse features and being two types of CPs. Latin infinitives also have the alternation between AcI and control, crucially though they also have control into finite clauses (ut/ne clauses) and what we
refer to as ‘vacuous’ Acl, which means obligatory insertion of a co-referential non-emphatic infinitival subject with some verb classes. The differences between AG and Latin can be attributed to differences on the discourse domain of their left peripheries. Secondly we discuss AG absolute participles, which surface predominantly in genitive with an agreeing subject. Given that an inherently Case-marked non-finite form does not necessarily license an overt subject (cf. Latin gerundial forms) we tentatively argue that the left periphery of absolute participial clauses plays a crucial role. Finally, we discuss Modern Greek na clauses, which exhibit the phenomenon of finite control in addition to also being independent embedded clauses. If seen in the context of a distinction between strong and weak phase CPs, we think that our proposal lends support to analyses that attribute the differences between the two types of na clauses, to their Cs.

In our final concluding chapter, we briefly discuss the implications of our analysis for Case theory and the notions of finiteness and obviation. Regarding the former we point out that AG data show that Case can also be linked to discourse features and not agreement features. Finally, we think that strong and weak phase Cs found in both the non-finite (AG infinitives) and finite domain (MG na clauses) shows that this is better viewed as a continuum instead of a dichotomy, with a variety of features (agreement, tense, mood as well as discourse features) playing a role into defining a form as finite or not.

0.2 Basic theoretical assumptions

The theoretical framework of our thesis is that of Minimalism as outlined in Chomsky, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2005, 2006 and related work. We will not give a general introduction on Minimalism here, instead we will only present the three notions that feature prominently in our theoretical chapter.

The central minimalist operation is Agree, defined as ‘a relation between two elements, α and β, where α has interpretable inflectional features and β has uninterpretable ones, which delete under Agree’ (Chomsky, 2001a: 3). In our work we will focus on one instance of this operation: namely Agree as Case matching, between an element α in the main clause and an element β within the infinitival clause. The situation that we describe has to do with control structures, where the null infinitival subject seems to copy the Case of its controller in the main clause. We
define this relation as Agree and we also have something to say regarding the locality of this operation.

For conceptual reasons that have to do with computational efficiency and memory, Chomsky has argued that the sentence is divided into two phases: vP and CP are supposed to be the derivational subarrays, the local domains where all operations apply. Additional evidence for characterising only vP and CP as phases has to do with their propositional character and their phonological independence. Crucially, there is a further distinction to be made, that between strong and weak phases, where the former are potential targets for movement and also have an EPP feature. So far, this has been argued to exist only in the v domain, where v* is the transitive vP with full argument structure and weak v is unaccusative and passive vP, which is defective in its argument structure. Although the full parallelism between C and v is desired, it has not been pursued fully. Given that v is the domain of the clause that is directly related to argument structure, it is logical that the difference between strong and weak phase v is directly linked to that. In our work we will argue that strong and weak phase C is also found, in both the finite and the non-finite domain. By C being the locus of discourse properties of a clause, we argue that the difference between strong and weak phase C relies on differences in their discourse properties. We will come back to all that in detail in Chapter 4.

In his latest work Chomsky entertains the idea that a phase is not defined in terms of a domain, but in terms of the properties of the phase-head, the latter being what is involved in selection, the label that drives all operations. The two phase heads (C and v*) enter the derivation with both edge and phi-features and transmit some of them to the heads they select. They must also have inheritance properties [C-T], [v*-V] to get the A vs. A’ distinction. This proposal has various consequences: firstly, T has no features by itself, secondly sometimes phi-features show up in C and finally, when T functions as if it has Agreement features, it is because they are transmitted by C. This means that infinitival C enters the derivation with all relevant features, a possibility that implies that edge and Case features can be related somehow. Again this is an idea that we will discuss properly and expand in Chapter 4.
Chapter 1: Infinitives and Control theory, then and now

1.1 Introduction
Infinitives have always posed a challenge to linguistic theory because they touch upon several difficult issues: first and foremost there are questions concerning the nature and the status of their null subjects, which have given rise to the entire debate concerning the Control module. There are two central questions regarding infinitival subjects in languages like English, firstly why they cannot be overt apart from some exceptional cases (like for example ECM (exceptional case-marking) verbs, cf. section 1.3) and secondly why, when they are null, they cannot have free reference but need to be either controlled or arbitrary instead. These constraints on the interpretation of the null infinitival subject have always been a matter of debate and despite a body of work on them there is still no fully satisfactory account. This chapter will serve as an introduction to Control theory from GB to Minimalism, and will also present the key analyses about overt infinitival subjects, namely the standard ECM analysis and Kayne’s (1984) for deletion analysis. This way we will present an overview of the theories that spell out clearly the core questions concerning infinitival syntax and we will see the data they have to account for, which are mainly taken from English.

This dissertation is about AG infinitives. Their main characteristic of these infinitives that one needs to keep in the back of one’s mind throughout this chapter are (a) that AG infinitives have an overt subject in generalized contexts and this subject surfaces in accusative case and (b) that the null infinitival subject agrees in case with its controller in the main clause (in cases of obligatory control) but it can also bear accusative case when it is arbitrary (or non-controlled\(^1\)). We therefore want to put these central questions of the thesis within the perspective of control theories and review their view of the character of the (null) infinitival subject. The null infinitival subject seems to have both pronominal and anaphoric properties and this raises the fundamental question of whether such a hybrid element can exist or whether it is better to view it as two distinct elements,

\(^1\) This is an instance of what we will argue is an accusative, referential *pro* as an infinitival subject, to which we will return later. For a detailed presentation of the data see chapter 2, section 2.4.6.
one anaphor and one pronoun (Bouchard, 1984). This latter view is supported by the Case facts of the AG data that we will present in Chapter 2.

At the end of the chapter we will also briefly discuss the standard accounts for overt infinitival subjects in English, namely ECM and Kayne’s for deletion analysis. We will do this for two reasons: firstly, because the first attempts to account for Accusativus cum Infinitivo (AcI) in Latin for example (which we will thoroughly discuss in Chapter 3), are ECM-type analyses and we need to introduce the reader to them. Moreover, a central characteristic of any attempt to account for overt infinitival subjects (in English) is to treat them as exceptional cases. Such approaches cannot be naturally extended to AG, where overt and null infinitival subjects are equally frequent and overt subjects are not found only with a particular, confined class of verbs.

There are several important issues with infinitives that we will leave out entirely, such as restructuring for example. Restructuring (cf. Burzio, 1986, Kayne, 1989, Rizzi, 1982, Roberts, 1997 and Wumbrand, 2003 among others) is the optional phenomenon with a closed class of verbs, where an infinitival complement clause seems to be part of the main verb’s complex, favouring a mono-clausal analysis of these constructions. There have been attempts to reduce obligatory control to restructuring, where there is no need for the postulation of the problematic category PRO since arguably restructuring infinitives do not have a distinct infinitival subject. The main reason that we will not go into the issue of restructuring is because main diagnostics for restructuring like clitic-climbing, cannot be replicated in AG, since AG does not have clitics in the relevant sense.

The organisation of this chapter is as follows: in the first section I will discuss Control theory in its various stages from early GB until now. I will start with standard GB and the PRO theorem (Chomsky, 1981) and the problems with his account. Then I will move on to attempts within the GB framework to deal with these problems. I will in turn discuss Manzini’s 1983 theory, Huang’s 1984 and 1989 theory, then the Null Case account of PRO (Chomsky and Lasnik, 1993) and finally Bouchard, 1984. Afterwards I will discuss more recent accounts within the Minimalist framework, most notably Manzini & Roussou, 2000, as well as the ongoing debate between Hornstein and Landau. In the last part of this section I will briefly review the syntax vs. semantics debate
concerning control, presenting arguments for the latter from Farkas, 1988 and Jackendoff & Culicover, 2001. In the second part of this chapter I will briefly present and discuss the standard ECM analysis as well as Kayne’s, 1984 alternative. The more specific accounts for overt infinitival subjects in Romance will be presented and discussed extensively in chapter 3, after we present the AG data in chapter 2.

1.2 Control theory

1.2.1 GB: the problem and the first insights

The central problem of Control is the position and the interpretation of the subject of infinitives in languages like English, which seems to be obligatorily null and controlled by an element in the main clause in most cases. Consider the following contrast:

(1) Plouto managed to play the song slowly

(2) * Plouto managed Christina to play the song slowly

In the above examples, the subject of the main verb and that of the infinitive need to refer to the same individual and when an object is inserted this leads to ungrammaticality (example 2). This phenomenon is called subject control, where the null infinitival subject is controlled by the subject of the main clause. The crucial thing here is that the subject of the infinitive cannot pick out another referent from the discourse, it refers obligatorily to the same entity the main subject refers to. There also exists object control (example 3 below), which is when the null infinitival subject is controlled by the object of the main verb:

(3) Christina persuaded Plouto to play the song slowly

What was initially observed about these examples is that the null subject cannot refer freely, the way null subjects of finite clauses in null subject languages do. So in trying to determine what kind of null element the infinitival null subject is, it seems that it is not the other null subject known in the literature, namely pro, but instead it seems like a different element, whose reference actually depends only on the subject or the object of the main verb and cannot be free. Subject and object control show the anaphoric
character of the infinitival subject. An instance of a non-anaphoric interpretation of the null infinitival subject is in cases like the following:

(4) It is a shame to play such a nice song fast.

In example (4) the subject of the infinitive ‘to play’ is null but it is not controlled by any argument of the main verb\(^2\). Instead it receives what is called an *arbitrary* interpretation, whereby it can be substituted by a generic type of subject. The infinitival subject in these cases has traditionally been called PRO\(_{arb}\) and it illustrates the pronominal character of the null infinitival subject. Crucially however, again the reference of the infinitival subject cannot be free, it cannot pick a random entity or somebody from the context, like overt and null (*pro*) pronouns can, it can only have a generic interpretation instead.

The reconciliation of these two interpretations of the null infinitival subjects, the controlled and the arbitrary one, with its two in a sense conflicting characteristics, the anaphoric and the pronominal one, has been the main incentive behind Control theory. What needed to be established initially was the status of this null element. First of all, contra other null elements, like *pro* for example, the null infinitival subject is in complementary distribution with overt DPs as exemplified by the difference in grammaticality of examples (1) and (2). This indicates the lack of optionality of these constructions: it’s not only that the infinitival subject can be null, it actually needs to be null for the sentences to be grammatical. Since there has been no known null element that is both (simultaneously) anaphoric and pronominal, the null infinitival subject was regarded as a new element, namely PRO. The properties of PRO with respect to Binding theory for example, had to be in accord with it being both anaphoric and pronominal. These two properties naturally led to a contradiction with respect to the distribution of PRO, that apparently had to be bound in its governing category according to principle A

\(^2\) This is even clearer in this example, since the main predicate does not have an argument capable of controlling the infinitival subject, with its subject being the expletive ‘it’ and its object the whole infinitival clause. There also exist examples with PRO\(_{arb}\) that do not have such a generic interpretation, like in the following case pointed out to me by Dora Alexopoulou (pc) ‘It is a shame to fail such good students’. Such examples can be accounted for by theories like Manzini’s, 1983 and Manzini & Roussou, 2000 as instances of null infinitival subject controlled by a null argument: ‘It is a shame (for us) to fail such good students’ or by an implicit benefactive: ‘it is good (for me/one) to swim’. The difference between these examples and (4) in the text is that in (4) there is not a possibility of reducing the infinitival subject to one controlled by a null agent, and therefore this example seems to argue for a true pronominal (arbitrary) null infinitival subject. We will go back to these issues when we discuss the theories in question.
of Binding theory (because it is an anaphor) and simultaneously it had to be free in its governing category according to principle B (because it is a pronoun). This contradiction was resolved with the introduction of the PRO theorem by Chomsky, 1981:

(5) PRO must be ungoverned

According to the PRO theorem, that PRO should be ungoverned meant that it has no governing category and it is therefore able to satisfy trivially both principles A and B. The way that this could be ensured was to claim that PRO has no governor and therefore no governing category. This way the apparently contradictory character of PRO could be reduced to the lack of governing category rather than to the dubious character of the element itself. This set of assumptions has consequences regarding the status of the infinitival clause, in order to ensure that the position of PRO is an ungoverned position. So, the infinitival clause is taken to be a CP with an empty C when there is a PRO subject. Null C is not a ‘proper governor’ because it is not a lexical head and only lexical heads can count as governors. As we will see shortly in cases of ECM, the infinitival clause is an IP and can take a lexical subject, governed and case-marked form the main verb. Naturally, PRO is banned from this position. Moreover, an infinitival clause with an overt complementizer like ‘for’, which counts as a governor, can also have an overt subject and PRO is again unavailable in this position.

Another characteristic of the position of the infinitival subject, related to the issue of government that we just discussed is that traditionally it is assumed that it has no Case available unless the infinitival clause (a) is selected by an ECM verb or (b) the infinitival subject is introduced with an overt complementizer like ‘for’ and therefore can be overtly realized. Consider the two following examples:

(6) Christina believes the song to be easy

(7) David prefers for Christina to cook dinner

In both these examples an overt infinitival subject is licensed and PRO is illicit in this environment:

(8) * Christina believes PRO to be easy
(9) * David prefer for PRO to cook dinner

The complementarity between PRO and overt DPs gives the impression that PRO is unlike other DPs, overt and null, in that it doesn’t need Case. Moreover, given that in GB case-assignment took place under government, the PRO theorem disallows even the possibility of PRO participating in any kind of canonical structural case-assignment. The data in (6) to (9) as well as the ones that show the anaphoric and pronominal character of PRO, seem to give contradicting evidence with respect to what is the relevant condition on the distribution of PRO: binding or case-theory. Examples (1) to (4) may indicate that PRO’s distribution relies on its properties as a pronominal anaphor, while examples (6) to (9) may show that PRO cannot appear in case-marked positions. By PRO being both a pronoun and an anaphor, binding principles could not otherwise be satisfied other by through the PRO theorem. And although in itself it is not a stipulation, its consequences are: according to it there is an element that neither has a governing category nor a governor. The existence of a category like PRO, from the inventory of null categories, although allegedly predicted due to its feature specification (+ pronoun, + anaphor), seems quite dubious. As we already said, what kind of an argument is this that doesn’t need Case? What kind of ‘pronoun’ is this that can only be arbitrary but never referential (unless when it is controlled)? What kind of ‘anaphor’ is this whose antecedent need not c-command it in order to bind it?

The proposals that we will discuss in the section that follows attempt to address in various ways within the GB framework the problems we just discussed, without dispensing of control theory. So, we will now turn to Manzini, 1983, Huang, 1984&1989 and that of Chomsky and Lasnik, 1993. Manzini seeks to reduce control to binding by

3 This example is ungrammatical in standard English, but acceptable in dialects like Irish for example. See Bouchard, 1984 and references therein.

4 Based on a system that employs the features +/- pronominal/anaphoric, the inventory of null categories is as follows: DP trace: +anaphoric, -pronominal, pro: -anaphoric, +pronominal, variable: -anaphoric, -pronominal and PRO: +anaphoric, +pronominal.

5 It is well-known that PRO can be controlled by an element that does not c-command it, if for example it is the subject of a gerund in an adjunct clause like in the following example: ‘Christina, had her brilliant idea, PRO, walking in Queen’s road’ Although we have not discussed gerunds at all already, we assume that their controlled subject is also PRO and a theory of control should be able to extend to cover them as well.
deriving the locality of Control and reinventing PRO as a purely anaphoric element. Huang on the other hand, seeks to combine pro and PRO into one element. Chomsky & Lasnik introduce the notion of Null Case as the ‘mechanism’ of licensing of PRO, rendering it on a par with other DPs with respect to its need for Case (and thus addressing criticism that pertained to that). All these accounts still regard (a) that PRO exists and (b) that it is one element contrary to Bouchard’s (1984) analysis that I will present next and that crucially argues that PRO is not one but two distinct elements that are already available in the theory, one pronoun and one anaphor and not a hybrid category that combines elements of both.

1.2.2 Saving PRO?

1.2.2.1 Control is Binding

Manzini’s theory essentially reduces Control to Binding. She argues that PRO is an anaphor, identical to a DP trace in the inventory of null elements. While this is a straightforward claim for the cases where PRO is controlled, it doesn’t seem too easy to support for some of the PROarb cases (cf. footnote 3). For the latter, Manzini argues that they can be reduced to Control by a null agent like in the following example:

(10) It is polite (for peoplei) PROi to eat with their mouth closed

Interesting as this proposal may seem for examples like the one above, it is not clear whether all instances of arbitrary PRO can be construed this way. For instance consider the following example:

(11) It is very unexpected PROarb to have a sunny day in November

In this example, the predicate ‘unexpected’ cannot take a ‘for’ phrase that would include the element that could bind the arbitrary PRO subject of the infinitival clause. Example (12) is therefore ungrammatical.

(12) *It is unexpected for usi PROi to have a sunny day in November

Not all predicates that allow for an infinitival clause with an arbitrary PRO subject can be argued to have a, sometimes null, benefactive for-PP that controls the interpretation of
the infinitival subject. This is why we think that Manzini’s account for non-controlled null infinitival subject cannot be maintained for all such cases.

Concerning the PRO theorem, Manzini argues that PRO is not a pronominal anaphor but an anaphor without a governing category instead. Using examples like the following she argues that it is a misconception the apparent complementary distribution of controlled and arbitrary PRO. In the following two examples the use of the anaphors *himself*/ *oneself* shows that the infinitival subject is controlled and arbitrary, respectively in the same environment.

(13) John asked how PRO <sub>arb</sub> to behave oneself
(14) John asked how PRO to behave himself

Examples like (13) and (14) show that the anaphoric and the (traditionally referred to as) pronominal variant of PRO, namely controlled and arbitrary PRO, are not (always) in complementary distribution. This set of data are especially supportive for Manzini’s theory, since if both instances of PRO are anaphoric, then there is no conflict in its use in the same environment. Such examples not only are not problematic but they are actually predicted by this theory: nothing should prevent the two anaphoric instances of PRO appearing in the same environment, on the contrary the opposite would have to be accounted for.

In order to reconcile the appearance of PRO in non-case marked positions, unlike other anaphors, Manzini has to stipulate the rule that empty anaphoric elements lack Case. Probably, the most important contribution of Manzini’s theory to the theory of Control however, is the introduction of domain governing category as a category where PRO, as an anaphor, should be bound. This is established via the notion of c-domain. Essentially, what this means is that PRO is always bound in the next clause upwards. This way the locality of Control follows from the status of PRO as an anaphor and no additional stipulation needs to be made.

Manzini’s theory tries to resolve the problems of Control theory through an attempt to simplify the nature of PRO: instead of viewing it as the hybrid anaphoric and pronominal category, she reinvents it as a purely anaphoric element whose distribution and interpretation are purely controlled by binding theory and by independent facts about
null anaphors. The locality of Control follows from its anaphoric status and it being bound in its domain governing category. Regardless of the shortcomings that we pointed out, especially concerning PRO as an anaphor bound by a null agent, Manzini’s theory is extremely insightful. Standard Control theory runs into the fundamental problem of defining PRO and in order to resolve this, it needs to invent this contradictory +anaphoric, +pronominal character. If PRO however is essentially like one of all other already known elements and the peculiarities in its distribution follow from independent factors, then Control theory can be reduced to the same principles of Binding and PRO is not a special category whose mere existence needs justification.

1.2.2.2. PRO is pro

Huang, 1984 &1989 is to a certain extent the mirror image of Manzini: if in her theory control is binding and all PROs are anaphors, for Huang PRO is like pro and as a null pronominal it needs identification and that is what yields the control effect. He argues for the generalized control theory, which determines the reference for both PRO and pro. The basic idea behind his theory lies in the claim that both elements have a general recoverability requirement but they satisfy it in two different ways: pro gets identified through finite Agr, while PRO does so through an antecedent DP. The generalized control rule that Huang argues for says that an empty pronominal is controlled in its control domain (if it has one) otherwise it refers freely and an empty pronominal in a complement clause is controlled in its control domain only if the matrix verb is a control verb. As a result of this, control is now regarded a ‘configurational’ matter and the role of the lexical properties of predicates is confined to whether they control obligatorily or non-obligatorily the subjects of their complement clauses. This point that Huang makes will be of importance in our later discussion about the debate as to whether control is syntactic or semantic. Huang’s theory receives further support from control into adjuncts (cf. example 33 in a later section), which ‘obviously has nothing to do with the lexical properties of main verbs but must be accounted for by reference to their structure’.

Both Manzini’s and Huang’s theories recognise only three null elements instead of four and neither accepts the PRO theorem. The main difference between them as we said in the beginning is that while Manzini argues for a generalized theory of
binding, Huang argues for a generalized theory of control, eliminating the difference between \textit{pro} and PRO. While Manzini has to stipulate that case is incompatible with anaphoric PRO, this assumption is not necessary here: PRO is identified through control by an antecedent DP and can arguably copy its Case. This is a very welcome assumption for the AG data that we will discuss in the next chapter.

\subsection*{1.2.2.3 Null Case}

The next alternative to standard Control theory that we will discuss is that of Chomsky and Lasnik, 1993 (C&L, henceforth). Their objective is to try to put PRO on a par with other arguments on the basis of Case theory. Recall that under standard assumptions PRO is the only element (along with DP trace) that does not need Case. This is another assumption that renders Control theory problematic. C&L therefore argue that PRO needs (and has) Case as much as any other argument, only that it has a special Case, available only for PRO, namely Null Case\textsuperscript{6}.

According to the Visibility Condition, Case makes an argument visible for theta marking. Therefore PRO, like any other argument needs Case, especially because the fact that it has a theta role, which is distinct from that of the main subject has been a very important argument for its existence\textsuperscript{7}. The first thing C&L do is to re-establish the dissociation of Control theory from binding. In order to do that, they discuss data like the following:

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(15)] John tries himself to be clever
\item[(16)] John tries PRO to be clever
\item[(17)] John injured himself
\item[(18)] * John injured PRO
\end{enumerate}

They argue that controlled PRO and anaphors can have similar distribution based on examples like (15) and (16). However the fact that PRO is disallowed in the standard environment of anaphors, like in example (18), shows that the distribution of controlled

\textsuperscript{6} For updated versions of the null case theory of PRO within Minimalism see Martin, 1992/2000 and Boscovic, 1997.

\textsuperscript{7} The main difference between Raising and Control, is that there are two theta roles involved in the latter (one for the main subject and one for PRO) and one in the former. This intuition is captured by assuming that in raising construction, the main clause subject has moved from the infinitival subject position while in control there are two distinct subjects, with two distinct theta roles, only the infinitival one being null.
PRO and anaphors is complementary rather than identical. Having established that, they move on to associate PRO’s lack of case with its position.

The argument goes like this: PRO is the minimal DP argument that lacks independent phonetic, referential and other properties. Accordingly it could be the sole DP that bears ‘minimal’ Case that could be visualised as Null Case. If all Case licensing is the realisation of Spec-head relation between an inflectional head and the element that fills its specifier position, then Null Case can be licensed in the specifier position of the non-finite (T) head, which lacks tense and agreement features. In C&L’s words: ‘the minimal Infl checks null Case and the minimal NP alone can bear it.’

The main advantage of this proposal is that PRO is not regarded an ‘exceptional’ argument anymore: it bears Case like any argument, only it is a different Case. This proposal however predicts that PRO and an overt DP can never occupy the same position. Although this is true for English infinitives (but not gerunds), it is not true for infinitives in European Portuguese and Ancient Greek. We will discuss this issue in great detail later, after we present the AG data, since this is the focus of this thesis. The crucial part of this proposal however is that non-finite T (Infl) can also have case-licensing properties like finite T. This way infinitival clauses are on a par with finite clauses with respect to their case-licensing properties, their differences lying on the different content of the T heads and consequently the different value of their Case feature. This point will be relevant later when we present our analysis of the Case-licensing of the subjects of AG infinitives.

1.2.2.4 There is no PRO (first attempt)

The final proposal within GB assumptions that we will discuss here is that of Bouchard, 1984. The main point of this proposal is that PRO is not an element that combines simultaneously both anaphoric and pronominal characteristics but it is two distinct yet already known elements in distinct environments: an anaphor and a pronoun. The more general point that Bouchard wishes to make is that no principles of grammar should refer specifically to empty categories (ECs), like for example the PRO theorem, instead rules can only refer to categories like N or NP. This way there is no more Control theory, with all the problems it carries with it and the distribution and interpretation of PRO will be
dealt with solely within Binding theory (in a different way than that by Manzini, 1983 as we will see). Locally controlled PROs are bound anaphors, while long-distance controlled PROs and arbitrary PROs are pronouns that freely refer. Null subjects of infinitives therefore receive a non-uniform treatment within his theory and there are no empty categories that have no overt counterpart, as there never was a stipulation of a *pronominal anaphor* like PRO.

In order to argue for all this, Bouchard initially argues that the assumptions of the PRO theorem do not follow: the fact that PRO needs to be ungoverned does not necessarily mean that it has no governing category. His approach wishes to argue against government (or the lack thereof) being the appropriate notion to account for PRO’s distribution: instead he argues that PRO is possible in the position of infinitival subject when case is not assigned in this position. Bouchard argues that the notion of government used, which is the one put forward by Aoun & Sportiche (1983), is a different one than that used for subcategorization and actually wider than that. This PRO-driven notion of government is neither intuitive nor economical, since it cannot be subsumed under the already existing one. Moreover, if binding theory need not account for the category of a pronominal anaphor it could have used this simpler notion of government as well as the notion of binding category instead of governing category, which is used only for PRO complicating the theory.

The main body of the data that Bouchard bases his argumentation on are cases where there appears to be dissociation of case from government. We will only mention one case here, because it will become very relevant when we see the AG data in the following chapter. In Russian adjectives that participate in secondary predication structures can either agree with the subject or they receive the default instrumental case (Bouchard, 1984: 189, ex. 84):

(19) Ivan vernulsja ugrjumyj/ugrjumym
    Ivan-nom returned gloomy-nom/Instr

These secondary predicates can also be inside infinitival clauses and the case patterns that are exhibited differ with respect to whether the infinitival subject is subject or object controlled and whether the infinitive has a lexical C. The distinction that Bouchard makes
in order to account for this, is that there are two types of control, grammatical and anaphoric control, where the latter does not involve full agreement between PRO and its controller. He also makes a link with quirky case marking and he predicts that this ‘special’ case agreement with PRO will only take place at a language that allows quirky case marking at LF. AG exhibits a similar phenomenon that we will discuss in detail in the following chapter.

Bouchard’s proposal is conceptually elegant, by simplifying grammar and eliminating control theory overall. Theory internal notions, with PRO being a pronominal anaphor are dispensed with and it uses only elements that are already available in the grammar (anaphors and pronouns) and independently motivated. However, there are two problems that this analysis runs against: firstly it is the issue that in some environments as we already saw (cf. examples 13 & 14) controlled and arbitrary PRO are not in complementary distribution as an anaphor and a pronoun in principle are. This would lead to a complication of his proposal in ways that are not clear to us, since it predicts total complementarity between the anaphoric and the pronominal null infinitival subject and it would run into great difficulty to account for a different situation.

The second problem has to do with the interpretations that are normally available with pronouns that are not available with arbitrary PRO. The null pronominal element that functions as a subject in null subject languages, namely pro, has both an arbitrary and a referential variant. Consider the following examples from Modern Greek:

(20) pro Se piran telefono
    you-acc took-3 pl telephone
    ‘Someone called you’

(21) pro Kateveno kato
    Come-1 sg down
    ‘I am coming down’

Pro, as we can see here has a generic/arbitrary interpretation in example (20), where it does not refer to someone in particular but to ‘people’ in general while in example (21) pro is referential and it refers to the speaker. As an empty pronoun it has both these
interpretations as it should. If arbitrary PRO is a null pronoun, like *pro*, then that too should have these two interpretations available. As we know however, it doesn’t and it only has the arbitrary one. In Control theory the reason for this was straightforward: PRO was not a canonical pronoun. Under this theory however it is difficult to see why a pronoun is not free to pick out any referent it wants from the general context. This discussion will become relevant in the following chapter when we present the AG data that seem to argue in favour of a referential null infinitival subject. What is crucial at the moment however is the fact that, as it stands, Bouchard’s theory runs into this problem about the apparently limited reference of arbitrary, pronominal PRO.

1.2.3 State of affairs so far

With Bouchard’s theory we conclude the presentation of some influential theories within GB assumptions. Before we move on to discuss the most important minimalist theories, we will sum up the situation so far. Initially, the null subject of infinitival clauses was described as a *pronominal anaphor*, whose distribution was predicted by the PRO theorem that stated that PRO needs to be ungoverned and has no governing category. The theory internal flavour of the control module gave rise to various attempts to refine or radically alter it. Here we presented Manzini, 1983, who argued that the distribution of PRO can be accounted for solely through binding theory and Huang, 1984 & 1989 who argued for a theory of generalised control to account both for the distribution of *pro* and PRO. Then we discussed Chomsky & Lasnik, 1993 and Bouchard, 1984 who both related the distribution of PRO to the case theory: C&L argue that PRO uniquely bears null case that is assigned by non-finite T, while Bouchard argues that PRO does not exist as a uniform category but it can be a null anaphor and a null pronoun in different environments and PRO can be found in environments with no case available.

In the section on Minimalism that follows we will focus on the debate between a theory that sticks to Control and the existence of PRO (Landau, 2000) and to theories that seek to reduce Control to movement (Hornstein, 1999) or attraction of features (Manzini & Roussou, 2000).
1.2.4  Control in Minimalism

1.2.4.1 Landau, 2000: PRO exists!

Landau’s most important contribution is its very detailed presentation of the empirical facts related to control. More importantly he is the first to point out that apart from the well-known distinction between Obligatory Control (OC) and Non-obligatory Control (NOC) there are further more fine-grained distinctions to be made. He identifies Exhaustive and Partial Control (EC and PC respectively) as parts of OC and Long-distance (LD) and Arbitrary Control as parts of NOC. Let us go through the data that exemplify these distinctions.

(22) Christina managed PRO to finish the section on time (EC)
(23) Plouto preferred PRO to rehearse at 4 (PC)
(24) John said that making a fool of himself/herself in public disturbed Sue (LD)
(from Landau, 2000: ex. 4a/b p. 94)
(25) It would ruin this song, PRO to play it fast (Arb)

Examples (22) and (23) are both the familiar OC construction but the main observation offered by Landau is that in (23) although Control is actually obligatory the reference of PRO is not identical to its antecedent but it also potentially includes somebody else. So in a context where Plouto and Christina discuss when to rehearse together for the concert, the null infinitival subject in example (23) refers to both of them and not only to the former, which is the subject of the main clause, its syntactic antecedent, which is what is predicted by a standard view on OC. This case where OC does not imply complete identity of PRO and its controller, is quite surprising for standard assumptions on Control and it could not easily be accommodated in older versions of the theory. In order to capture these two variants of OC Landau argues for two different control mechanisms in each of them: (standard) control of PRO in EC and binding of Agr in PC. For the latter he essentially follows Borer’s, 1989 analysis about anaphoric Agr in control complements. He therefore introduces the PC generalization:
(26) The PC generalisation

In tensed complements, PRO inherits all phi-features from the controller, including semantic plurality, but not necessarily semantic singularity.

The idea behind these two distinct ways to get OC is that in the PC case an element needs to be inserted to mediate control that would be ‘unspecified for semantic plurality and that feature will not be matched on PRO’. This element is Agr and therefore control in PC is reduced to binding of Agr by a functional head (possibly T) in the main clause. Following Pesetsky & Torrego, 2000, Landau assumes that in tensed clauses T is moved to C and the Agr feature on T comes along as a free rider. From there it can be bound by an element in the main clause, namely main T, yielding the desired control effect. EC clauses on the contrary, involve standard control of PRO by its antecedent in the main clause, which also involves an Agree-type operation, this time between PRO and its antecedent without the mediation of Agr. A crucial assumption is that what differentiates EC from PC infinitival complements is that the latter but not the former are tensed. This is illustrated with data like the following (taken from Landau, 2000: examples 11 a/b, p. 6):

(27) *Yesterday, John managed to solve the problem tomorrow (EC)

(28) Yesterday, John wanted to solve the problem tomorrow (PC)

Example (27), which is an instance of EC, cannot appear with an adverb that is not temporally compatible with the one in the main clause. This illustrates that the tense of the infinitival clause is entirely dependent on that of the main verb. In (28) though, which is a PC infinitive, the infinitive can take the future adverb and therefore refer to the future although the main verb refers in the past and has the adverb ‘yesterday’. To sum up the discussion on OC, Landau’s theory argues for a distinction between EC and PC complements based on their tense specification. Control in EC is standard control of PRO (by an argument of the main clause) while in PC it is binding of Agr in the spirit of Borer, 1989.

Landau redefines the nature of PRO in NOC. Recall that in GB the alternative for arbitrary control was that PRO in those cases was either a pronoun (Bouchard, 1984)
or bound by a null agent (Manzini, 1983). In his theory, NOC is broken down into two components, LD and arbitrary, and PRO is regarded a different element in each of these cases. In LD cases, which effectively are the well-known Super-Equi constructions, PRO is considered a logophor in the sense of Reinhart & Reuland, 1993. In the cases of arbitrary control, PRO is considered to be bound by a generic (null) operator (also argued by Manzini & Roussou, 2000 that we will discuss shortly). This way, the nature of PRO remains coherent, unified and homogeneous in a sense, but still the differences in its character in each construction are preserved. So, PRO is effectively anaphoric in all its instances and the differences in its interpretation follow from the elements that control it in each case: in OC PRO is purely anaphoric, controlled syntactically by an antecedent, in LD PRO is a logophor bound in the context by discourse factors like focus for example and in cases of arbitrary control PRO is bound by a generic operator.

One thing that Landau does not explicitly discuss is the relation between PRO and Case. He obviously does not subscribe to a null Case theory of PRO\textsuperscript{8}, since he does not need it: licensing of PRO happens through syntactic control and any resort to a theory of null Case would be superfluous. He moreover does not discuss the possible Case licensing properties of non-finite T, which he argues exist at least in PC complements and whether his theory would predict different Case patterns in EC and PC complements because of that. His analysis predicts that PRO will bear “whatever Case is assigned/checked by T”, without discussing any possible differences of case-licensing when T is absent syntactically or semantically inert that would imply lack of Case licensing properties. Concerning PRO and Case-concord Landau claims that his analysis does not disallow it (it just doesn’t require it): on the contrary it could be viewed as an instantiation of the possibility that PRO and its controller may form an anaphoric chain. The problem for any kind of theory that accepts a Case-marked PRO (not with null Case) is that it would need to get into some discussion concerning a redefinition of the nature of PRO, since Case licensing happens under government and this is explicitly disallowed under the PRO theorem. Landau carefully avoids any discussion about it, particularly when he takes it to be PRO in the classical sense e.g. in the OC cases: he adopts it fully as it is and he doesn’t engage into any kind of discussion about redefining its characteristics.

\textsuperscript{8} As a matter of fact he explicitly argues against a variant of such an approach in the face of Martin, 1996.
Therefore Landau has a good theory of the interpretation of PRO but not one for its distribution. To sum up this discussion, I will insert a table with his typology on different types of Control and the type of PRO involved in each of them:

(28) The typology of Control (Landau, 2000):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Exhaustive – EC (ex. 22) (Tenseless infinitives)</th>
<th>PRO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obligatory-OC</td>
<td>Partial –PC (ex. 23) (Tensed infinitives)</td>
<td>Control of Anaphoric Agr (C-T on C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(VP-internal infinitives)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-obligatory – NOC (VP-external infinitives)</td>
<td>Long-distance – LD (ex. 24)</td>
<td>PRO is a logophor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arbitrary (ex. 25)</td>
<td>PRO is bound by a generic operator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before we move on to the next section we would like to say one last word about Landau’s subsequent work and his theory of the calculus of control, Landau, 2004 & 2005. In this work Landau wants to extend his proposal for control in infinitives to the phenomenon of finite control, found in the Balkan languages and Hebrew. In finite control, what arguably happens is that subjects of finite (subjunctive) clauses can be obligatorily controlled by some main verbs (mainly in the absence of infinitives in the language). We will discuss these issues extensively at the end of this thesis, in Chapter 5, where we deal with Modern Greek non clauses that prototypically exhibit this phenomenon. What suffices to say at this point, so that we don’t lose focus of our main issue in this chapter, namely ‘traditional’ control theory, is that Landau’s proposal relies
on the existence of +/- T/Agr features that exist both on T and C of the embedded clauses and allow or disallow control from the matrix predicate. According to his theory the finiteness of the embedded clause is not a decisive factor on whether it can be controlled, since a finite clause can have a feature specification on its C and T that allows control of its subject, as is the case in Balkan subjunctives that are further split into controlled and free subjunctives, the C specification on the former being [-T] essentially allowing for the phenomenon of finite control. The most important message of this theory is that it is again (as in earlier more traditional work on finiteness) the joint effect of T and Agr features on both T and C that can explain the attested typology of finite and infinitival, controlled and non-controlled clauses.

1.2.4.2 There is no PRO (second attempt): control is movement

Hornstein, 1999 seeks to reduce control to movement: his main claim is that PRO does not exist and what is standardly referred to as (controlled) PRO is a DP trace, while arbitrary PRO is an empty pronoun (pro). This theory regards (obligatory) Control as identical to Raising and therefore needs to account for the differences in theta role assignment between the two types of predicates. Recall that the major motive behind differentiating Control from Raising (initially due to Rosenbaum, 1967) is the fact that in the former (but not in the latter) there seems to be a theta role associated with the main subject and a distinct, second theta role associated with the infinitival predicate that the controlled null element (PRO), the subject of the infinitive bears. In Raising however, the main verb has no external theta role contrary to the infinitival predicate and the construction is regarded a result of movement of the infinitival subject to the position of the main subject. This is illustrated in the following examples:

(29) Ploutōi promised PROi to play the song in the concert (Control)

(30) Christinai is likely ti to sing in the concert (Raising)

In example (29) “Plouto” would need to bear two distinct theta roles, one associated with the predicate “promise” and one with “play” and in order to avoid problems with the theta-criterion this is captured via the existence of a subject-controlled PRO as the infinitival subject. In example (30) “Christina” bears only one theta role, that of the
infinitival predicate “play” because the main predicate “is likely” has no external theta-role and the construction is the result of movement, subject-to-subject raising, conventionally illustrated here with the use of a trace (t).

The insight that raising and control predicates differ with respect to their thematic differences cannot be maintained under Hornstein’s analysis (or at least not in this form) and some additional assumptions need to be made. Primarily as we already said what has pushed into this direction of an analysis for Raising and Control has been the standard definition of the theta criterion in Chomsky, 1981 according to which “each DP can bear one and only one theta role and each predicate can assign one and only one theta role”. In order to reconcile Control with a movement analysis equivalent to raising, Hornstein abandons at least the first part of the theta criterion and he argues that “there is no upper bound on the number of theta roles a chain can have”. Such a radical assumption that has been implicitly present in various other works such as Chomsky, 1986, would need systematic scrutiny, since it constitutes a rather major departure from mainstream theory.

There are certain things such as the locality of control, which follow rather nicely from Hornstein’s theory: if control is reduced to A-movement, the strictly local character of the relation between PRO and its antecedent follows. Moreover, treating OC PRO as a residue of movement derives the prohibition against split antecedents. Additionally the null phonetic status of PRO also follows: if it is the same as a DP trace, one does not need to explain why there is no overt counterpart of it. This point could be viewed differently as well, since such an account would predict structures where the alleged “moved” subject stays in situ analogous to the “unraised” version of raising verbs (example 30) with an expletive subject. In other words if PRO is a DP trace then why don’t we ever see a sentence like (31) in languages like English?

(31) * It wants John to leave (instead of John wants to leave)
(32)  It is likely that John will leave (instead of John is likely to leave)

The ungrammaticality of (31) can be attributed to the thematic grid of the predicate “want” that has an external theta-role, contrary to the raising predicates ‘be likely’. ‘Want’ requires an animate (experiencer) subject and its theta role would be left
unassigned in a construction with an expletive subject. Under this approach, raising and control are still distinguished by their theta specifications, and more accurately by the amount of theta roles associated with each of them. The relevant difference between them in Hornstein’s terms would be that the chain associated with a raising predicate bears only one theta role while the chain associated with a control predicate bears two theta roles.

An apparent problem for Hornstein’s analysis is control into adjuncts, which is a very common type of Control. Consider the following example:

(33) Pluto; can row well without PRO; training too hard

Hornstein’s analysis would have to assume that “Pluto” is generated within the adjunct gerundive clause and from there it is moved to the position of the main subject, something that is not standardly accepted as licit. The way to get out of such a seemingly problematic position, is to follow Nunes (1995) theory of “sideways movement” whereby movement out of an adjunct is licit. Nunes’s theory allows movement out of an adjunct, where an element in one subtree is re-merged into a position in another unconnected subtree to a non c-commanding position under certain conditions. Hornstein adopts his proposal and reconciles his movement analysis with control into adjuncts.

For NOC (and long-distance control) Hornstein assumes that the null infinitival subject is pro. He essentially argues that NOC obtains when movement is prohibited, as for example with subject infinitives. Therefore he adopts Bouchard’s insight claiming that the infinitival subject is fundamentally different in control and arbitrary environments, being an anaphoric element (DP trace) in the former and a pronominal element (pro) in the latter. The problem his analysis faces is twofold. Firstly, English is not a null subject language and pro does not exist elsewhere. Therefore something more needs to be said about what allows pro in the position of non-controlled infinitivals, what regulates its distribution and what disallows it in the subject position of finite clauses in English. Moreover, as we pointed out in the Bouchard section as well, a pronoun and even more an empty pro subject can have both an arbitrary/generic and a

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9 I thank Ian Roberts for making this point to me.
referential reading. This *pro* however seems to have only the former and not the latter. It is unclear to us how this is possible and why a pronoun cannot refer freely to an element in the discourse but it can only be arbitrary instead.

Finally we will discuss two problems that Hornstein’s theory runs into, both of which illustrate the same general point about control being possible in environments where movement is not. The first one is control into gerunds, as seen in the following examples:

(34) John remembered [PRO posting the letter]
(35) John remembered [Bill posting the letter]
(36) *Bill i was remembered [ t; posting the letter]

If control is movement, then one cannot explain why although we observe control into gerunds (34), movement out of it is banned (36). The second problem was pointed out by Landau, 2003 and is the existence of partial control (PC). Recall that in PC, the (controlled) subject of the infinitive is not identical to that of the main clause and this for Landau is captured in terms of binding of Agreement and not PRO itself. If control is movement however then no other relation can be established between the moved category and its trace other than *full* identity, since the very concept of partial movement is irrational. To this Hornstein, 2003 answers that in PC the extra individual reading (for the infinitival subject) arises as an instance of adjunction of a comitative at LF. Hornstein & Boeckx, 2004 provide a different answer to this same point by claiming that PC is a property of few verbs and not generally a property of control that needs to be accounted for as such. We think that these replies do not really address the point: PC is indeed a property of Control and it needs to be addressed as such and not as an exceptional property, a lexical peculiarity of certain predicates.

1.2.4.3 There is no PRO (third attempt): control is attraction

Manzini & Roussou, 2000 (M&R henceforth) propose a way to eliminate PRO from the inventory of empty categories that is related to that of Hornstein’s in the sense that this too is an attempt to reduce control to a configurational relation between two elements (‘controller’ and ‘PRO’) that resembles a chain. The main point of M&R’s theory is that
DPs are merged in the positions where they surface in and from there they attract features of the predicate they are arguments of. This analysis is the mirror image of Hornstein’s in a sense: while for Hornstein control is reduced to movement (with Raising of the DP from the subject position of the infinitive to the subject position of the main verb) for M&R obligatory control is “the special case of the same DP attracting features of more than one predicate”. Arbitrary control on the other hand is the attraction of the predicate by an operator in C. An essential assumption they have to make is that A-movement does not exist at all and they argue for this based on lack of reconstruction effects with A-movement (but see for example Burzio, 1986) and on the lack of blocking effects on PF rules with it. In their theory A-movement is reduced to identity of features, controlled ‘PRO’ is also captured as such and there is no such thing as A (DP) traces.

The natural question for this approach is again, how it treats the theta criterion. For M&R theta roles are features and a theta feature is an interpretable feature on V, attracted by the interpretable D feature of the DP. Their version of the theta criterion involves scopal last resort and the minimal link condition (MLC) combined. The relevant principle is the following:

\[(37) \quad F \text{ attracts all and only the } F_A \text{'s that are in its scope.}\]

Within their theory control and raising differ only by the nature of the predicate involved: the former being associated with a predicate that attracts more than one theta feature while the latter associated with a predicate with one theta feature. This is another similarity with Hornstein’s theory, where raising and control predicates differ only with respect to the amount of theta roles associated with them.

For M&R, like Landau, the difference between OC and NOC (and consequently controlled and arbitrary PRO) lies in the different temporal properties of the infinitival clause in question. In their theory, the C position and operators hosted there play a crucial role in the interpretation of infinitival clauses and the interpretation of non-lexicalised arguments also varies in accordance with the temporal context. Their idea is that “the operator in C attracts Tense exactly as it attracts the lexical predicate. Therefore the generic operator in C determines a generic interpretation both for the non-lexicalised argument and for Tense.” This of course is reminiscent of Landau’s analysis for EC and
PC where the former is an instance of control of PRO while in the latter control is mediated through Agr in C. In M&R’s theory, the C position of control complements does not have any operators that might block attraction of the embedded predicate by a DP in the main clause or by finite C and this is why control as opposed to an arbitrary interpretation of the infinitival subject is actually possible in these cases. The absence of blocking effects can therefore be connected to the absence of temporal properties of these infinitives.

Arbitrary control obtains when the predicate is not associated with a lexical DP in which case it can be interpreted as having a specific rather than a generic argument given the appropriate context. Arbitrary PRO therefore surfaces only when there is no DP argument in the clause that immediately contains it. For M&R PRO<sub>arb</sub> has a logophoric character that follows from it being licensed by an operator in C rather than by a DP. In order to account for the necessary +human interpretation of arbitrary PRO, they postulate that when an operator (as opposed to a DP) attracts a predicate, this leads to the logophoric reading of the argument with the obligatory +human reading. The structural difference between OC and NOC depends on whether the closest attractor is a DP argument (as for adjuncts) or C (as for subjects).

The empirical challenges of M&R’s theory do not involve control into adjuncts or into gerunds: contrary to a movement reductionist theory, it is conceivable to formulate rules on attract that allow it to operate in these environments. What is still difficult to account for in their theory is partial control:

(38) Plouto<sub>i</sub> preferred [ PRO<sub>i+1</sub> to rehearse at 4]

If the interpretation of PRO relies on its features being attracted by the main clause subject, it means that it can only be identical to it and it is not clear how it can receive an interpretation involving also another individual.

1.2.4.4 Interim Conclusion on Control in Minimalism
Within Minimalism, one type of approach to Control theory had to do with the familiar tactic of eliminating Control module from the theory, by reducing it either to Movement (Hornstein) or Attraction of features (Manzini &Roussou). These approaches run into the
theoretical (cf. theta criterion) and empirical (cf. PC) problems that we discussed. The other type of analysis has to do with a more traditional approach to Control whereby PRO exists (even somewhat still undefined) and the way to tackle the familiar problems is by getting the more refined distinctions we saw in table (28). Prima facie, Landau’s theory seems superior mainly due to its empirical adequacy, although it will run into problems when faced with the AG data we will present in Chapter 2.

1.3 Interlude: the syntax vs. semantics debate

Before we leave null infinitival subjects and control theory, we want to briefly discuss the long-standing theoretical debate of whether control is a theory that is better understood in terms of syntax or semantics. The main point of disagreement revolves around the question of controller choice: whether a verb is subject or object control can be accounted through lexical semantics or syntactic principles such as the minimal distance principle of Rosenbaum, 1967. This question may not be extremely relevant for us in the context of the aforementioned theories, since what syntax is mainly interested in is what is the exact relationship between the null infinitival subject and its antecedent (whichever that is) and whether this relationship being obligatory affects the nature and the interpretation of the infinitival subject. If one adopts Hornstein or M&R however, the locality of control comes for free: the null infinitival subject can only be controlled by a c-commanding element because this is the requirement if the relationship between these two elements is one of movement or attraction. Jackendoff & Culicover, 2001 (J&C henceforth0 challenge these theories (especially Hornstein’s) with some verbs that have more than one possible controllers and the choice between them happens with semantic (lexical) and not syntactic criteria. The Minimal distance principle (MDP) proposed in Rosenbaum, 1967 wants to capture the fact that intransitive verbs are subject control, while transitive ones are object control. The clear generalisation that emerges roughly is that the null infinitival subject is controlled by the element in the main clause that is closest to it. The notable exception to this theory is the verb ‘promise’, which, although transitive, is subject control.

(39) Manolis promised Christina [ PRO; to come to the movies tonight]
This verb is treated exceptionally in most syntactic theories of controller choice. J&C argue however that in OC the controller is determined by the thematic properties of the verb selecting the infinitive and grammatical functions like subject or object do not play much role. The element that always controls is that which bears the thematic role of source, and is not determined by its syntactic position. J&C provide an interesting argument against a movement account for control, with examples like the following (J&C, 2001: ex 25a):

(40) A furtive attempt PRO to leave would be a good idea now

This is an instance of OC inside a nominal, where there is no overt controller of PRO. In such examples the lack of overt controller provides no target for movement and is thus an argument against Hornstein. Farkas, 1988 also argues for a semantic account for controller choice but not one that depends on theta roles. Instead she argues that the controller in OC constructions is determined in terms of a responsibility, [RESP] relation: according to her a controller always has some sense of intention, which is not always captured in terms of a theta role like agent or source.

This kind of theory provides some important insight in control theory. It is difficult to decide between them and a purely syntactic account, because one would need specific data. In Chapter 4 however, we will discuss some AG data that may provide some evidence in favour of a more syntactic view of control. As we said in the beginning of this section however, we are more interested in how the relation between controller and PRO is established and it is on this that we focus.

1.4 Overt infinitival subjects in English

1.4.1 ECM

As we have already discussed, infinitives in English do not usually have overt subjects. The two examples that follow are the notable exceptions to this generalisation.

(41) Rita believes Frida Kahlo to be a great artist
(42) Christina wants for Rita to be happy
Example (42) can receive a fairly straightforward account on the basis of the existence of the complementizer *for* that seems to be responsible for the existence of the overt infinitival subject and also its Case marking (Chomsky, 1981). Example (41) on the other hand has been puzzling for the theory and has been treated in an exceptional manner.

The most striking thing about verbs like *believe* that alluded to their exceptional nature is that although the subject of the infinitival clause they subcategorise for seems to be thematically related to the infinitival verb, it also seems to function simultaneously as an object of the main verb, getting its accusative Case from it. This is illustrated if a pronoun is used instead of a full DP in this position.

(43) Rita believes her/*she to be a great artist

Moreover, if the main verb is passivised, the subject of the infinitive, acting like a canonical direct object of the main verb is turned into its subject. Therefore, the passive equivalent of (43) is (44):

(44) Frida Kahlo is believed to be a great artist

These data were thought to argue for an analysis whereby a main verb like *believe* is able to exceptionally Case-mark the subject of the infinitival clause that it has as a complement. *Believe* is therefore considered to be a member of the class of ECM (exceptionally case marking) verbs that tolerate overt infinitival subjects due to their special lexical properties and can case mark DPs that are not their direct objects.

The exact mechanism under which ECM takes place can be one of the following: ECM verbs may have a lexical property that allows them to trigger CP-reduction by deleting the ‘C’ position of their CP infinitival complements in order for them to be transparent to government (and consequently case-marking) from outside. Another alternative is that ECM verbs have a double subcategorisation frame: they can select either a CP or an IP/TP. This would explain the existence of sentences like the following (in addition to (41)), where an ECM verb takes a finite complement clause with an overt complementizer:

(45) Rita believes that Frida Kahlo is a great artist
In example (41) above, \textit{believe} is considered to take an IP complement, and this gives it the ability to govern and exceptionally Case mark the infinitival subject whereas in example (45) \textit{believe} takes a CP complement that is able to tolerate its own overt subject without any complications for the theory. Finally there is also the possibility of ECM being reduced to a raising-to-object analysis, whereby the infinitival subject is generated inside the infinitival clause, where it receives its theta role from the infinitival verb and then moves to the position of the object of the main verb, where it receives accusative Case. This is clearly possible only if (by some of the aforementioned ways) the infinitival clause is not a CP and can allow for the infinitival subject to raise out of it.

Analyses like ECM, in order to account for overt infinitival subjects, essentially stipulate a certain lexical property for a class of verbs in order to account for their syntactic behaviour. It is also very clearly an English-driven analysis, which, exactly because it treats this phenomenon as exceptional (as it is indeed in English), cannot be easily extended to account for other languages that have overt infinitival subjects in a more generalised way or with a larger (or different) class of verbs. Kayne’s, 1984 alternative to the ECM analysis stemming from the cross-linguistic comparison of English and French is a less stipulative more viable alternative to which we turn next.

1.4.2 For-deletion
Kayne’s original \textit{for}-deletion analysis was essentially intended to discuss the properties of prepositional complementizers in English and French. The main thing he wants to account for is why there is no equivalent of ECM in French\textsuperscript{10} as the following examples show:

\begin{align*}
(46) & \quad \text{Christina believes Suede to have been a great band} \\
(47) & \quad \text{*Christine croit Suede (d’) avoir été une groupe super}
\end{align*}

In order to do that he initially establishes the status of “\textit{de}” as a complementizer, equivalent of English “\textit{for}” and not as an I element. His arguments are based on the distribution of “\textit{de}” its co-occurrence with other elements that are in C, like wh-elements

\textsuperscript{10} Kayne’s analysis makes a very interesting point about the unavailability of preposition stranding in French as opposed to English and its relation to ECM. We will not present this part of the paper here at all however since it is not relevant to our principal discussion.
and on its interaction in word order with negation among others. However there are two important differences between French “de” and English “for” as demonstrated by the following examples taken from Kayne, 1983: p. 109 (his examples 56-59).

(48) *Ce serait dommage de quelque chose lui arriver
(49) It would be a pity for something to happen to him
(50) Ce serait dommage de partir maintenant
(51) *It would be a pity for to leave now

Firstly, as (48) vs. (49) shows, French “de” cannot take a lexical subject contrary to English “for”. Secondly, as the difference in grammaticality between (50) and (51) shows, English “for” cannot take a controlled subject contrary to French “de”. These two properties lead Kayne to claim that the complementizer “de” cannot assign Case to the subject of the infinitive whereas “for” can. The question of course is why this is the case. The answer Kayne gives is that “for” governs the adjacent subject position whereas “de” does not. The line of thought of his argument goes like this: believe-type verbs take an infinitival clause as a complement with a null complementizer. Therefore in (41) for example with the prototypical ECM verb, the infinitival subject “Frida Kahlo” receives its Case from that null C and not directly from believe. French infinitives also have a null complementizer with this class of verbs but as already argued French prepositional complementizers do not govern the adjacent subject position and consequently they cannot Case-mark the infinitival subject. As a result French does not have the equivalent of English ECM, not because the intrinsic properties associated with believe-class verbs are parametrised but because complementizers have a different status (and different syntactic behaviour) in English and in French.

Kayne’s for-deletion analysis makes much more sense cross-linguistically than the original ECM analysis. In our view this is mainly because it unifies the complement types this class of verbs takes both cross-linguistically and within the same language (there is no longer the need to assume that believe in English can take both IP and CP complements) simplifying the theory significantly. For Kayne, all infinitives are CPs across the board and the differences in the availability of an overt infinitival subject lie in the properties of the complementizer in each language, be it overt or null. The flexibility
of this analysis makes it possible to adapt it for various languages with similar phenomena and more generalised overt infinitival subjects, something which makes it a natural candidate for an analysis to account for the AG infinitives. In chapter 3 we will discuss in depth the adaptations of this proposal for various (mainly Romance) languages since practically every single analysis of overt infinitival subjects has to do with their C position and therefore implicitly or explicitly follows Kayne’s intuition. The exact implementation of this intuition however is still a matter of debate. In Chapter 4, we will present our interpretation of it and we will offer our view as to what exactly the content and the role of infinitival C is.

1.5 Overall conclusion
In this Chapter we gave an overview of Control theories within GB and Minimalism. We presented the main insights as well as the main problems concerning the existence of PRO, its distribution and its interpretation. As we see them the two main problems of Control theory are firstly PRO’s character that seems to be both anaphoric and pronoun-like. This creates various paradoxes that require stipulations (like the PRO theorem) in order to be accounted for. The second problem, which is more important for our purposes is the interaction of PRO with overt infinitival subjects. In English, where the latter option is very limited, there seems to be an exceptional way to account for it (ECM). In Romance languages however and of course in AG where overt and null infinitival subjects interchange more freely, such analyses cannot be maintained and more issues (like Case licensing of the overt subject) also come into play. In the following Chapter we will thoroughly present the AG data. This will clearly illustrate the extent of the problem any standard theory (of the ones we presented) would face.
Chapter 2: Ancient Greek infinitives: the data

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 General

In the previous chapter we saw an overview of various theoretical attempts to address the question of infinitives and their (mainly null) subjects. In this chapter we move on to the data that this thesis wants to account for, that is Ancient Greek (AG) infinitives with overt and null subjects and the Case patterns they display in each of the two cases. The paradigm that we will present in detail involves the following:

(a) Infinitives with overt accusative subjects (the Accusativus-Cum-Infinitivo construction, AcI)

(b) Infinitives with controlled subjects, exhibiting Case agreement with their controller in the main clause (the Case Agreement Across Copula construction, CAAC, term due to Andrews, 1978)

(c) Finally, null non-controlled infinitival subjects, marked with accusative.

The infinitival data will be preceded by a small introduction on certain aspects of AG grammar that will be useful in the discussion that follows. We will also discuss briefly the status of the rich morphology of AG infinitives as well as their extensive distribution, which prima facie renders implausible an ECM analysis for AcI. In the end of the chapter we will present some counterexamples to the generalisation that all overt infinitival subjects surface in the accusative: the data that we will discuss involve apparent nominative infinitival subjects of raising verbs, agreement mismatches and subject modifiers.

In this chapter we will try to confine any theoretical discussion to the minimum and focus on the data instead. However we will try to formulate the initial theoretical questions that are formed by the generalisations that emerge. In the last section moreover, the one that looks at the apparent counterexamples, we will rely on some theoretical apparatus in order to illustrate our point.
2.1.2 A note on methodology

The data presented in this Chapter are genuine and not constructed AG examples apart from some very few exceptions that will be clearly indicated. They have been mainly collected using the TLG (Thesaurus Linguae Grecae) resource. The choice of texts revolves around works of the Classical period, avoiding the ones with extreme literary style, which include: Lysias: Orationes, Isocrates: Orationes, Demosthenes: Orationes, Aristophanes: Comedies, Plato: Dialogues, Xenophon: Hellenika, Thucydides: Historia

Certain examples, especially some of the exceptional ones, are taken from AG Grammars like Goodwin, 1889 and 1894, Jannaris, 1897, Smyth, 1920, Bacharakis, 1993 and Schwyzer, 2002.

2.2 Some notes on AG grammar

In this section we will give a very brief overview of certain aspects of AG grammar, the ones that are absolutely necessary for the discussion that will follow. To start with, consider the following table, which consists of the inflectional paradigm of the regular verb *grapho*: ‘write’, in all available tenses (aspect), moods and voices of the language.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imperfective</th>
<th>Future</th>
<th>Aorist</th>
<th>Perfect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active V:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indic.</td>
<td><em>grapho:</em></td>
<td><em>grapso:</em></td>
<td><em>egrapsa</em></td>
<td><em>gegrapha</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subj.</td>
<td><em>grapho:</em></td>
<td><em>grapsoimi</em></td>
<td><em>grapsaimi</em></td>
<td><em>gegrapho:</em> or *gegrapho:*s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opt.</td>
<td><em>graphoimi</em></td>
<td><em>grapsei</em></td>
<td><em>grapsai</em></td>
<td><em>gegraphoimi</em> or *gegrapho:*s eie:*n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imp.</td>
<td><em>graphe</em></td>
<td><em>grapsai</em></td>
<td><em>grapson</em></td>
<td><em>gegraphe</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf.</td>
<td><em>graphein</em></td>
<td><em>grapson</em></td>
<td><em>grapsai</em></td>
<td><em>gegraphe</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prtcl.</td>
<td>*grapho:*s,</td>
<td><em>grapsas</em>,</td>
<td><em>gegraphe</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>ousa, on</em></td>
<td><em>asa,</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 I wish to thank Geoffrey Horrocks for advising me on the choice of texts and extensively discussing examples with me. All errors on the choice of examples as well as their translation remain my own.

2 I also wish to thank Theodore Markopoulos for never failing to astonish me by producing extremely rare examples that usually confounded my generalisations, much to my disappointment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle V:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indic.</td>
<td>graphomai</td>
<td>grapsomai</td>
<td>egrapsame:n</td>
<td>gegrammai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subj.</td>
<td>grapho:mai</td>
<td>grapso:mai</td>
<td>grapsaime:n</td>
<td>gegrammenos o:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opt.</td>
<td>grapho:me:n</td>
<td>grapso:me:n</td>
<td>grapsai</td>
<td>gegrammenos eie:n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imp.</td>
<td>graphou</td>
<td>grapsoime:n</td>
<td>grapsasthai</td>
<td>gegraso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf.</td>
<td>graphe:sthai</td>
<td>grapsesthai</td>
<td>grapsasthai</td>
<td>geagraphthai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prtcpl.</td>
<td>grammenos, e;: on</td>
<td>grapsomenos, e;: on</td>
<td>grapsamenos, e;: on</td>
<td>ge grammomenos, e;: on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Passive V:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indic.</td>
<td>Same as middle</td>
<td>Same as middle</td>
<td>Same as middle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subj.</td>
<td>Same as middle</td>
<td>Same as middle</td>
<td>Same as middle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imp.</td>
<td>graphe:so:me:n</td>
<td>graphe:ti</td>
<td>graphe:nai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inf.</td>
<td>graphe:sesthai</td>
<td>graphe:sesthai</td>
<td>grapheis, eisa, ein</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prtcpl.</td>
<td>graphe:somenos, e;: on</td>
<td>graphe:somenos, e;: on</td>
<td>graphe:somenos, e;: on</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (1): the morphological paradigm of the finite verb grapho: ‘write’

As we can see AG has four morphologically distinct moods: the indicative, the subjunctive, the optative and the imperative in addition to two separate ‘verbal forms’ infinitives and participles. The latter two cannot be found in all tense/aspect forms, but only in the imperfective, future, aorist and perfect. There also exist three voices: the active, the middle and the passive, the latter two coinciding in the imperfective and the perfect. AG has synthetic morphology and the only analytic forms are in subjunctive and

---

3 In this table we have not included the imperfect past forms in the active and the middle/passive voice respectively ‘egraphon/egraphome:n’ and the past perfect ones ‘egraphene:egegramme:n’. The reason for leaving them out is (a) because they have no other form apart from the indicative that we just stated and (b) because in this table we want to highlight the interaction of mood and voice in the finite paradigm.

4 In this table we have used the terms imperfective, future, aorist and perfect to refer to present, future, past and present perfect respectively. The reason we did that was because the stems are not temporal but aspectual and referring to the aorist infinitive for example as ‘past’ instead of ‘aorist’ would be a misnomer. I wish to thank Geoffrey Horrocks for highlighting this point to me.
optative mood of all voices of the perfect. Indicative mood is used to denote an event that is *real* and is also the mood where tense is prototypically expressed. As we will also see when we comment on the semantic content of the infinitival inflection, the tense distinctions in all other AG moods as well as the infinitive and the participle, denote mostly differences in aspect and not true tense *per se*. The following example illustrates a use of a verb in the indicative:

(1) Dike:n ekeinoi do:sousin
Justice-acc they-nom will give-pres
‘They will be punished’

Demosthenes, *On the false embassy*: 306

The subjunctive and the optative mood are the typical *irrealis* moods that are used in both main and embedded clauses. The imperative mood denotes *demand* and can also be substituted by the infinitive in main clauses in some circumstances that we will discuss in section 2.5.5. Examples of all three of them respectively are given below:

(2) Io:men kai akouso:men tou andros
Go-subj-1 pl and listen-subj-1 pl the-gen man-gen
‘Let us go and listen to the man’

Plato, *Protagoras*: 314b

(3) O: pai, genoio patros eutuchesteros
Oh child-voc be-opt-3 sg father-gen happier-nom
‘Oh child, may you become happier than your father.’

Sophocles, *Ajax*: 550

(4) Me: thorubeite
Not make noise-imp-2 pl
‘Do not make noise’

Plato, *Apologia*: 21a

The distinction between *realis* and *irrealis* modality, which cuts across grammatical categories is further manifested through the use of two distinct negative markers. In clauses that have a realis flavour the negation marker used is *ou(k)*, while in irrealis
contexts the relevant negation marker is \textit{me:}\( \text{(n)} \). This distinction is retained in \textit{(declarative and final)} infinitives and we will discuss it in detail in Chapter 4, section 4.3.3.1. The following two examples illustrate this pattern in the indicative and the optative respectively:

(5) Ou gar ti po: panta sapho:s pepusmetha
   Not then something then all-acc clearly learn-prf-ind-1 pl
   ‘For as yet we have not had been clearly of these things.’
   Plato, \textit{Charmides}: 153c

(6) Me: pleio: kaka pathoien
   Not more-acc bad-acc get-3 pl-opt
   ‘I wish them no greater evils.’
   Sophocles, \textit{Antigone}: 927-8

In AG there exists the counterfactual marker \textit{an} that can be paired with the indicative or the optative, giving rise to the potential indicative and potential optative respectively. The use of these additional moods is to denote possibility and is used mainly in reported speech. This marker can also accompany the infinitive, yielding the potential infinitive, a use that we will discuss again in Chapter 4, section 4.3.3.2. The following examples illustrate the potential indicative and optative, respectively:

(7) Ple:g:es ktupon pas tis e:isthet’ an sapho:s
   Blow-gen sound-acc every-nom someone-nom perceive-ind-pst-3 sg \textit{an} clearly
   ‘Each one of us distinctly heard the sound of a blow’
   Euripides, \textit{Iphigeneia in Aulis}: 1582

(8) Idoi tis an toiouton
   See-opt-3 sg someone-nom \textit{an} such as this-acc
   ‘One could see as such’
   Demosthenes, \textit{Against Leptines}: 13

With this we conclude our very brief overview of the moods in AG. As we saw there is an extensive paradigm, which is manifested through synthetic (and to a lesser extent analytic) morphology, a double negation system and independent markers like \textit{an}. 
The next thing we want to discuss briefly, since it will feature prominently in our discussion that follows, is predicate agreement: in a sentence where the verb is copular, the subject always agrees in case with the adjectival or nominal predicate of the verb (example 9). In cases where the predicate denotes the possessor, ‘part-of-a-whole’ or a property, it can appear in the genitive, referred to as the ‘predicative’ genitive (example 10).

(9) E:n gar he: parodos stene:
    Was-3 sg then the road-nom narrow-nom
    ‘The road was narrow’
    Xenophon, Anabasis: 1.4.4

(10) Ego: de toutou tou tropou eimi aei
    I-nom then this-gen the way-gen be-1 sg always
    ‘I am always of this character’
    Aristophanes, Plutus: 246

AG also allows secondary, adverbial predication with verbs that are not copular. The Case agreement requirement, between the subject and the adverbial predicate ensues here as well:

(11) Ske:noumen hupaithrioi
    Camp-1 pl ground-nom
    ‘We camped on the ground’
    Xenophon, Anabasis: 5.21

This construction will become very relevant in the section on control, where we will use such examples to test the Case of the null infinitival subject.

The final thing we will discuss here are the constructions that are available with certain impersonal verbs that take infinitival complements. AG has various impersonal verbs and expressions as well as passive verbs that seem not to have a Nominative argument. They appear on the third person singular and are accompanied by a dative argument and an infinitival clause. The syntax of these verbs involves a dative argument
that acts like a thematic subject and has the theta-role of experiencer, referred to as a ‘personal’ dative by the traditional grammars. Traditional grammars also argue that the infinitival clauses that appear with such verbs are their structural subjects, and these verbs are considered to be intransitive, having no internal theta role or an accusative Case feature to assign for any internal argument. Some of these verbs however, like dokei ‘seem’ can sometimes be inflected for person other than the third, also accompanied by their dative argument and an infinitival clause. A nominative can also appear in such cases, where it always agrees with the verb in number and person. This is standardly referred to as the ‘personal’ construction of the (otherwise) impersonal verbs. The following two examples illustrate the aforementioned facts with the verb dokei:

(12) Dokei moi aporon einai
   Seems-3 sg to me-dat difficult-acc to be
   ‘It seems to me to be difficult’

Lysias, Against Eratosthenes: 1

(13) Pantes eran emoige edokoun autou
   All-nom to love to me-dat seemed-3pl him-gen
   ‘It seemed to me that all people loved him’

Plato, Charmides: 154 c

Both in this chapter and in chapter 4 we will discuss these constructions at length. The main questions we will address are (a) whether they are instances of control or raising, (b) what is the role of the Nominative argument found in these constructions and (c) the categorical status of the infinitival clause. We will not embark on a discussion concerning the status of the dative argument and whether it could be a quirky subject, like that argued for in Icelandic by Sigurðsson, 1989 among others. With this, we conclude our discussions on some key facts of the AG grammar. We will now move on to discuss infinitives in detail, starting from their morphological properties.
2.3 Morphology

The first striking difference between AG infinitives and other, more prototypical infinitives, like English ones for example, is the presence of additional, special morphology on the former but not on the latter\(^5\). As we saw, AG infinitives have all three Voice distinctions and they have markers that are morphologically temporal but semantically ambiguous between tense and aspect. Consider table 2 for AG as opposed to the English paradigm that involves merely the *to write / to have written* distinction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Medio-Passive</th>
<th>Passive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperfective</td>
<td>graphein</td>
<td>graphesthai</td>
<td>graphesthai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aorist</td>
<td>grap sai</td>
<td>grapsasthai</td>
<td>graphe:nai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>grapsein</td>
<td>grapsesthai</td>
<td>graphe:sesthai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfect</td>
<td>gegraphenai</td>
<td>gegraphthai</td>
<td>gegraphthai</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table (2), the morphological paradigm of the infinitive of the verb grapheo: ‘write’*

As we saw in table (1) as well, the infinitives and participles do not have the whole range of tenses: they lack the imperfective past and the past perfect. There is a lot of debate about what exactly the morphology in question denotes, although it is clear that it is not agreement. Traditional grammars assume that tense morphology denotes true tense only in the indicative form of the verb: any other mood (subjunctive, optative and imperative) as well as the verbal forms just mentioned, employ this morphology to make aspectual distinctions (Jannaris, 1897 among many others). Under such assumptions present denotes imperfective aspect, the aorist denotes perfective aspect and the perfect denotes perfect aspect. Future is treated as special and it is exceptionally regarded as denoting futurity relative to the main verb\(^6\).

\(^5\) This observation naturally leaves aside the issue of ‘to’ and its status as an inflectional element (Radford, 1997) or as a C element (Roberts & Roussou, 2003).

\(^6\) The very existence of future infinitive, the late rise of its use (it emerged after Homer) and also its early decline and subsequent loss and its extensive use in reported speech are very thorny issues that enjoy little or no consensus among theorists. For a comprehensive and extensive study on Future tense in Greek, see Markopoulos, 2006.
Even with finite verbs tense morphology also denotes aspect: for example since AG has both perfective and imperfective past forms, the former is not only used to denote past but also perfectivity. The fused morphology of AG does not make it easy to tell with certainty which morpheme does what. Consider for example the form egrapsa (1\textsuperscript{st} person singular, past tense, active voice). A very simplistic morphological analysis would show that the ‘pastness’ of the form comes essentially from a combination of three elements: the augment e in the beginning of the verb, the consonant s at the end of the stem and also a as the main vowel of the person ending, as opposed to e being the main vowel in the present tense for example. Each of these suffixes can be found in isolation in other forms as well, and it is the combination of all three of them in a given form that gives the interpretation in question and not one of them alone: the augment is also found in imperfective past form, egraphon the syllabic consonant is also found in the future, grapso: and a as the main ending vowel is also found in present perfect, gegrapha. Therefore it is extremely difficult (and maybe impossible) to pinpoint which part of the special morphology found in this form pertains to tense and which other pertains to aspect. To sum up, the issues that arise from the morphology of AG infinitives are the following:

(a) They have non-prototypically infinitival-like morphology that includes voice and tense/aspect markers.

(b) This morphology clearly does not denote agreement, and is mostly aspectual except in the future where it is (exceptionally) temporal.

(c) This is bound to interact with the status of the null infinitival subject, due to the alleged incompatibility of a PRO-type subject with rich morphology on the infinitive.

Of course it is well known that other infinitives have rich morphology (the most prominent example being the European Portuguese inflected infinitives, which have agreement morphology) and AG is not unique in that sense. However, it is also well known that such infinitives also tend to demonstrate syntactically unexpected properties (in the case of Portuguese, overt Nominative subjects) and a special treatment by the
theory is needed. I will now move on to presenting the syntactic behaviour of AG infinitives, which will demonstrate even more clearly the complexity of this construction.

2.4 Syntax
Syntactically, the main idiosyncrasy of AG infinitives is related to the nature of their subjects. AG infinitives can have overt subjects marked with accusative Case, when the infinitival subject is distinct from that of the main verb and when it is co-referential to it, but emphatic. We refer to these constructions as standard and emphatic AcI respectively and they pose the initial question that we need to address, namely what licenses the Case of the infinitival subject in these constructions. AG infinitives however, can also have controlled null subjects, whose Case seems to be the same as that of their controller. We name this construction CAAC (Case agreement across copula) and it poses the second question, namely if there is something that licenses accusative in the AcI cases, what disallows it in control. Is it merely an issue of the controlled subject being null and as such non-Case marked? This last question is answered negatively if one considers a third class of infinitival subjects: non-controlled null subjects, marked with accusative. These subjects we argue need not only be arbitrary (as is normally the other possible case with infinitival subjects, apart from control) but can also be referential null subjects, like pro in finite clauses of null subject languages. In the sections that follow we will exemplify each of these cases separately and we will try to see what distinguishes each of these environments.

2.4.1 Standard AcI
AG infinitives can appear with an overt accusative subject when the latter has disjoint reference from that of the main clauses. This is illustrated in the following examples:

(14) Ego: oun (...) ouch he:goumai [ didakton einai arete:n. ]
I-nom then not think-1 sg taught-acc to-be virtue-acc.
‘I then think that virtue cannot be taught.’
Plato, Protagoras: 320b, 4
(15) ἐσο ὑπερβάλει τα ἰσχύειν ἀυτά ἀποκρινόμενον μάλλον 
Maybe then better is-3 sg you-acc to say-pres these-acc answer-prtepl-acc more 
[ e: eme huper sou polupragmonein] 
than me-acc for you-gen be busy-pres 
‘But perhaps it is better that you say these things in answering, than I should take all the trouble for you.’

Plato, *Theaetetus* : 184e

(16) Βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἀν [ τοῦτο houto:s genesthai ].
Want-1 sg-opt then an this-acc this way-adv to be-pres 
‘I would want this to turn out this way.’

Plato, *Apologia* : 19a

In example (14) the subject of the main verb, *ego* is distinct from the subject of the infinitive, *τε:ν arete:n* which surfaces is accusative case. This is a fairly straightforward example, which is also quite illustrative of the phenomenon in question. In example (15) we have a somewhat more complicated situation, with a verb taking two infinitival clauses as arguments. The main verb is an impersonal, and the two infinitival clauses are connected with each other with a comparative contrastive schema: ‘it’s better you for to do this than for me to that’. The subject of the first infinitival clause *se ‘you’* is overtly expressed in accusative and is contrasted with the infinitival subject of the second infinitive, *eme ‘me’*. The construction therefore involves a null expletive subject for the main verb and two infinitival subjects being contrasted with each other:

(17) [Main V (Subj) [ inf V₁ Subj₁ [inf V₂ Subj₂]]]

This example leads us naturally to the next instance of Acl that we will discuss in the next section, where an infinitival subject can be overt if it is emphatic or contrasted with another subject, infinitival or not.

Example (16) is straightforward like (14): the subject of the main verb is omitted due to *pro-drop* and the infinitival subject *touto ‘this’* is expressed overtly in the accusative.
As we can see from the above examples, AG employs infinitival complements with various verb classes, which can also take finite complements without any clear change in meaning. Verbs that are part of the same class, like phe:mi and lego:, both meaning ‘say’ take non-finite and finite complements respectively and this difference can be better attributed to a lexical idiosyncrasy of each entry more than a syntactic difference. In AG verbs from the same class can take both finite and non-finite complements without using the finite ones for cases of disjoint reference and the infinitival ones for control. The standard use of AcI with disjoint reference in example (14) illustrates that. In this respect AG is not like Modern Romance languages, like French that display the obvation effect exemplified below:

(18) Christina veut partir
    Christina wants-3 sg to go
(19) *Christina veut Rita partir
    Christina wants-3 sg Rita to go
(20) Christina veut que Rita parte
    Christina wants-3 sg that Rita goes-3 sg-subj
(21) *Christinai veut que ellei parte
    Christina wants-3 sg that she goes-3 sg-subj

Consider the following example that is an instance of an infinitival clause being coordinated with a finite embedded clause:

(22) Humas pantas eidenai he:goumai [hoti ego: men
    You-pl-acc all-pl-acc to-know think-1 sg that I on the one hand
ortho:s lego:,
    correctly speak-1 sg him-acc on the other hand stupid to-be.

correctly speak-1 sg him-acc on the other hand stupid to-be.

‘I think that you have all perceived that I speak correctly, whereas he is stupid.’

Lysias, Against Theomnestus I: 15, 3
In this example we observe the following: there is the main verb *he:goumai* ‘think’, which takes the infinitive *eidenai* ‘to know’ as its complement. This infinitive however takes two clauses as complements: a finite one introduced with *hoti* and the infinitival one. The two complement clauses have distinct subjects and while the finite clause has the subject that is co-referential to that of the main verb, the infinitival has the one with disjoint reference. This example shows that AG does not obey obviation and its complementation system is freer than that of Modern Romance languages: a verb can take both a finite and an infinitival complement and the subject of either clause can be either co-referential or distinct from that of the main verb.

### 2.4.2 Emphatic AcI

In example (15) we saw for the first time an infinitival subject that is overtly expressed although it is co-referential with the main clause subject. In that case, there were two infinitival clauses with contrasting subjects. In the examples that we will see in this section the infinitival subject is overtly realised although it is the same as that of the main verb for emphatic reasons. Consider the following examples:

(23) Oiomai [ eme phaulon einai ze:te:te:n ]

Think-1 sg me-acc bad-acc to be researcher-acc

‘I consider myself to be a bad researcher’

Plato, *Charmides*: 175e

(24) Oimai eme pleio: chre: mata eir gasthai e: alous

Think-I me-acc more-acc money-acc to work-pres than others-acc

‘I think that I have made more money than others.’

Plato, *Hippias major*: 282e

(25) Bouloime:n an, eipon, eme te dunasthai aute:n apodounai

Want-1 sg opt an said-1 sg me-acc and to be able her-acc to give
kai humas komisasthai
and you-acc to bring

‘I said that I would want me to give her away and you to take her’
In examples (23)-(25) the subject of the main clause and the subject of the infinitive are co-referential but furthermore in all three examples the main subject is omitted while the infinitival subject is inserted without any clear contribution in the meaning of the sentence with some new information. The claim made by the grammars concerning such examples is that since there is always the option of omitting the infinitival subject in cases of subject control and since these cases are actually the vast majority, the insertion of the accusative subject when it is the same as the subject of the main clause is done for emphatic reasons. Presumably the best correlate with English would be a cleft such as, I imagine that it is me that will have to go there. So compare the previous three examples with (26), where there are no overt subjects at all and is the standard subject control structure7.

(26) Bouletai elthein

Wants-he to come-pst

‘He wants to come’

The main question that these data pose is what exactly is emphasised in these constructions and how this semantic effect is achieved. Can we talk about a standard focus construction, where what is focused is the infinitival subject or is it some other kind of emphasis? As can be seen from the examples cited here, this is a construction fairly limited with respect to the verb class that takes it, namely oiomai and boulomai, in addition to it being quite rare overall. The former usually takes an infinitival complement with a subject distinct from that of a main clause. So it could be plausible to assume that what is actually emphasised is the fact that, it is not a disjoint reference structure as it usually is. Under such an assumption emphasis in these examples is viewed more like some kind of contrast, something that is further supported by examples like (15) with two infinitival clauses and two distinct subjects. We will come back to this discussion

7 The subject of the main verb does not surface overtly in the emphatic examples, apart from very rare occasions. I have not found any satisfactory reason for this and I tentatively attribute it to standard cases of pro drop.
extensively in Chapter 4, where we will lay down our analysis of AG infinitival subjects and where the notion of emphasis and contrast will play a crucial role. The emphatic examples conclude the presentation of overt infinitival subjects. We will now move on to discuss control structures and see the CAAC mechanism they employ.

2.4.3 Control

In the previous section we established that AG infinitives have the possibility of having overt Case-marked subjects with disjoint reference or emphatic co-reference with the main subject with a wide variety of verbs. Given that infinitives are the prototypical environment where control obtains, the natural question we need to address now is how that is achieved. In this section we will look into subject, dative argument and object control structures. We will try to determine the Case of the controlled infinitival subject using copular constructions. Our finding will illustrate that in cases of control, CAAC obtains and therefore the controlled infinitival subject copies the Case of its controller, whatever that is.

2.4.3.1 Subject control

The main generalisation about subject control in AG is that the predicate of a copular infinitive agrees in Case with its controller in the main clause, and therefore surfaces in the nominative Case. This is exemplified below.

(27) Kai bouloime:n an [ kallinikos genesthai
   And want-pref-opt-1 sg an victorious-nom to become
   to:n so:n erasto:n ]
   the-gen your-gen lovers-gen
   ‘And I would want to become victorious among your lovers’
   Plato, Alcibiades B: 151c

(28) Estin oun hostis bouletai [ athlios kai kakodaimo:n einai ];
   Is then whoever-nom wants-3 sg petty-nom and sad-nom to be-pres
   ‘Is there anyone who wants to be miserable and sad?’
   Plato, Meno: 78a
(29) Elpizei dunatos einai archein
    Hopes-3 sg able-nom to be-nom to rule
    ‘He hopes to able to rule’

Plato, *Republic*: 9. 573c

The first thing we can point out is that in the above examples the infinitival subject can be controlled both by an overt (28) and a null (27) and (29) subject of the main verb. This difference does not result in a different pattern in case agreement and CAAC obtains in all cases. So in example (27) the null first person nominative subject of the main verb bouloime:n an controls the null infinitival subject and thus triggers Case agreement with the adjectival predicate kallinikos that appears in the nominative Case. In example (28) the nominative Case on the predicates athlios and kakodaimo:n is transferred by the overt subject of the main verb hostis. Finally in example (29) a null subject of the main verb is again responsible for the nominative Case on the predicate dunatos. The generalization therefore is that control is canonically marked with Case agreement between the predicate inside the infinitival clause and its antecedent in the main clause (CAAC), unless there is an overt infinitival subject inserted for emphatic reasons (cf. previous section), when the predicate agrees with the accusative. AG grammar therefore employs two distinct mechanisms for when the infinitival subject is overt and co-referential with that of the main clause and when it is null and controlled. Overtness of the infinitival subject seems to play a crucial role in distinguishing the two cases, with accusative Case being available for the infinitival subject only in the former case and not the latter. The crucial thing to remember here is that (a) if there is an overt infinitival subject, it is always in accusative and (b) this overt accusative can never be overridden in favour of a CAAC structure even if the infinitival subject is semantically identical to the main clause one, like in the following constructed example (which is a variation of (22)):

(30)* Oiomai eme phaulos einai ze:te:te:s
    Think-1 sg me-acc bad-nom to be researcher-nom
    ‘I consider myself to be a bad researcher’

8 Traditional grammars sometimes refer to overt infinitival subjects in nominative. I will discuss these cases in great detail in section 2.6, where I will argue that they are instances of overt Raising or LDA (long distance agree).
The CAAC operation poses various theoretical challenges that pertain to the existence and nature of the null infinitival subject as well as the operation involved. We will get back to them after we finish presenting the data on control. A crucial aspect of control in AG is that there are very few exclusively control verbs: a verb like *boulomai* (just like its equivalent “want” in English) can take both controlled and non-controlled infinitival clauses, with both an accusative subject (when it is overt, for any reason) and a null controlled subject. Given also the fairly free interchange between finite and non-finite clauses as complements of verbs in addition to the ability of the same verb taking a controlled infinitive or an AcI structure, it seems that control in AG is not so much an exclusive lexical property of verbs, but more of a ‘property of chains’ (term due to Dora Alexopoulou, p.c.). What this means is that this Case agreement between a controller and the infinitival subject, establishes also a semantic relationship between them that is otherwise known as control. With all this in mind, we can see that two of the main assumptions behind the existence of PRO are challenged by AG data, firstly that PRO is in complementary distribution with lexical elements and secondly that it needs to be ungoverned and not Case marked (leaving aside null case theory).

2.4.3.2 Object Control

CAAC is retained as the mechanism used in control constructions in object as it is in subject control. This is illustrated in the following example:

(31) **Kurou** edeonto [ ho:s *prothumotatou* genesthai. ]

Cyrus-gen pleaded-3 pl as most willing-gen to-become

‘They pleaded to Cyrus to become as willing as possible.’

Xenophon, *Hellenika*: I.5.2

Example (31) is fairly straightforward and it illustrates an infinitival subject controlled by an object in the genitive case, *Kurou*. As a result the predicate of the infinitive *prothumotatou* also appears in the genitive case. There is however a complication regarding object control as most verbs in AG take objects in the accusative Case and object control structures end up looking identical to AcI. This issue has been referred to the literature as *pseudo-AcI* (Phillipaki-Warburton & Catsimali, 1989 and Tantalou, 2003.
among others) and it has created the illusion that all AcI examples could be reduced to simple cases of ditransitives taking an accusative and an infinitival clause as arguments. We shall see arguments against such a claim in Chapter 3. The following examples illustrate such a structure:

(32) Ho:s arti me e:nankazen ho huper ekeinou logos

As just me-acc forced-he the [for him-gen] speech-nom
eit’eboulome:n eite me: [ toiouton einai.]
either wanted-I or not this-acc to be
‘The speech in his favour forced me to be like this, whether I wanted it or not.’
Plato, Theaetetus: 179 b

(33) Homoio:s gar tas mikras to:n poleo:n kai tas megalas

Equally then the small-acc the cities-gen and the big-acc
autonomous einai keleuousin
autonomous-acc-pl to be-pres urge-3 pl
‘They (the treaties) urge that our small and big cities will be equally autonomous’
Isocrates, Plataicus: 10

In both examples (32) and (33) we observe the *pseudo-AcI* construction we just mentioned, with verbs that take two objects, an accusative and an infinitive. In the first example the main verb *e:nankazen* takes two complements, the accusative *me* and the bracketed infinitival clause. The predicate inside the infinitival clause surfaces in the accusative case, because its null subject is controlled by the accusative argument of the main verb. In (33) we have exactly the same situation, with the verb *keleuo*: ‘urge’ that takes the two accusative arguments *tas mikras* and *tas megalas* (with the partitive genitive yielding the meaning of ‘the small and the big of our cities’), which control the accusative of the predicate inside the infinitival clause *autonomous*. This kind of examples are not illuminating concerning the possibility of the null infinitival subject being marked with a different case feature in control clauses, but are however interesting in their own right.

2.4.3.3 Control by a dative argument
Dative arguments of impersonals can also control case agreement inside an infinitival clause. We are discussing them in a section separate from subject or object control because we are agnostic to their status: they are not structural subjects in the same way nominatives are, but they are not objects either. Whether it could be feasible to argue that they are quirky subjects, like in Icelandic, is not clear to us and the examples that we provide are not illuminating in that respect. Consider (34):

(34)Nun soi exestin [ andri genesthai.]

Now you-dat is-possible man-dat to become
‘It is now possible for you to become brave.’

Xenophon, Anabasis: VII.1.21

In example (34) the pattern that we observe is the following: the dative argument of the impersonal verb *exesti* controls the null infinitival subject of the infinitival clause and therefore the predicate of the infinitive appears in the dative case. In section 2.6.1 we will see more Case agreement pattern observed with these verbs. At this point however, what is important to keep from this example is that an experiencer argument is able to control case agreement within the infinitival clause, much like a subject or an object can.

(35)Onto:s gar esti plousiois he:min hapasin einai ;

Then is-3 sg rich-dat us-dat all-dat to be
‘Shall we really all become rich?’

Aristophanes, Plutus: 286

(36) Aphikomene:i huparchei aute:i eudaimoni einai

Arrived-prtepl-dat exist-3 sg her-dat happy-dat to be
‘When she arrives, then she is happy.’

Plato, Phaedo: 81a

(37)Ananke: de: (esti) touto:i luko:i genesthai

Need then is-3 sg him-dat wolf-dat to become
‘Inevitably he is transformed into a wolf.’

Plato, Republic: 565d
Examples (35) to (37) illustrate the same phenomenon with different predicates: esti, *huparchei* and the impersonal expression *ananke*: esti all have dative arguments that function essentially as thematic subjects that can control case agreement inside the infinitival clause. The exact status of the dative argument does not seem to play a role as it is not the case that it has the thematic role of experiencer in all the above examples.

### 2.4.3.4 Interim conclusion about control and some first theoretical questions

Before we move on, we want to briefly sum up the data on control and consider the theoretical questions they pose. Control in AG is manifested through CAAC—Case agreement across copula. This operation poses several theoretical challenges, the first and most important one having to do with the existence and nature of the null infinitival subject in these cases. Does CAAC require the existence of a (Case-marked) null subject to mediate between the controller in the main clause and the predicate of the infinitive? This could be the possibility of having the Case of the controller copied first on the null controlled infinitival subject and from there the Case could be transferred to the predicate, via standard subject-predicate agreement. A second possibility could be that the null controlled infinitival subject might bear Null Case (in the sense of Chomsky & Lasnik, 1993) and therefore it does not count in Case transferring: the predicate agrees directly with its controller in the main clause and CAAC obtains. This possibility does not seem very promising however, mostly due to the fact that as we have seen, infinitives seem to license Accusative in the AcI cases: it is not clear how the infinitival subject can appear sometimes with accusative Case and sometimes with Null Case. This would imply two distinct Case-licensing mechanisms in the same environment, a possibility which is not very appealing. A third possibility would rely on the overall lack of the infinitival subject in cases of Control, following Wurmbrand’s, 2003 analysis of restructuring and the direct Case agreement between the controller in the main clause and the infinitival predicate would follow. In order to decide among the alternatives several questions need

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9 There is also a fourth option to account for CAAC, whereby control is an instance of structural Case assignment, whereby the infinitive can license various Cases for its the subject (and consequently the predicate): Accusative in AcI and Nominative, Genitive and Dative in CAAC. This option seems to fail in the same way the Null Case theory would: if we posit a Case licensing mechanism from within the infinitival clause that can license more than one Case feature, this constitutes an unnecessary complication that results in a major weakening of the theory.
to be further addressed such as the structural nature of the infinitival clause for example, since the third option can work only if infinitival clauses are vPs, as is the case with restructuring. An issue that could illuminate the nature of the operation in question and therefore shed some light on the issues we mentioned is the locality of CAAC: we could imagine a situation where there is a potential controller in the main clause but cannot establish CAAC inside the infinitival clauses because it is ‘too far away’. Accusative could therefore be licensed for the infinitival subject in those cases, for reasons of locality. In the following section we explore this possibility with a wide variety of data.

2.4.3.5 Is there locality-driven AcI?

So far we have seen that AcI and CAAC can appear in the same contexts (cf. examples with verbs like oiomai, boulomai etc). The infinitival subject can be overt in cases of disjoint reference or emphatic co-reference with the main clause subject while in all other cases, CAAC obtains. The question we want to address in this section therefore is whether in cases of semantic co-reference between the infinitival subject and an element in the main clause, Accusative can be licensed not with some emphatic effect but because the controller and the infinitival subject cannot establish CAAC by being ‘too far away’. This way we might be able to decide if CAAC is long distance Agree as defined in Chomsky, 2001a and 2001b, whose locality conditions are better accounted for in terms of phases or intervening heads (Relativized Minimality effects, cf. Rizzi, 1990). The first example we will discuss is the following:

(38) All’ humo:n deometha [treis ontes ] easai he:mas eti
But you-gen ask-1 pl three being-prtcl-nom to let-pst us-acq even
prothumoterous genesthai
eager-acq to become
‘But all three of us plead with you to let us give greater proofs of our zeal.’
Lysias, Polustratus: 35,8

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10 I would like to thank Raffaella Folli for her insightful comments on this issue that led to significant rethinking of this section.
Leaving aside issues of word order and the bracketed participial construction the structure of the example is as follows (PRO used in a purely representational fashion):

(39) Deometha humo:n [ PRO₁ easai hemas₁ [ PRO₂ genesthai prothumoterous ]]

The main verb *deometha* takes two complements, the genitive object *humo:n* and the infinitival clause whose subject is controlled by the genitive argument. The infinitive *easai* also takes two complements, the accusative object *he:mas* and the second infinitival clause whose subject is controlled by the accusative argument. The question for us is since PRO₁ is co-referential with the main verb subject, why does the predicate *prothumoterous* appear in the accusative and not in the nominative? The answer seems to rely on the presence of *he:mas*, which controls PRO₁ and consequently the agreement on the predicate. As we saw on the schema in (37) *he:mas* is the object or the infinitive *easai* and not the subject of the infinitive *genesthai*. The limited availability of object drop renders its presence mandatory and therefore the predicate agrees with it, surfacing in accusative, overriding the nominative of the main clause. We therefore conclude that the insertion of accusative in this case is due to independent factors and not due to locality restriction on CAAC. In addition to that perhaps the role of the genitive argument can be highlighted: although it does not intervene between the main clause subject and PRO₁ in (38) it does so in structural terms as we can see in (39), which is the schematised version of the example. The presence of *he:mas* then is further demanded in contrastive relation to that genitive argument. We will come back to this last point in the end of this section, in relation to other examples, which will be more revealing regarding the notion of contrast.

The following example is again an instance of deeper embedding and its consequences for CAAC:

(40) **Haute:** moi phainetai, o: Hermogenes, boulesthai einai

She-nom to me-dat seems-3sg Ermogenes-voc to want to be

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11 Object drop in AG will play a major role in our analysis of AG infinitives and will be discussed in a later section. It does seem to be freer than in MG (where it is only possible with indefinite objects) but still not entirely productive. It is definitely not as frequent and unproblematic as subject drop, which is the standard case both in Ancient and Modern Greek.
The above example is similar to (39) with respect to involving a main verb whose subject controls an infinitival subject embedded under another infinitival clause. The relevant schema is (41):

$$(41) \text{Haute:}i \text{ phainetai moi } [\text{PRO}_i \text{bouleusthai } [\text{PRO}_i \text{einai he: orthote:s }]]$$

So, *haute*: the nominative subject of the main clause, which is probably a result of raising, is co-referential with both null subjects of infinitives (*bouleusthai* and *einai*) and the predicate of the second infinitive *einai*, surfaces in Nominative Case. Contrary to the situation in (38) there are no intervening DPs to obstruct Case agreement apart from the dative argument *moi*. We know independently however that in cases of raising where there is both a nominative and a dative argument of the verb either of them can control agreement in CAAC\(^{12}\). This example therefore verifies our conclusion from the previous example, namely that the depth of embedding does not affect CAAC, contrary to the existence of interveners, like the genitive argument in (39) that seem to be obstructive.

Consider lastly the following example:

$$(42) \text{Mallon an ego:ge sumbouleusaimi } [\text{eme men le:ron } [\text{he:geisthai } \text{ einai } ]$$

More an I advise-opt-pst-1 sg me then babbler-acc to regard-pres to be [seauton de einai kai eudaimonesteron ]

yourself-acc then to be and happier-acc

‘I should rather advise you to regard me as a babbler and yourself as happier.’

Plato, *Charmides*: 176a

In the above example the syntax goes as follows: the main verb *sumbouleusaimi an* takes the infinitive *he:geisthai* as its argument, and it takes two infinitival clauses as arguments, one with *eme* as the subject and one with *seauton* as the subject. The two

\(^{12}\) We will discuss such examples at length in section 2.6.1
subjects are linked with the *men...de* type of co-ordination, which enhances the contrastive effect. This is reminiscent of example (15), repeated here under (43):

(43)Iso:s de beltion (esti) [ se legein auta apokrinomenon mallon ]

Maybe then better is-3 sg you-acc to say-pres these-acc answer-prtcl-acc more
[ e: eme huper sou polupragmonein]

than me-acc for you-gen be busy-pres

‘But perhaps it is better that you say these things in answering, than I should take all the trouble for you.’

Plato, *Theaetetus* : 184e

We think that these cases illustrate the true character of “locality” that may be at play: what could be viewed as locality is actually contrast in between the two subjects of the infinitival clauses that are complements of the same verb. The relevant schema is the following:

(44)[Main V (Subj) [ inf V₁(*men*) Subj₁ [inf V₂*de* Subj₂]]]

In the above schema, Subj of the main verb can be overt or not (due to pro-drop) while the subject of the second infinitive that *has* to be overt, in accusative Case because Subj₁ of the intraposed infinitival clause is inserted. Usually the two infinitival clauses are accompanied by the familiar ‘*men...de*’ type of co-ordination (“one the one…on the other hand”) that accentuates the contrastive flavour of this construction. In Chapter 4 we will discuss the differences between contrast between two accusatives and contrast between the accusative infinitival subject and an element in the main clause (nominative subject or dative argument) that bear different Case features.

Summing up this section we can focus on the following: CAAC as the syntactic operation that manifests control in AG displays only Relativized Minimality effects of the type observed in example (38). Any other instance of overt accusative infinitival subject discussed was reduced to a contrastive structure with a main verb with two infinitival complements the former with a distinct and the latter with a co-referential infinitival subject. All relevant examples also involved a contrastive schema like *men...de*. We want to argue that this structure is by and large the same as emphatic AcI that we illustrated in
section 2.4.2. The difference between *emphatic* ACl of that sort and *contrastive* ACl of the sort we are discussing now is that in the former the infinitival subject is contrasted with an element in the main clause, the nominative or the dative argument. In the latter case, the contrast is between two accusatives. In Chapter 4 we will spell out the exact difference between the two constructions.

In the following section we will present and discuss the null non-controlled infinitival subjects that seem to bear accusative case. We will argue that in addition to the familiar \( \text{PRO}_{\text{arb}} \) AG also has a referential null non-controlled infinitival subject that resembles \( \text{pro} \) found in finite clauses. These data challenge the generalisation that has been implicit so far: namely that while overt subjects bear Accusative, null ones cannot do so and allow Case agreement with their controller.

2.4.4 *Null accusative subjects*: \( \text{PRO}_{\text{arb}}, \text{pro} \) or both?

As we saw in standard Control theories, both controlled and arbitrary null infinitival subjects are considered one element, namely PRO. Here we will attempt a different type of classification based on the Case properties of these subjects. As we saw, the controlled null subjects are marked with absence of accusative that gives rise to CAAC. In this section we will see two varieties of null accusative subjects, an arbitrary and a referential one, which resembles \( \text{pro} \) in finite clauses of null subject languages (NSL).

2.4.4.1 \( \text{PRO}_{\text{arb}} \) ?

The most common cases of non-controlled infinitival null subjects are those with arbitrary interpretation. Let us look at the following examples\(^\text{13}\) that illustrate a variety of cases.

(45) Chre: \begin{center} grammata manthanein \end{center}

\begin{center} Must-3 sg letters.acc to learn.pres \end{center}

\begin{center} ‘People must be educated’ \end{center}

(46) Philanthro:p\textbf{on} einai dei

\begin{center} Friendly.acc-3 sg to be must-3 sg \end{center}

\(^{13}\) Example (45) is taken from Bacharakis 1993 who does not give a reference for it.
'One needs to love people'

Isocrates, *Nicocles*: 15

(47) Dro:ndas he:dion thanein
Acting-prtcl-acc- 3 pl sweeter-neut to die

‘It is better to die in action’

Euripides, *Helen*: 814

(48) Oukoun nunde: eleges hoti estin he: arete: boulesthai te tagatha
Then not now said-2 sg that is-3 sg the virtue-nom to want the good things kai dunasthai;
and to be able

‘Did you not just say that virtue is for one to want good things and to be capable of them?’

Plato, *Meno*: 78b 3-4

The null infinitival subject in all the above examples seems to be what has been traditionally referred to as a PRO with arbitrary interpretation, whereby PRO has no antecedent/controller from the main clause and consequently receives an arbitrary interpretation, like ‘you, one, people’. Usually PROarb seems to have a fixed person feature in languages: it can be singular as in English15, cf. ‘To talk to oneself/*ourselves is fun’ or plural as in Italian as Chomsky, 1982 points out. The interesting thing in AG is that it can be both, as examples (46) and (47) show. In AG moreover, as we have seen in the control examples, it is possible to see the φ-features as well as the Case of a null infinitival subject via agreement with a predicate when the infinitive is a copula. In example (47) the predicate *philanthro:pon* bears accusative case and moreover it is in the

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14 This example is also an instance of object drop, where the object of the second infinitive (*dunasthai*) is dropped because it is the same to that of the previous infinitive (*boulesthai*) and therefore easily construed. We shall not discuss this aspect of the example here but will come back to it in the next section.

15 But consider the following example brought to my attention by Winnie Lechner, p.c. ‘It is important to respect each other’s needs’. The reciprocal *each other* must be licensed by a plural element, so it seems that arbitrary PRO in this example bears a plural feature. This implies that things might not be as straightforward as they seem concerning English. We will come back to this point in Chapter 4.
3rd person singular, implying the existence of a singular accusative null subject. In example (46) however, the participle *drondas*, that acts like an adverbial predicate (cf. the discussion in section 2.7) surfaces again in the accusative case, but this time in the 3rd person plural.

These data show us two very important things about non-controlled infinitival subjects in AG, (a) that they have an accusative case feature available for the infinitival subject, contrary to control, which is marked with CAAC resulting in direct agreement between the predicate and its controller in the main clause and (b) that PROarb comes with two sets of *phi*-features, being able to surface with both 3rd person singular and 3rd person plural morphology. The latter point might suggest that this element is actually not the usual PROarb found in the position of infinitival subjects, but more like the non-referential *pro* in finite clauses of null subject languages like Modern Greek, where the null subject of a finite clause can be either referential or arbitrary. Consider examples (49) and (50) pointed out to me by Dora Alexopoulou (p.c.), example (51) from Spyropoulos, 2002 as well as example (52):

(49) [Otan imun mikri] me *pro* fonazan kodi sto scholio
   When was-I young me-cl called-3 pl short in school
   ‘When I was young, they called me ‘short’ in school’

(50) Ta kaka pedia ta *pro* vazun timoria
    The bad children them-cl put-3 pl punishment
    ‘Bad kids are punished’

(51) [Sta Kalavrita] *pro* ftiachnun kalo tiri
    In the Kalavryta make-3 pl good cheese
    ‘They make good cheese in Kalavryta.’

(52) *pro* Vrechi / Kani krio
    Rain-3 sg Does-3 sg cold

16 For the existence of arbitrary *pro* in pro-drop languages see also Rizzi, 1986 for Italian and Holmberg, 2004 for Finnish.
‘It rains / It’s cold’

All the above examples have arbitrary or expletive interpretation of the subject and in Modern Greek this is a pro while in English it would either be a generic ‘they’ or passive voice would be used instead or even an expletive subject. The arbitrary subject of the AG examples (45)-(46) resembles this kind of pro, mostly because of the evidence that it exists both in singular and plural, resembling a null pronoun and PROarb.

Interestingly however the arbitrary null infinitival subject never seems to appear overtly17. There is no evidence of an overt equivalent of ‘one’ or ‘they’ as an infinitival subject with the arbitrary/generic meaning. Indefinite pronouns such as tis ‘someone’ have an existential presupposition when they are used and can never mean ‘one’.

(53) Touto tis isto:
    This-acc someone-nom know-2 sg-imper
    ‘Let someone be aware of this.’

Sophocles, Ajax: 417

The ‘one’-type of interpretation can be made available with an impersonal construction without a dative argument.

(54) Aei kratiston esti tale: the: legein
    Always better-acc is-3 sg the thue (things)-acc to say
    ‘It is always better to say the truth’

(55) Prose: kei misein tous prodotas
    Is appropriate-3 sg to hate the traitors-acc
    ‘It appropriate (for us, for one) to hate the traitors’

Demosthenes, On the false embassy: 258

17 As is well-known, there can be no evidence of an ungrammatical construction in a dead language, since we do not have the ability to check for negative evidence. However, Geoff Horrocks, Theodore Markopoulos and Harris Platanakis, who I thank for their remarks on this issue, verify my claim. The lack of overt generic subjects in AG is not a property that seems to be confined to non-finite clauses and can be attributed to independent factors about the use and interpretation of overt pronouns in the language.

18 Taken from Bacharakis 1993, without further reference.
Based on the above, it suffices to say that PROarb is an instance of a null subject in accusative, visible on a predicate of a copula (as in CAAC), without the possibility of an overt counterpart.

2.4.4.2 Referential pro

The existence of two types of person features of PROarb in AG in addition to its ability to bear its own Case feature i.e. accusative, albeit it is null contrary to control, where the null subject copies the Case of its controller, provide evidence that this is a pro type of null element. If that is indeed the case, then we would expect that the referential variety of pro exists as well, since there is nothing in the system that would prevent that. This would mean that we would have data with a null accusative infinitival subject, with the Case morphology visible on the predicate of a copular infinitive where the null infinitival subject refers to an element previously introduced in the discourse, possibly in a previous clause or in general easily construed from the context but crucially not arbitrary. This prediction is actually borne out, based on data like the following.

(56) All’ emoige, ephe: o: So:crates, didakton einai dokei

But me-dat ge said-3 sg oh Socrates taught-acc-fem to be seems-3 sg

‘But, he said, for my part Socrates, I think it is teachable (wisdom)’

Plato, Euthydemus: 282c

In this example, the predicate didakton bears accusative case and this implies that its null subject does so as well. The infinitival subject does not have arbitrary interpretation, instead it refers to a notion of ‘wisdom’ previously introduced in the discourse, which is easily construed from the context (the previous sentence is a question from Socrates ‘do you think wisdom can be taught?’). This accusative on the predicate actually disambiguates the structure, in favour of a non-control interpretation of this -otherwise potentially ambiguous- sentence. To see the possibility of ambiguity consider the following example:

(57) Houto:s he:meis polu beltious to:n andro:n euchometh’ einai

This way we-nom much better-acc/nom the men-gen wish-we to-be-pres
‘This way we wish that you will be much better than the (other) men’

Aristophanes, *Thesmophoriazousae*: 810

In the above example the morphology on the predicate *beltious* is ambiguous between nominative and accusative, as it happens sometimes with adjectives and (neuter) nouns in AG. This makes the whole example ambiguous between a control interpretation, whereby the null infinitival subject would be controlled by the main verb’s subject and the meaning would be ‘we wish to become…’ and a non-control structure (which is actually the correct interpretation here, based on the context), whereby the meaning of the sentence would be, ‘we wish that you will become…’. In this case therefore, and since the morphology is ambiguous, confusion arises with respect to the interpretation of the null infinitival subject. In example (56) however, where the predicate bears unambiguously accusative case, the meaning is clear and it is the non-control interpretation. Needless to say that if the predicate of (56) was nominative, *didaktos*, the structure would be subject control with a meaning, ‘It seems that I am…’ and this is something that cannot be overridden\(^{19}\). Consider finally another example that illustrates the same phenomenon:

(58) All’ hosoi men eleutherias kai tou dikaiou epithumountes (…)

But whoever-nom men freedom-gen and justice-gen want-prtcl-nom

to:n humetero:n kinduno:n meteschon [ou pone:rous einai politas ](…)phe:mi

the our dangers-gen take part in-3pl not bad-acc to-be citizen-acc say-1 sg

‘But those who longing for freedom and justice shared our dangers, I conseder them not to be bad citizens.’


Example (58) above, involves two clauses: one with *meteschon* as the main verb, whose subject is *hosoi* and one with *phe:mi* as the main verb that also takes the infinitival

\(^{19}\) Contrary to exceptions in the opposite direction, like the ones we will discuss in section 2.7, where an accusative predicate might, in a very limited set of cases and under special circumstances, still have an interpretation where they are co-referential with an argument in the main clause, the opposite is never found. There can never be a nominative predicate and the construction not be subject control. I will come back to this observation in a later stage of my analysis.
clause as a complement. The bracketed infinitival clause has a null subject and its predicate surfaces in the accusative. The null infinitival subject is referential and actually refers to *osoi*, with which it has no thematic relation. This example is illuminating in two respects, firstly it is another instance of a referential accusative null infinitival subject, whose content is recovered from the context. Secondly it shows that an element cannot control an infinitival subject or trigger CAAC, unless the infinitive is embedded in that clause. The depth of embedding is not relevant, as we saw in examples (38) and (39) in section 2.4.5.3 but what is crucial is for the infinitival clause to be a complement or a complement of the complement of the verb whose argument controls the infinitival subject.

What is crucial in examples with referential accusative null subjects is not only the possibility of the use of a certain case morphology (accusative) on the predicate to disambiguate a structure, but also and more importantly the fact that there exists a referential, non-arbitrary, non-controlled infinitival subject. If this element is accusative *pro*, nothing would prevent it from appearing in the object position of ditransitives and we would expect to find object drop in AG. Consider the following example:

(59) Autos prothumoteros egenou to:n strate:go:n eme labein e: sauton

He-nom more willing-nom became the generals-gen-pl me-acc to get or him-acc

‘You from all the generals became more willing that I get this (the prize) than yourself.’

Plato, *Symposium*: 220 e, 6

The above example is an instance of object drop where the (definite) object of the infinitive *labein*, which is identified from the previous sentence as a prize, is dropped. Example (48) above, repeated below under (60) illustrates the same phenomenon.

(60) Oukoun nunde: eleges hoti estin he: arete: boulesthai te tagatha

Then not now said-2 sg that is-3 sg the virtue-nom to want the good things kai dunasthai;

and to be able

‘Did you not just say that virtue is for one to want good things and to be capable of them?’
In this case, the infinitive *boulesthai* takes the object *tagatha*, the next infinitive *dunasthai* takes the same object, which is dropped as it is easily construed. MG arguably has object drop only with indefinite objects and not with definite ones\(^{20}\), something which makes it a different situation to that just observed in AG. This is illustrated in the following minimal question and answer pair, pointed out to me by Sabine Iatridou, p.c.:

\[(61)\text{Ethis diavasi Marquez?}\]
Have read-2\textsuperscript{nd} Marquez

Ne, (*ton) eho diavasi
Yes him have read
‘Have you read Marquez? Yes, I have’

\[(62)\text{Ethis diavasi to ‘ekato hronia monaksias’?}\]
Have read-2\textsuperscript{nd} the hundred years solitude-gen

Ne, *(to) eho diavasi
Yes it have read
‘Have you read ‘a hundred years of solitude’? Yes, I have’

In AG however, we see that this is not the case, as the dropped object in example (59) is definite and not a generic, indefinite prize. As a matter of fact the distribution of AG dropped objects is very much discourse-constrained: although AG does not have any object agreement, objects are nonetheless dropped when they can easily construed from the context. Moreover, unlike Italian, AG objects are not always interpreted as arbitrary. The data on object drop imply that an accusative *pro* exists in AG independently and therefore it is not just postulated for theory internal reasons in the position of infinitival subjects as we have argued here. Additionally, we see that *pro* in object drop and as an infinitival subject is licensed in a very similar manner, i.e. only when the context supports it. Note however that not every language that has object-drop needs to have it as a subject of infinitives (even if that language has AcI).

To summarise the data from this section we can say that these data on arbitrary and referential null infinitival subjects argue for a split in the lines of null infinitival subject regarding the Case they bear. On the one hand there are controlled null subjects that seem to copy their controller, while on the other hand there are the ones we argued are like pro, arbitrary and referential that are marked with accusative Case, which is the canonical Case for infinitival subjects in AG, as seen in AcI. The existence of the accusative Case feature on the predicate of a copular infinitive sometimes disambiguates examples that would otherwise be considered control structures.

2.5 The rest of the distribution
In the previous sections we presented infinitival clauses with overt and null subjects. The distribution that we discussed was mainly when infinitives function as complements of a variety of verbs like verbs of saying (ex. 15), thinking (ex. 14), wanting (ex. 16) etc. We felt that presenting the data firstly based on the overt vs. null subject distinction and then within the null subjects the different Case patterns observed (CAAC vs. null accusatives), would be more telling. However, one of the most intriguing aspects of AG infinitival syntax that we need to account for is the fact that overt (accusative) infinitival subjects can be found in a wide variety of environments, in much more generalised contexts than English ECM for example. This section therefore will complete the picture of the distribution of infinitival clauses in AG, by providing examples of a variety of verbs that take infinitival complements as well as other interesting environments with infinitives. We will not discuss the following examples extensively, since we are including them here for the sake of completeness. We will merely give the relevant example and then comment on it very briefly.

2.5.1 Complements of perception verbs

(63) Akouo: Dio:nos en tois malista hetairon einai te se nun kai gegonenai dia pantos
Hear-1 sg Dion-gen in the-dat most beloved-acc to be-pres and you-acc now and to be-prf for ever
‘I hear that you are and always have been one of Dion’s most intimate companions.’
The above example is an instance of an infinitive functioning as the complement of a perception verb. The verb *akouo:* takes the infinitival clause as a complement with an overt accusative subject, *se.* The possibility of CAAC with such verbs is not clear to us, since we have not found any relevant examples.

### 2.5.2 Complement of Control verbs

So far, in order to illustrate control we have seen examples with verbs like *boulomai* ‘want’. Obviously this is not the only control verb that takes infinitival complements. The following example is an instance of a controlled infinitival clause with *peiro:mai* ‘try’.

(64)

Metria d’ echo:n toutois peiro :mai [ nautikois ergazesthai.]
Moderate then have-prtcpl these-dat try-1 sg in-the-sea to-work
‘Having a moderate capital, I try to work in the sea.’

Demosthenes, Apaturius: 4.6

*Peiro:mai* in this example takes an infinitival clause as a complement, whose subject seems to be controlled. Joseph, 1992 however argues that the status of this verb as a control or a raising predicate is not entirely clear. In examples like the above it is not easy to distinguish between the two, and therefore we will not commit on any analysis about it. We will discuss extensively the possibility of the same predicate being control and raising in relation to *doko:* ‘seem’, in section 2.6.1. The next example is an instance of another control predicate.

(65) Ho de hupescheto tauta poie:sein
The-nom then promised-1 sg these-acc to do-fut
‘He then promised that he will do these things.’

Lysias, Eratosthenes: 14, 6

In (65) again the verb *hupischnoumai* ‘promise’ controls the subject of its complement infinitival clause. Unfortunately due to the overall rarity of CAAC, it has not been easy
to come across examples with more verbs that exemplify it. We think however, that if it was possible to test it we would find it in all cases of control.

2.5.3 Subject Infinitival clauses:

(66) Homologeitai [te:n polin he:mo:n archaiotate:n einai.]  
Is-accepted the-town Acc our-Gen very-ancient to-be.  
‘It is widely admitted that our town is the oldest.’  
Isocrates, Panegyricus: 23

The above example features a passive verb that has no overt nominal subject. Under current assumptions, we could postulate a null expletive *pro* while traditional grammars assumed that the whole infinitival clause is the subject of the passive verb. In example (12) above, with the impersonal *dokei* the thematic subject of the verb was construed by the dative experiencer argument. Passive verbs do not take dative arguments, so their thematic subject can only be construed as a generic, arbitrary *pro*. As we can see in the above example, the infinitival clause has an overt accusative subject and this shows fairly straightforwardly that the Case of the infinitival subject cannot be dependent on the main verb: passive verbs do not have an accusative feature available, so the Case of the infinitival subject cannot be attributed to that. The exact analysis of such verbs is not an issue that we will take on here, we could assume that the whole clause is the subject, or that it is the associate of a null expletive subject. The importance of these examples is that they are arguments against ECM analyses of AcI, since they show that infinitival clauses (with overt or null subjects) can be the arguments of passives or impersonals, where there is no accusative feature available.

2.5.4 Adjunct Clauses:

The following two examples are instances of adjunct infinitival clauses that function as temporal or result clauses, introduced with specific overt complementizers.

*Temporal clauses introduced with prin ‘before’*

(67) Hoi proteron en Amphipolei oikountes [prin Philippon labein,]  
The-nom before in Amphipolis live-prt-nom before Philip-acc to-get-past
te:n Athenaiο:n cho:ran eichon.
the-fem Athenians-gen country had-3 pl.
‘Those who inhabited Amphipolis, before Philip took it, were holding Athenian territory.’

Demosthenes, *Halonessus* : 28

**Result clauses introduced with ho:ste ‘so that’**

(68) Hoi tektones (...) pantes polemika hopla kateskeuazon, [ho:ste
The builders-nom all-nom of-war arms produced so that
te:n polin onto:s oiesthai polemou ergaste:ron einai ]
the city-acc really to-think-prs war-gen institution-acc to-be-prs
‘The builders were all producing arms for war, so that one really thought the city was an institution of war.’

Xenophon, *Hellenika III* : 4, 17:6

Adjunct infinitival clauses are a very interesting case, since they are some of the few instances where infinitival clauses are not dependent on a main verb and instead they appear in an unambiguously bi-clausal environment. In cases like the ones above, where the infinitival clauses are adverbial there is no thematic or selectional relation between them and the verb of the main clause. This is yet another argument against an ECM-type of analysis for AcI: if infinitives can appear with overt accusative subjects in such environments (as is the case in both examples (67) and (68), it is clear that the main verb cannot be responsible for the Case of the infinitival subject. ECM requires that the main verb selects as a complement the infinitival clause whose argument it exceptionally Case-marks. If on the other hand one postulates ECM as a mechanism in complement infinitival clauses with AcI and not in adjunct clauses like the above, this implies two separate mechanisms for the same phenomenon, a clearly undesirable and uneconomical conclusion.

Another very important thing is that these adjunct clauses are introduced with overt complementizers. This is an initial indication that all infinitives are CPs, something that could provide some insight about their syntactic properties and their overall
behaviour. In section 4.3 in chapter 4, we will argue precisely about that and we will come back to adjunct infinitival clauses of this sort.

### 2.5.5 Infinitive substituting the imperative in main clauses:


‘Foreigner, go tell the Spartans that we lay here, loyal to their orders.’

Herodotus, *Historia* VII: 228

Infinitives can sometimes substitute a verb in the imperative mood. Their overt subjects in such cases are in the Vocative Case, as is standard with all verbs in the imperative. This does not mean that infinitives in general can have overt subjects in a Case other than accusative, which would be something that would complicate matters quite a lot. Instead it seems that infinitives mimic the imperatives in all respects in such examples, and therefore by analogy also take subjects in the vocative.

### 2.5.6 Articular infinitive

(70) Apisto:si to:i eme tetime:sthai hupo daimono:n

‘They don’t believe that I am honoured by the Gods.’

Xenophon, *Apologia*: 14

Lastly as we can see in the above example, infinitives can be introduced with determiners and they can therefore be nominalized and function in the place of nouns. In example (70) above, the infinitive introduced with the dative determiner *to:i* functions as the (dative) object of the verb *apistoo*:. Articular infinitives can have distinct subjects in the accusative as in the case above, or exhibit control from the main verb.
2.6 Apparent counterexamples

The generalizations as they emerge so far from the data involve:

(a) Overt accusative infinitival subjects (disjoint reference, emphasis/contrast)
(b) Null Case-less infinitival subjects (CAAC-control)
(c) Null accusative infinitival subjects (arbitrary and referential pro)

The fact that AcI exists and is the predominant infinitival structure has never been questioned. Traditional grammars however have sometimes assumed that infinitives have overt subjects in different Case other than accusative, namely nominative. The data that allegedly illustrate this claim are of two sorts: firstly they are the CAAC/control data that we discussed in section 2.4.5. Case agreement is supposed to argue for a null infinitival subject marked with different Case. This is not something we want to challenge, however we think that CAAC does not show us that infinitives can actually license subjects in Case other than accusative. What it does show is that the null controlled infinitival subjects somehow cannot bear accusative Case. The exact formulation of our intuition will come in Chapter 4. We will therefore not dwell on these cases in this section.

In the following two sections (2.6.1 and 2.6.2) we will discuss trickier cases of “apparent” overt Nominative infinitival subjects. We will argue that all these cases can be reduced to raising, long-distance agreement (LDA) and agreement mismatches and are crucially not instances of non-Accusative infinitival subjects. We will also discuss different Case agreement patterns with different constructions of verbs doko: and exesti that display true optionality and challenge the control vs. raising divide. In section 2.6.3 we will discuss exceptions to the generalisation that (object) Control exhibits CAAC. We will conclude that CAAC fails in these cases for reasons independent of the mechanism involved.

2.6.1 Dokei: Raising/LDA, optional CAAC and apparent Nominatives

The most common case of apparent Nominative infinitival subject has to do with verbs like dokei. As we have seen in section 2.2, these verbs have both the ‘personal’ and the ‘impersonal’ construction. The latter was exemplified in example (13), repeated below under (71):
(71) Dokei moi aporon einai
   Seems-3 sg to me-dat difficult-acc to be
   ‘It seems to me to be difficult’
   Lysias, Eratosthenes: 1

This is a prototypical impersonal construction, with the main verb surfacing with default, third person singular agreement, a dative argument as a thematic subject and an infinitival clause, possibly as a structural subject. In this section we will focus on cases where there are also nominative Case arguments in these constructions:

(72) all’ edokei autois houtos epite:deios einai me:nute:s
    but seemed-3 sg them-dat he-nom useful-nom to be prosecutor-nom
    ‘But he seemed to them to be a useful prosecutor.’
    Lysias, Agoratum: 18

The third person agreement on the verb in example (72) presumably indicates that this is an impersonal construction, where the infinitival clause is the subject of edokei and the dative the experiencer argument. This example also features (here in bold) the Nominative argument houtos and its Case-agreeing predicate inside the infinitive epite:deios me:nute:s. Based on the position of the nominative argument, which is found adjacent to the infinitive as well as the fact that this is supposed to be an impersonal construction, traditional grammars have considered the nominative as the subject of the infinitive.

Within current theoretical frameworks however, this example can receive a straightforward explanation as an instance of long distance agreement (LDA). The main verb, edokei is personal and it has the nominative argument houtos as its subject. The fact that there also exists a dative argument does not pose any problems, since it is not uncommon to find a construction with both an overt Nominative (structural) subject and a Dative (thematic) one. If this was indeed the case then we would never expect to find agreement mismatch between this verb and the Nominative in the clause, as in all raising constructions. Consider example (12) repeated here under (73):
In this example the verb is in the third person plural agreeing with its nominative subject *pantes*. The existence of the nominative does not prevent a dative experiencer, *emoige* from surfacing. In this example it is not possible to argue that the main verb is impersonal and that the Nominative is a subject of the infinitive, simply because the verb is not in third person singular, which can be considered default agreement. It surfaces in the third person plural instead with an overt agreeing nominative subject. Based on examples like this, we want to argue that all instances of nominative subjects in such constructions are subjects of the main verbs and not of the infinitives, eliminating the possibility that overt infinitival subjects can surface in any other Case than accusative.

Sometimes the subject of *doko*: can coincide with the dative argument, in an apparently uneconomical manner. It is interesting to explore the Case agreeing patterns when the infinitival clause that is an argument of *doko*: has a copula with a predicate. Consider the following two examples.

(74) *Doko*: moi *adunatos* einai

‘I think that I am weak’

Plato, *Republic*: 2. 368b

(75) *Kai moi* doko:, ei me: *proteros heo:rake*: auton e: ekeinos eme, and me-dat think-I if not before see-3rd sg-pfr him-acc or he-nom me-acc *apho:nos* an genesthai speechless-nom an to-become-pres ‘If I had not seen him before, I think that I would be speechless.’

Plato, *Republic*: 1. 336d
Both are quite interesting examples for a number of reasons: first of all, as we already said *doko*: is in the first person singular, with a null subject and yet a co-referential dative argument. This makes it look like a *I seem to me (to be beautiful)* type of construction that looks curious. Moreover although the predicate of the infinitival clause could be in dative, agreeing with the dative argument, instead it is in nominative, agreeing with the (null) subject. This however, is not the only pattern we get. Consider the following example as well.

(76) *Epieikei* an moi doko: pros touton legein

Lenient-*dat* an to me-*dat* seem-1sg about these-*acc* to speak

‘I think I speak fairly to him’

Plato, *Apology*: 34d

In example (76) we see the other logical alternative within CAAC, with the infinitival predicate surfacing in dative Case, agreeing with the dative experiencer in the main clause. The difference in Case agreement does not seem to involve any difference in meaning so we are forced to regard these two constructions as optional, with the optionality lying in the lexical properties of the verb in each example. Schematically examples (74) and (75) can be represented as follows:

(74') \[ V \ Nom_t \ Dat_t \ Inf_t \ Pred_{nom} \]

(76') \[ V \ Nom \ Dat \ [ \ PRO_{dat} \ Inf \ Pred_{dat} ] \]

This way the difference between (74) and (76) would be attributed to the same verb *doko*: having both a raising and a control variant. In (74’) we assume that the argument was

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21 There is a slight complication with this example as it is debatable whether the correct transcription is *epieikei* or *epieike:i*: in the former case, the one we adopt here, the adjective is an adverbial predicate in the dative case, agreeing with the dative argument of *dokei*. In the latter case however, if it actually is *epieike:i*: it would be an accusative plural object, ‘I say lenient things’. Examples of CAAC with a dative are very rare to find but example (34) in section 2.4.3.3 is another clear instance of such a case with the verb *exesti* whose syntax is very similar to impersonal *dokei*. Our point therefore, about CAAC being possible both with a nominative and with a dative controller remains intact.

22 Although this predicate is an adverbial one, the agreement rules are exactly the same as the canonical subject/predicate ones, as we have already discussed.

23 I wish to thank Norvin Richards for making this point to me.
generated in the infinitival clause and then moved to the main clause (conventionally marking this with the use of a trace, ti), being licensed in Nominative and therefore transmitting it to the infinitival predicate. In (76’) the dative experiencer argument of the main verb controls the PRO subject of the infinitive, transmitting its Case to it and therefore the predicate can surface in Dative. We do not want to commit to a PRO-based account for AG infinitives at this stage and PRO is used here purely configurationally, denoting the null controlled infinitival subject. Whatever particular analysis we decide on for AG null infinitivals, we will retain the intuition that Control is different from Raising and therefore the essence of the observation made here will be kept intact.

Before we move on we want to point out that these data can provide us with a type of diagnostic between a syntactic and a semantic treating of control that we saw in the previous chapter (cf. Section 1.3). Therefore, another way to see the difference in Case pattern between examples (74) and (76) is to say that both cases are instances of control24, and their difference lies in the choice of controller. If that is indeed the case, a semantic account of the choice of controller (Farkas, 1988, Jackendoff & Culicover, 2001) would not have anything to say about these examples, since in both cases the thematic argument that controls is the same, i.e. the experiencer of the verb. Admittedly syntactic accounts cannot account for which arguments controls the infinitival subjects and consequently transmits its Case to it. But optionality is a notion which is more easily accounted for in syntax, than in lexical semantics.

The examples that we discussed in this section show us the peculiar case agreement patterns that are exhibited with verbs like doko:. We argued that both in personal and impersonal constructions of this verb, there are no non-Accusative infinitival subjects. Instead whenever there is an overt nominative argument we have argued that it is the subject of the main verb. We have not discussed the exact differences between Raising and Control constructions, but we will come back to them in Chapter 4.

24 An argument in favour of such an account is that it is not the case that only raising predicates/constructions exhibit CAAC with a nominative argument: the verb boulomai ‘want’ can very easily have the same pattern (i.e. voulomai sophos genesthai- want-1 sg wise-nom to become) and there is no way to analyse this as raising. Therefore an analysis that has a uniform account of all nominative CAAC (as control and not as raising) is conceptually superior to another one that deals with some as instances of raising and some others as instances of control. The only constructions that we will analyse as raising are those with overt nominative subjects like examples (72) and (73). For a direct comparison between raising and control in AG, see Chapter 4, section 4.4.4.2.
2.6.2 Phe:mi: agreement mismatches and case-marked modifiers

The use of infinitives in indirect speech, with verbs like phe:mi is extremely common. AcI is found in this environment as commonly as in any other. However, there are some examples that are considered to involve Nominative infinitival subjects. Let us look into some of them.

(77)(oute gar an ego: apophe:saimi)

hos ouden phe:mi allo epistasthai e: ta ero:tika

who-nom nothing-acc say-1 sg anything-acc to know but the love things-acc

‘(I do not see how I could decline) me who says that I know nothing else apart from love-matters.’

Plato, Symposium: 177 d

(78) Kai nun ero:tais [ei echo: se didaxai] hos ou phe:mi

And now ask-2sg who-nom not say-1 sg

didache:n einai all’ anamne: sin
teaching-acc to be but recollection-acc

‘And now you are asking, if I can instruct you when I say that there is no teaching but only recollection.’

Plato, Meno: 82a

The two examples above involve non-restrictive relative clauses, illustrating what we can call the “royal he” effect, whereby the subject of the relative clause is a third person pronoun (in bold) and the verb is in the first person. The crucial thing for our purposes is that there is only syntactic and not semantic agreement mismatch in these cases since the third person pronoun and the first person verb refer to the same individual, namely the speaker. This construction is the exact opposite of the English sentence ‘You cannot say this to me, who is such a good cook’ as can be seen from the translation. Traditional grammars however regarded that the verb has a null first person pronoun subject, while the third person pronoun in Nominative is the subject of the infinitive: this way they would not need to resort to a suspension of rigid subject-verb agreement rules, even if they didn’t have any semantic effect. However, we want to argue here that since there is no semantic mismatch between the overt subject and the agreement on the verb, the
Nominative is indeed the subject of the verb. Ian Roberts pointed out to me that this does not even need to be considered as agreement mismatch since third person can be thought of as absence of person.

The following two examples are by no means exceptional, on the contrary they are quite straightforward Control examples where the absence of an overt infinitival subject and the surfacing of the infinitival predicate in Nominative Case yielding the Subject Control interpretation. The interesting thing about them however is that the Control interpretation in question is achieved with a typically non-Control predicate like *phe:mi*. The outcome seems quite odd and initially it might seem that these examples could be a case of (null) Nominative infinitival subject that is not co-referential with the main clause subject. All major translations of this work however (since both examples are from the same author and play), show that this is not the case and these are really instances of Control. The moral of the story is that an infinitival predicate in Nominative *always* denotes Control, irrespective of whether it looks initially plausible or not.

(79) *Athanatos einai phe:mi Dionusos Dios, touton de doulon (einai)*

Immortal-nom to be say-1sg Dionysus-nom Zeus-gen him-acc slave-acc

‘I say that I am immortal Dionysus the son of Zeus and he is a slave’

Aristophanes, *Frogs*: 631-632

(80) *Epeide: kai su phe:s einai theos (…)*

Because and you-nom say-2sg to be god-nom

‘Since you claim to be a god’

Aristophanes, *Frogs*: 635

CAAC with subject Control seems like a more robust mechanism than with Object Control, as there have not been any exceptions observed with the former (as examples (79) and (80) demonstrate). We will discuss exceptions to Object Control in the following section and we will try to provide independent reasons for why they exist. Example (77) is interesting for another reason: the infinitive *einaí* takes the predicate *athanatos Dionusos* as its predicate in the nominative, under standard CAAC. There also exists another predicate in the accusative, *doulon* whose overt subject *touton* is also in
accusative, for which we postulated the null infinitive in brackets. This is of course an instance of contrast between control manifested through Case agreement and disjoint reference manifested through AcI. This example reminds us of the contrastive cases of AcI discussed in section 2.4.5.3 like in examples (41) and (42). We will come back to these cases in Chapter 4.

The last two examples of this section have to do with the use of the overt modifier autos. The use of the Nominative pronoun autos and especially its peculiar position in examples like the following has led traditional grammars to regard it as the subject of the infinitive. However, here we will argue that it is actually a modifier of the infinitival subject, copying the case of the case-marked PRO involved in these structures. Let us look into the first relevant example.

(81) (Kleο:n) ouk ephe: autos all’ ekeinon strate:gein

Kleon not said-3 sg he-nom but him-acc to be general-pres

‘Kleon didn’t say that he was general himself, but somebody else.’

Thucydides, Historia IV: 28, 2

What makes this example look like an exceptional case is the fact that the pronoun autos seems to be an overt nominative infinitival subject. Instead we want to propose that this is a straightforward instance of CAAC, with the case transferred not to an adjectival predicate (as we have seen in all previous cases) but to a modifier for the subject. The same way PRO seems to be case-marked in cases of control and in turn transfers its case to the adjectival predicate of copular constructions, here it allows its modifier to surface in nominative, the case of the controller. The structure of example (81) could be the following:

(82)[CP [TP Kleο:n [NEG ouk [TP ephe: [CP autos PRO (strate:gein) [CP [C all’ [TP ekeinon [t strate:gein, [V_i]]]]]]]]]]

This schema shows a simple instance of a main verb ephe: taking two co-ordinated infinitival clauses, the first one is an elliptical control infinitive, with the infinitive null and only the nominative modifier autos present, signalling that this is a control structure. The second infinitive is a classic instance of AcI, with the overt accusative ekeinon.
Interestingly, this is a contrastive structure where the modifier is placed next to the subject of the Acl infinitive, and the effect is very clear: nominative signals control, while accusative signals obviation. This observation will be made relevant in Chapter 4, where we will outline our proposal.

The final example we will discuss in this section is another case of a nominative modifier. This time there is not a [Nom vs. Acc] situation but this is a simpler case instead.

(83) Αλλα πεί:μεν εγώ:γε ο: Σο:κράτες καί αυτός τοιούτος είναι
   But say-1 sg I-nom oh Socrates-voc and he-Nom such-Nom to be
   [hoion su huphe:gei:] who-Acc you-nom indicate-2sg

   Plato, Gorgias: 458b
   ‘I too, Socrates, claim to be of the sort you indicate.’

Although this could seem like a straightforward case of a subject modifier, the position that *autos* is found at, namely adjacent to the infinitive, has led traditional grammars to regard it as the infinitival subject. If we assume a similar situation than before however, this problem disappears since *autos* surfaces in nominative because it modifies the null nominative PRO that is involved in subject control structures. Note that the element *kai* just before *autos* is not the conjunction marker that links sentences, instead it is what is referred to as the *intensive* marker, which accompanies focused elements\(^{25}\). This example concludes our discussion about apparent nominative infinitival subjects.

### 2.6.3 Control with no CAAC

In this last section we will discuss two examples, where although we have a control interpretation and a null infinitival subject, CAAC fails and the predicate of the copular infinitive surfaces in the accusative. Consider the following example, pointed out to me by Theodore Markopoulos.

\(^{25}\) This point will be made relevant in Chapter 4 when we lay down our analysis and discuss extensively such intensive markers (like *kai, te, ge*) and we argue that they canonically accompany elements in Nominative and not in Accusative.
(84) Lakedaimoniois exesti humin philous genesthai bebaio:s.
Lakedemonians-dat is possible you-dat friends-acc to be-pres of course
‘Of course it is possible for you to become friends of the Spartans.’

Thucydides, Historia IV: 20, 3

The impersonal main verb *exesti* has its dative experiencer argument *humin*. The infinitival verb *genesthai* has a null subject and a predicate in accusative, *philous* although it actually refers to the dative argument of the main verb. Finally the topicalised dative *Lakedaimoniois* is an argument of the infinitival predicate *philous*. According to the data we presented in the section on control by a dative argument, the infinitival predicate should surface in the dative since it refers to the dative argument, like in example (34) repeated here under (85):

(85) Nun soi exestin [andri genesthai.]
Now you-dat is-possible man-dat to become
‘It is now possible for you to become brave.’

Xenophon, Anabasis: VII.1.21

If that were the case then (84) would look like (86):

(86) Lakedaimoniois exesti humin philois genesthai bebaio:s.
Lakedemonians-dat is possible you-dat friends-dat to be-pres of course

If that had been the case then practically every argument of both predicates would be in the dative. A possible account for what happens is that CAAC is suspended in order for such a situation to be avoided.

The following interesting example, taken from Philippaki-Warburton & Catsimali, 1989: example (22) (without further reference), might shed an interesting light to the previous discussion:

(87) Houtoi edee:the:san Athe:naio:n [sphisi boe:thous PRO genesthai]
They-nom asked Athenians-gen them-dat assistants-acc to become
‘They requested the Athenians, PRO, to become their assistants.’
In the above example we have a situation quite similar to that of example (84) where the predicate \textit{boe:thous} of the infinitive surfaces in the accusative case although it refers to the genitive object of the main verb, \textit{Athe:naio:n}. In this example, we cannot resort to an account similar to the one we proposed earlier, claiming that CAAC would result in all arguments surfacing in one Case and thus creating confusion. What we could propose for this example instead that could also be applied to the previous one is that these are instances of non-obligatory control (NOC) and therefore CAAC does not actually fail to apply but actually \textit{cannot} apply. Predicates \textit{exesti} (ex.85) and \textit{deomai} (ex.87) are not obligatory control-OC predicates and therefore the null subjects of their infinitival complements need not transfer the case of the controller. By analogy to the vast majority of overt infinitival subjects, the predicates in these cases surface in accusative case. This can be taken as an argument that these examples are instances of \textit{accidental co-reference} and not true Control and it is only the latter that is manifested through CAAC that fails to be established in these cases. So, CAAC can be regarded as a mechanism reserved by the language for OC cases only and not for any kind of co-reference.

\textbf{2.7 Conclusion}

In this chapter we presented the main body of the AG data from infinitival clauses. Having briefly discussed certain aspects of AG grammar, we moved on to the morphology of AG infinitives and we saw that they are inflected for tense/aspect. The data can be summarized as follows: infinitival subjects are overt and (accusative) Case marked in instances of disjoint reference and emphasis/contrast. In cases of control, direct Case agreement between the predicate in the infinitival clause and its controller in the main clause (CAAC) is exhibited. Finally there also exists an infinitival null subject in the accusative, possibly \textit{pro}, both referential and arbitrary. We also showed that AG infinitival clauses have an extensive distribution, functioning as complements of a wide variety of verbs, subjects of passives and impersonals, (a limited range of) adjunct clauses, instead of nouns (\textit{articular} infinitive) among others. Last but not least we argued against the existence of any other type of overt infinitival subject in a Case other than accusative, and examples that were regarded as such by traditional grammars were reduced to instances of LDA/Raising, agreement mismatches and case-marked modifiers.
The data in this Chapter pose several important questions that need to be addressed in any analysis of AG infinitives:

(a) What licenses Accusative in environments of disjoint reference and emphasis?

(b) What ‘suppresses’ Accusative in Control (resulting in CAAC) but not in accidental co-reference or pro\textsubscript{acc}?

(c) In other words, is the availability or not of Accusative in the position of infinitival subject optional or is there something that regulates it and if yes, what is it?

(d) What is the status of AG infinitival clauses?

(e) What kind of mechanism is CAAC?

In the following Chapter we will present and discuss analyses of other languages that have overt infinitival subjects and we will explore the possibility of these analyses accounting for the AG data as well. The more important question that needs to be adequately addressed, which seems to be a unique thing to AG infinitives is point (c) above and it is to this that we will focus our criticism of other analyses.
Chapter 3: How to deal with overt subjects for infinitives: previous analyses

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter we presented the data about the subjects of infinitives in AG. The following table summarises the situation so far.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disjoint reference (a)</th>
<th>Accusative DP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AcI</td>
<td>Emphatic/contrastive (b)</td>
<td>Accusative pronoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject (c)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Null Nom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Object (d)</td>
<td>Null Acc/Gen/Dat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referential (e)</td>
<td>Referential (e)</td>
<td>Null Acc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{Pro}_{acc}</td>
<td>Arbitrary (f)</td>
<td>Null Acc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table (1) Typology of overt and null subjects in AG infinitives*

\textit{Accusativus cum Infinitivo} (AcI) can be found with infinitival subjects that are distinct from the subject of the main clause (a) and when the infinitival subject is emphatic/contrastive (b). Control on the other hand, is signalled with case agreement between the controller and the main clause and the infinitival subject visible on the predicate of a copular infinitive-CAAC. The Case of the null infinitival subject can be nominative for subject control (c) and accusative, genitive or dative for object control (d) according to the subcategorisation properties of the main verb. Finally there arguably exists an accusative pro subject of AG infinitives that can either be referential (e) or arbitrary (f), the latter standardly being referred to as PRO_{arb}. A subject of the type (e) seems to be unique to AG infinitives and is signalled with null accusative, as is the arbitrary pro. We are separating the controlled from the arbitrary infinitival subject (essentially disjoining what has been traditionally been assumed controlled from arbitrary PRO), pairing the latter with the referential variety based on the different case agreement patterns in the data we are dealing with. Obligatory control (OC) is signalled with case agreement between the controller in the main clause and the null infinitival subject (giving the impression that accusative is disallowed in these constructions) while the arbitrary infinitival subject illustrates the availability of accusative case in this position, like in standard AcI. The interchange between AcI and CAAC shows that control must be a ‘property of chains’ in the sense
that case-agreement is a syntactic mechanism, which disambiguates a control from a non-control structure. Semantics plays the minimum role of CAAC being possible only with a class of verbs that is in principle compatible with a control interpretation.

The questions posed by these data, that need to be addressed in any analysis concerning infinitival subjects in AG are the following:

(a) What licenses the accusative for the infinitival subject in cases (a-b) and (e-f)?
(b) What disallows accusative in cases (c-d) and how is case agreement established between the controlled infinitival subject and its antecedent in the main clause?
(c) Is an overt accusative (a-b) different from a null accusative (e-f)? Is it licensed in a different way, by a different mechanism?

The uniqueness of the situation in AG lies in the existence of both overt, Case-marked subjects and the control structures that exhibit no availability of case. Any analysis that is put forward to deal with this phenomenon should find a way to account for a reason for this interchange.

The role of this chapter is twofold: we will firstly present the data of languages with overt nominative and accusative infinitival subjects and then we will discuss the main analyses about them. We will start with Latin AcI and discuss the ECM type of analyses that were the first ones to have been proposed. We will present counterarguments for such an approach for Latin and we will extend them to AG. Latin is of central importance because it has both the AcI and CAAC/control options.

Afterwards we will present Rizzi’s, 1982 influential Aux-to-Comp analysis and consequently we will also present the relevant data from Italian. The Aux-to-Comp analysis along with Kayne, 1984 that we have already discussed, are the main

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1 This question will be made clearer in the light of our analysis that links the availability of overt case realisation of the infinitival subject with the existence of an active Focus head in the left periphery of the infinitival clauses. Under our assumptions, case marked elements are focused elements and arguably this is not possible with null elements. In other words, case availability is linked to the overt expression of the subject DP and this does not seem to be the case in examples (e-f). We will tackle those issues in detail in chapter 4.

2 For an overview of various existing analyses about Romance languages see Menching, 2000.

3 Although there are important differences between the two languages and it is not clear that an analysis for one can be straightforwardly extended to account the other as well, still Latin AcI is the closest phenomenon to AG AcI. In Chapter 5 we will try to extend our analysis to account for the Latin data as well.
analyses that have argued explicitly for the role of C in Case licensing of infinitival subjects. Every other analysis after that (that is not of the ECM-type) in a way modifies Rizzi’s intuition. After Italian, we will present the data from European Portuguese inflected infinitives and discuss Raposo’s, 1987 analysis. Then we will discuss infinitival constructions with overt nominative subjects in Southern Italian dialects and the analysis of Ledgeway, 2000. Then we will present the situation in Romance with reference to the Spanish and Sardinian personal infinitive in relation to the European Portuguese inflected infinitives and the analysis of Sitaridou, 2002. Finally, for this part of the chapter we will discuss Latin again and the newer analysis that exists for this data, that of Cecchetto & Oniga, 2001, which is a variant of Aux-to-Comp unlike the first analyses for the phenomenon.

In the remainder of the chapter we will discuss the few analyses that already exist for AG (overt and null) infinitival subjects. These are those by Horrocks, 1987, Philippaki-Warburton & Catsimali, 1989, Tantalou, 2003, Sevdali, 2003 and Spyropoulos, 2005. These are divided into two main camps: those that capitalise on the role of infinitival C and those that regard Case licensing of infinitival subjects on a par with Case licensing in finite clauses, from a functional element in the infinitival clause, namely non-finite T. Most of these analyses fail to adequately account for the AcI vs. CAAC distinction and we therefore will not adopt them. All of them attribute Case properties to C one way or another, the differences having to do with the exact nature of the feature in question as well as the exact relation between C and T. Most analyses pinpoint finiteness as the relevant feature, which is in the lower domain of the left periphery following Rizzi’s, 1997 system, and thus envisaging the C-T relation as a temporal relation. Our analysis also attributes Case properties to C and its interaction with infinitival T, but it does so by employing a discourse feature of C located in the upper part of the C-domain. We think that the AG data show that discourse related properties of the clause like emphasis and contrast can interact with T’s case features to yield the Case patterns we get.

3.2 AcI in Latin, the first attempts: ECM?

In this section we will present the debate that took place in the late ‘70’s-early ‘80’s that had to do with the first formal attempts to characterize the AcI phenomenon, where the first attempt was to reduce AcI to ECM. After presenting this view, we will
give the counterarguments from the literature concerning Latin and then extend them to AG as well. This way we can rule out the option of any type of ECM analysis for AG infinitives.

3.2.1 The original ECM analysis: Pepicello, 1977

Pepicello, 1977 argues that the accusative infinitival subject is the raised object of the main verb. The main goal of the paper is to make comments concerning Raising and where it applies and the discussion revolves around the notion of Primacy as outlined in Ross, 1972, the crucial idea behind it being that when a node A c-commands node B transformations that apply to node B must also apply in node A but not vice versa. Therefore, the line of reasoning is as follows: if there is Raising to object in Latin then there must also be Raising to subject for Latin not to disobey Primacy. In order to establish the former Pepicello discusses data from passivisation such as the following (1) (his 4):

(1) ...qui unus omnium justissimus fuisse traditur.

who alone of-all most just-nom to-be is-said
‘...who alone is said to have been the most just of all.’

Cicero, pro Sestio, 67.141

In this example (known in the traditional literature as Nominativus Cum Infinitivo, NcI) the subject unus of the passivised verb traditur is also semantically the subject of the infinitive fuisse. Therefore in order for it to be able to become the subject of the main verb, it must have been at some point of the derivation its object, since direct Subject-to-Subject raising across clauses is not allowed. Therefore, Pepicello argues that the subject of the infinitive has to be raised to the object position of the main verb before it can be further raised as the subject of the verb when passivised. Crucially, he also argues that the accusative infinitival subject always surfaces in the object position of the main verb in the canonical cases of AcI as well, like the one below taken from Bolkenstein, 1979:

(2) dico te [ venisse ]

Say-I you-acc to-have-come.
‘I say that you have come.’
Pepicello therefore analyses the familiar AcI construction as an instance of raising to object as well. Therefore, assuming Primacy, one would expect to find subject raising in Latin as well. This is not the case with the canonical raising predicates like *apparet* ‘it appears’, *accidit* ‘it happens’, *evenit* ‘it turns out’, *aequum est* ‘it is right’ and *verisimile est* ‘it is likely’ as it would be expected. In order to account for this fact and not to prove Primacy wrong, he argues that it is semantic reasons that make raising impossible with these predicates ‘(…) the verbs and adjectives under consideration act like idioms when they are employed in their specialized senses (…) the specialized semantic readings are syntactically restricted to impersonal construction’ (Pepicello, 1977:213). So, it is the idiomatic meanings of these predicates that block raising, not something in the syntax of Latin.

In the section devoted to AcI alone Pepicello discusses a traditional approach according to which the emergence of the AcI construction stemmed from ditransitive verbs taking two objects, one accusative and one infinitive and then this generalized to other verbs as well, giving the impression that the accusative is to be associated with the infinitive. Regarding this, Pepicello poses three important synchronic questions:

(a) Why is the agent/subject of the infinitive in the accusative?
(b) If the AcI equals a full (embedded) clause, why is the ‘verb’ in infinitival form?
(c) What is the categorical status of these constructions?

The answer to the first question is very straightforward under his analysis: the infinitival subject is in the accusative because structurally it is the object of the main verb. Concerning this point, the author himself recognizes that it denies the traditional intuition that verbs with infinitives are monoclusal, an intuition that he claims ‘is difficult to defend’, and this is a point that we ascribe to as well.

The second question he poses has been very neglected in the literature but also is extremely important since it adheres to the seemingly ‘clausal’ nature of infinitival clauses in such languages. Given the morphological richness of these infinitives as well as their ability to have distinct subjects, this question can be paraphrased as to

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4 This idea, also known as the expansion hypothesis has also been pointed out to me as an option for the emergence of AcI in AG by Geoffrey Horrocks (p.c.). However, as noted also in relation to Latin, although this hypothesis could be a feasible account for the diachrony of the construction and the way it emerged, it does not constitute an adequate explanation for the synchronic status of the language.
what is their difference from finite clauses and what does this difference signify. Since we know that in these languages infinitival clauses can be used in contexts where finite complement clauses can be used relatively freely then one should try to investigate if there is any kind of way to predict the distribution of the one over the other. A satisfactory answer to this question could also be extended to further specify the finite vs. non-finite distinction. In order to address this point Pepicello follows Kiparsky & Kiparsky, 1970 who claim that a moved or deleted subject of a clause prevents Subject-Verb agreement forcing the verb to become non-finite. Since in Latin, according to Pepicello’s analysis, the infinitival subject is actually the object of the main verb, it means that it never stays in situ and it can never trigger subject-verb agreement. In the last question, concerning the status of the infinitival clause, Pepicello simply answers that it is that of a remnant of a clause, consisting of the infinitive and the trace of the subject. We think that there are more things to be said about Latin (and AG) infinitives and we will see that this issue has generated some disagreement in the literature.

3.2.2 Against ECM (part I): Bolkenstein, 1979

Bolkenstein, 1979 argues against a Raising analysis of Latin AcI as well as against what he refers to as the ‘traditional analysis’, which is the ‘expansion hypothesis’ that we mentioned before. For the latter his critique can be summarized in that he does not consider it to constitute any kind of explanation for the synchronic status of the subject (or its Case) of AcI and he dismisses it on this basis. Both raising and the expansion hypothesis treat the infinitival subject as the object of the main verb in some point of the derivation and it is against this claim that he focuses his critique.

Bolkenstein initially challenges the expansion hypothesis based on the c-selectional properties of predicates like dico ‘say’. This verb that can straightforwardly take the AcI as its complement (cf. example (2) above) is nonetheless ungrammatical with a bare Accusative object:

(3) (=5b) * dico te
    say-I you-Acc
    ‘* I say you’

The point made is that synchronically the c-selectional properties of a verb like dico
do not justify an analysis that postulates that the accusative in AcI comes from the main verb, since it is apparent that the verb does not have an accusative to give to its internal argument, when it functions as a simple transitive verb. This argument extends also to the s-selectional properties of the main verb and Bolkenstein demonstrates that the accusative subject of AcI constructions is not sensitive to selectional restrictions of the main verb. Consider the following examples (his 7a and 7b respectively):

(4) Dico portam patere
   Say-I door-Acc to-be-open
   ‘I say that the door is open.’

(5) * Cogo portam patere.
   Force-I door-Acc to-be-open
   ‘I force the door to be open.’

In example (4) we see that *dico, which cannot take an inanimate object when it is a simple transitive verb, can nonetheless tolerate an inanimate subject of an AcI complement that it takes. Example (5) on the other hand, which is a structure with the ditransitive verb *cogo shows that when the argument portam is indeed the object of the main verb, it cannot be licensed if it contradicts the main verb’s theta grid even though the infinitive is the same. The above examples illustrate clearly how the infinitival poses selectional restrictions on the Accusative only when it functions as its subject (in cases of AcI, ex. 4) but not when the structure involves a ditransitive verb taking an accusative and an infinitive as objects (ex. 5): these two structures can be kept clearly apart in the language.

Finally, regarding the expansion hypothesis, Bolkenstein argues that in order for it to be valid, there needs to be some evidence of an increase in the semantic class of verbs which are allowed to govern AcI over a period of time. This would be expected on the basis of an hypothesis that involves expansion of a structure, from already existing verbs to more. In addition, there has not been any decrease of NcI in favour of passives with AcI subjects, which would also be expected under these assumptions. On the basis of all the above arguments he therefore concludes that the AcI must be one constituent and that there is no synchronic evidence that the
accusative infinitival subject is the object of the main verb at any point of the derivation.

He then moves on to give more arguments against a raising-to-object analysis for the accusative subject of AcI, the most notable of which has to do with ditransitive verbs like *admoneo* ‘warn’. Consider the following example: (Bolkenstein, 1979: 15a)

(6) eam admoneo eos profectos esse

   Her-Acc admonish-I them-Acc left-Acc-pl to-have

   ‘I admonish her that they have left.’

In this case, where the main verb already has one accusative object (*eam*) the accusative in the infinitival subject cannot come from it, since in Latin apparently there are no verbs that can take two accusative objects. Consider moreover the case of one-place predicates like *constat* ‘it is certain’, that take an AcI clause as an argument:

(7) (=17a) eos venisse constat

   them-Acc to-have-come it-is-certain

   ‘It is certain that they have come.’

Like in the case of the ditransitive verbs, here it is also problematic to assume that the Case of the accusative infinitival subject comes from this kind of predicate that again does not have (accusative) case to give to its internal argument. Like in AG, such predicates never surface with accusative objects or nominative subjects, they sometimes take dative arguments and most commonly infinitival clauses. His final argument deals with AcI as complements of nouns as demonstrated in the following example:

(8) (=20a) nuntius oppidum teneri

   message town-acc to-be-held

   ‘The message that the town was being held.’

In this case, it is evident that the accusative of the AcI cannot come from the noun *nuntius* because nouns generally neither assign Accusative to their complements nor do they allow ECM (cf. the ungrammatical English example [*the belief of John to be intelligent*]). Nouns can case mark their complements, but in these cases it is genitive
case that they license and never accusative, like in the following example with a genitive of possession from Latin:

(9) domus Regis
    house    King-gen
    ‘The house of the King’

Based on the above evidence, Bolkenstein dismisses both a raising and an “expansion” hypothesis analysis for AcI. He claims that since Latin infinitives have their own subject, there is a rule which assigns accusative instead of nominative to that subject. He also points out that when the infinitives are periphrastic, gender/number agreement\(^5\) is exhibited in the participle that is part of the infinitive and moreover Latin infinitives may independently refer to a time earlier, co-temporaneous with or later than the time of the main verb. All this makes Latin AcI clauses ‘less non-finite than English non-finite clauses’ (Bolkenstein, 1979: 33). He doesn’t explicitly argue for an articulated analysis about Latin AcI but he hints in the direction of Latin infinitives being more like verbs in the relevant sense than English infinitives. However, he thinks that a satisfactory account of ECM infinitives and NcI would still require Raising, so he doesn’t eliminate the possibility of ECM overall from the system of the language.

3.2.3 Against ECM (part II): AG data

In this section I will give the examples that can be be “translated” into AG in order to show that an ECM analysis cannot be maintained as a viable account for all cases of AcI. If we want to deal with AcI as a uniform phenomenon and want to provide an analysis for all its instances, then this analysis cannot be ECM. Firstly let us see an instance of a verb taking AcI complement but not a bare accusative object. Such a verb is \textit{oiomai} ‘to think’ and the following example illustrates it taking an AcI complement:

(10) Oiomai d’oud’an touto auton epicheire:sai apodeiknunai
    Think-1 sg not AN this-acc him-acc to attempt-pres to prove-pres
    ‘I think that he will not attempt to prove this’

\(^5\) But cf the discussion in Cecchetto & Oniga (2001) on the so-called agreement of the Latin infinitives section 3.3.3.
According to the grammars there is no instance of *oiomai* with a bare accusative object alone and therefore examples like the following can be considered ungrammatical:

(11)*Oiomai touto
Think-1 sg it-acc
‘I think (about) it’

Based on this argument we can conclude that the accusative of the infinitival subject in AcI cannot come from the main verb, since this verb, not being a simple transitive verb, cannot license an accusative.

The argument about a ditransitive verb taking an accusative object and an AcI complement cannot be translated into AG because AG has ditransitives with two accusatives, like the verb *ero:to:* ‘to ask’ for example, as can be seen in (12).

(12)Ou tout’ero:to: se
Not this-acc ask-1 sg you-acc
‘I am not asking you this’

Aristophanes, *Clouds*: 641

The most straightforward argument against ECM, which we have already stated in Chapter 2, comes from AcI infinitives as subjects of impersonal verbs and passives. We repeat example (66) from chapter 2 under (13):

(13)Homologeitai [ te:n polin he:mo:n archaiotate:n einai.]
Is-accepted the town-Acc our-Gen very ancient to-be.
‘It is widely admitted that our town is the oldest.’

Isocrates, *Panegyricus*: 23

In this example, the whole infinitival clause functions as the subject of the impersonal verb *homologeitai* that also has passive morphology. In this case, more unambiguously than any other, one cannot claim that the accusative comes from the main verb, because it doesn’t have any accusative feature to give based on Burzio’s generalization whereby a predicate with no external theta role has no accusative
feature available for its internal argument.

Spyropoulos, 2005 gives more arguments against ECM that involve an AcI clause as a complement of a noun as well as what happens when you passivise an AcI clause. We will discuss these examples in the relevant section, 3.5.5.

3.2.4 Against ECM (part III): Pillinger, 1980

Pillinger, 1980 argues against a raising-to-object analysis of the Latin AcI focusing on the status of the infinitival clause. His main focus are ECM verbs that Bolkenstein leaves out of his discussion and thus consequently one can put forward a uniform account (against raising) of all AcI clauses of Latin. The notion of a subject is central to his discussion and he wishes to explore whether the infinitival subject in AcI is a prototypical subject or an object. He bases his discussion on Keenan’s, 1976 notion of derived subjects: ‘Derived subjects may look like subjects without behaving like them; but if they behave like subjects, then they look like them.’ By behave he refers to syntactic behaviour and control and by look like he refers to position, case-marking and verbal agreement. His aim is to dismiss Postal’s, 1974 evidence of raising by discussing the cases that are applicable to Latin, namely: comparative reduction, pseudo-clefting and right-node raising.

Concerning firstly right-node raising he challenges the approach that it is only constituents that can be raised. He illustrates with the following examples that the situation in Latin is the reverse from English and Latin infinitives actually behave like constituents with respect to this diagnostic test: the infinitival clause in (16) can be right-node raised contrary to the situation in English (15) (Pillinger, 1980: 10 a/b vs.12a):

(14) I find it easy to believe- but Hank finds it hard to believe- that Teng is a CIA agent.
(15) * I find it easy to believe- but Hank finds it hard to believe- Teng to be a CIA agent.
(16) ego velim – tu autem nolis- Caesarem esse regem.
    I would wish you but would not wish Caesar-acc to be king-acc
    ‘I would wish – but you wouldn’t wish’ that Caesar should be king.’

His next point is Case-marking violations: classic ECM verbs that also subcategorise
for dative objects like in the following examples.

(17)(=15a) credo Marco/ *Marcum
    believe-I Marcus-dat / acc
    ‘I believe Marcus.’

(18)(=15b) credo Marcum nuper advenisse
    believe-I Marcus-Acc recently to-have-arrived
    ‘I believe Marcus to have recently arrived.’

With these examples it is evident that a verb like *credo does not have any accusative
Case feature to give to the subject of the AcI and that therefore this accusative cannot
come from the main verb.

The next arguments by Pillinger have to do with infinitives acting like
complements of complex NPs, and are similar to Bolkenstein’s example (8) that we
discussed earlier. Consider the following examples from English and Latin:

(19)(=21b) The command [*(for) all troops to move out] was given on Friday
(20) (=23) crebri ad eum rumores afferebantur (…)[ omnes Belgas
    persistent to him rumours were relayed all-Acc Belgas-Acc
    contra populum Romanum coniurare.]
    against people-Acc Roman-Acc to-be conspiring
    ‘Persistent rumours were relayed to him (…) that all the Belgians were
    conspiring against Rome.’

Contrary to the English example where the infinitival clause, which is the
complement of the noun, can only have an overt subject when it is introduced with
*for, the Latin example lacks such an overt complementizer but still surfaces with an
overt accusative subject. Therefore, Pillinger claims that the accusative comes from
‘somewhere within the infinitive’, but crucially not from the NP rumores.

The final argument on the topic of the entire AcI being one constituent, comes
from Passivization. The relevant example is the following:

(21) [Gallos esse altissimos] creditur.
    The Gauls-Acc to be very tall-Acc is-believed
‘It is believed that the Gauls are very tall.’

In this example the whole AcI is passivised and functions as the subject of *creditur*. Under standard assumptions that only constituents can be passivised, it is evident that the entire infinitival clause is one constituent and its accusative subject has never raised out of it⁶. Based on all the above Pillinger reaches the conclusion that the accusative in AcI is a true subject and not an object of the main verb and that raising to object does not apply in Latin. Regarding Keenan’s generalization of subjects, Pillinger proposes the following modification: ‘Raising to object can be retained perhaps renamed Subject to Accusative shifting’ (my emphasis). This ‘modification’ is a somewhat clumsy attempt to account for the accusative Case in an argument that seems to be so straightforwardly a subject. Finally concerning the Nominativus cum Infinitivo constructions, he claims that they involve direct subject-to-subject raising.

### 3.2.5 Interim conclusion [about an ECM analysis of overt infinitival subjects in Latin (and AG)]

Pillinger’s paper is the last that deals with an ECM analysis for Latin AcI. We will discuss in passing some more arguments against it for AG from the analyses of Philippaki-Warburton & Catsimali, 1989, Tantalou, 2003 and Spyropoulos, 2005. Together with the arguments we put forward here, we think that it is legitimate to dispense with an attempt to account for AcI in the spirit of an ECM analysis.

In addition to the actual data presented, we want to argue against the intuition behind an ECM analysis, which basically regards the infinitival verb as extremely impoverished and dependent on the main verb, so much so that the licensing of the infinitival subject must come from the main verb in an apparently exceptional manner. The extent of the phenomenon of overt infinitival subjects in Latin and AG, which appear in extensive contexts and with a wide variety of verbs makes the adoption of an ECM-type analysis fundamentally problematic. To conclude, ECM can be abandoned both on empirical grounds of all the arguments given above as well as theoretical grounds of an analysis that treats an all-pervasive construction like AcI in an exceptional manner.

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⁶ But cf. also example (1) that is an instance of NcI and is a frequent alternative to example (19). The possibility of both these constructions (that is also found in AG) needs to be addressed and accounted for. For a view on this alteration see Cecchetto & Oniga, 2001.
The next set of analyses that we will discuss as a possible account for AcI is related to Rizzi’s Aux-to-Comp. Overall one could say that this type of analysis is a much more plausible alternative to ECM. The main intuition behind it is that the C position of (some) infinitivals plays a crucial role in enabling them to license overt subjects. The relation between infinitival C and T plays an important role, and in these analyses this relation is envisaged as temporal. We will start with Rizzi’s original analysis and then we will move on to that by Raposo for European Portuguese inflected infinitives and finally we will come back to Latin with the analysis of Cecchetto & Oniga, 2001.

3.3 Italian, Portuguese and more Latin overt infinitival subjects: Aux-to-Comp

3.3.1 Rizzi, 1982: Aux to Comp in Italian infinitival clauses

Italian infinitival clauses do not have overt subjects apart from two cases when the infinitival clauses in question are complements of epistemics and verbs of saying: (a) if the subject is wh-extracted and (b) if the auxiliary (of the infinitive) is moved to a clause initial position (arguably in infinitival C). The infinitival subjects in these cases surface in Nominative case. These two contexts are exemplified below (Rizzi, 1982: ex. 2b and 6a respectively):

(22) La donna che Mario affermava [ t non volerlo sposare] èra mia sorella
    the woman that Mario maintains not want him to marry is my sister
    ‘The woman that Mario maintains she didn’t want to marry him, is my sister.’

(23) Suppongo [ non esser la situazione suscettibile di ulteriori miglioramenti]
    I suppose not-to-be the situation susceptible of further improvements
    ‘I suppose that the situation is not susceptible of further improvements.’

In example (22) the infinitival subject la donna is relativized and appears in the beginning of the complex nominal that makes up the subject and in example (23) the auxiliary of the infinitive esser is found clause initially, following only negation (which is in C according to Rizzi). The apparent peculiarity of this construction poses the following questions: what licenses the nominative in the infinitival subject only in these environments and what is special about these constructions that is not shared with other Italian infinitival clauses.
Certain word order patterns can prove quite illuminating about what is happening in these cases. Overt subjects in non-finite contexts like gerundival, adverbial clauses for example can appear when the standard word order found in declarative clauses, namely [S Aux V], is reversed to [Aux S V]. Subject-Aux inversion can also apply, at a very special stylistic level, in subjunctive conditional clauses, thus creating the context for deletion of *se* ‘if’ as can be seen in the following example:

(24) (Se) tornasse Mario, saremmo tutti contenti
    (if) came back Mario, would be all glad
    ‘If Mario came back, we would all be glad’

Moreover, the clausal boundaries of the infinitives with overt subjects count on a par with “tensed” boundaries for subadjacency, while “control” boundaries are transparent in the relevant sense. This could be used as an argument for a C position in these infinitives, just like tensed clauses and contrary to control infinitives that seem to be VPs in these cases. Based on these facts, Rizzi argues that there exists an Aux-to-Comp rule in Italian, whereby the verb is raised to a clause initial position and is thus rendered able to license a subject for the infinitive. The availability of infinitival clauses with overt subjects after certain verbs and not others is regulated by the interaction of the existence or not of a C position in these clauses with rules like the doubly filled Comp filter (Chomsky & Lasnik, 1977 and Riemsdijk & Williams, 1986). Rizzi’s account on the nature of the Case of the subject (nominative) in these cases is quite interesting: nominative differs from other Cases in that it’s not assigned by a lexical element. It’s reasonable to assume that it’s a “purely structural Case” i.e. assigned on the basis of some general properties of certain structural environments, while non-Nom cases are assigned through government of a lexical head. This way, he does not have to assume some special relation between C and T of the infinitival clause that would facilitate case licensing. Instead he attributes the exact value of the case feature of the infinitival subject to the ‘properties’ of the construction, whatever this means.

Rizzi, based on his data, envisages the relationship between C and T as movement of V from T to C but he also takes the C/T relation to manifest in a way the properties of the whole construction. When C manages to establish an adequate
relation with T it can license a subject that would otherwise be illicit in this construction. Another crucial point is the fact that (especially in the case where the infinitival subject is licensed because it is wh-extracted) it seems that the relevant feature on C (that links it to T, or that is active in this case) is a discourse related, wh-feature and not a finiteness or a temporal feature. With Aux-to-Comp, Rizzi set the foundations of an analysis that employs the relation between C and T in infinitives in order to account for overt subjects. We will now move on to the analysis by Raposo, 1987 that takes this a step further, refining (or reconceptualising in a sense) the same intuition.

3.3.2 Raposo, 1987: Inflected Infinitives in European Portuguese

The data Raposo wants to account for with his analysis are the European Portuguese (EP) Inflected infinitives that have overt (subject) agreement morphology. They can license lexical subjects in the nominative case as well as pro subjects but crucially not PRO, which is found only with the uninflected infinitival forms. A standard use of an inflected infinitive is the following (Raposo, 1987: ex. 2a):

(25) Será difícil [ eles aprovarem ] la proposta ]
Will be difficult them-nom to approve (+3 pl) the proposal
‘It will be difficult for them to approve the proposal.’

The distribution of EP inflected infinitives is the following: they can be complements of epistemic, declarative and factive but crucially not volitional predicates. They can moreover function as extraposed subject clauses (like in example (25) for instance) and they can also be complements of adjectives. They cannot occur as main clauses and they cannot occur with an overt complementizer like que. Lastly but very importantly they cannot function as interrogative or relative clauses, which arguably have a C position filled with an operator. Leaving aside the distribution of inflected infinitives, the existence of their overt nominative subjects could be easily attributed to infinitival Agreement being responsible for the Case of the subject. However, this

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7 Based on this Raposo dismisses right away the possibility of the infinitival subject receiving its Case through an ECM type of configuration, since in EP adjectives cannot assign Case. Additionally to that, we can point out that although ECM can be thought an alternative for a subject with an accusative Case, it is not easy to see how this could be extended to a nominative subject as in EP inflected infinitives (or Italian for that matter). A main verb can exceptionally case mark an infinitival subject with an objective/oblique case like accusative but it definitely cannot do so to an element in nominative.
does not explain (among other things) why inflected infinitives cannot function as main clauses, in addition to the restrictions on what type of embedded clauses they can be. It seems that there is something more to be said concerning Case assignment to the infinitival subject. The peculiarities of their distribution easily remind us of the Italian data so the solution that will be put forward can be anticipated. However, let us first lay out the theoretical assumptions Raposo makes, concerning C, T, their relationship and their featural content.

What is more important in Raposo’s analysis is the specific determination of the relationship between infinitival C and T. According to him, the C position of clauses that are complements of epistemics and declaratives hosts an “abstract” Tense operator. This T operator, according to Raposo, is distinct from but also related to the (+T) morphology in Infl. Following Kayne, 1984 he straightforwardly assumes that government can cross one clause boundary but not two. Moreover, he employs the idea of Case percolation: main V can assign Case to its complement CP and this Case can percolate down to C, since C is the head of CP. Another thing he considers relevant for EP inflected infinitives is what he calls the ‘Infl parameter’. This amounts to saying that Infl can be specified for (+/- T) in addition to it having Agr features. EP inflected infinitives follow from the possibility of having an infinitival Infl specified for overt agreement features while it is also (-T), which is a highly marked option and therefore poorly attested within UG. Availability of Case for the infinitival subject is regulated by the following principle: (Raposo, 1987: 23 (p. 92)) ‘in the absence of (+T), Infl (or Agr in Infl) can assign Nominative Case to a lexical only if it is itself specified for Case’ (my emphasis). What this means essentially is that movement (or some agreement relation in general) between Infl and C has the result of Case licensing because this is the only way Case can be transmitted from main V. This variant of Aux-to-Comp is envisaged more as a form of ECM in a way, since the Case licensing of the infinitival subject relies on the availability of Case of the main verb.

The main intuition behind Raposo’s analysis for the differences in the distribution with inflected infinitives has to do with the category of the infinitival clauses in each case. According to him inflected infinitival clauses, which permit lexical subjects, are NPs and the main clauses that select them (or have them as subjects) are IPs and not CPs: this way main V can govern and transmit Case to infinitival C that consequently can license an overt subject. Volitional predicates
cannot take inflected infinitival complements because they cannot subcategorise for nouns: the movement of Infl to C results in the nominalization of the clause and such a mechanism renders these constructions ungrammatical.

Raposo’s analysis is very important mostly because it takes Rizzi’s original intuition a step further: it was important to point out that a relation between C and T may play a role in Case licensing but it is also important both to further specify what this relation is and to further link this to the morphological properties of the elements in question. Raposo defines the C/T relation as a temporal relation, also linking it to the morphological richness of the Infl of these infinitives. Moreover, his version of Aux-to-Comp is more linked to main V’s Case properties than anything else. How exactly this Case feature is realised as Nominative (as opposed to Accusative) is not entirely clear (but it seems to be related to the +Agr feature and not the +T one).

The following (and last) variant of Aux-to-Comp is the more recent analysis by Cecchetto & Oniga, 2001, which radically updates the well-known intuition employing the familiar Latin data on AcI and Control.

3.3.3 Latin again: Cecchetto & Oniga, 2001
Cecchetto & Oniga, 2001 (C&O henceforth) discuss the familiar null and overt Latin infinitival subjects (PRO and AcI). They initially discuss PRO and the fact that it cannot be straightforwardly used in Latin due to what they define as ‘the incompatibility problem’: null and overt subjects of infinitives in Latin are in free variation and consequently PRO also features in a Case8 position, something that contradicts standard assumptions about it. As we have already mentioned, this situation directly extends to AG so this analysis could be a good candidate to account for the AG data as well. Discussing the inflection of Latin infinitives C&O point out that they have tense morphology (present, past and future) and that they support sequence of tenses (SOT)9. However, after exploring the idea that they may also have agreement (exhibited in the participle used in the periphrastic tenses), they reject it on the basis that it is not canonical subject agreement since it is limited to gender and

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8 Apparently, they do not refer to Null Case here.
9 SOT refers to the rule whereby the tense of an embedded clause is dependent on the tense of the main clause not in a semantic kind of way (in other words not in the sense that the embedded verb denotes the tense relative to that of the main verb) but in a formal way: in oratio obliqua (indirect speech) in Latin when the main verb is past, the embedded verb cannot be future for example. AG does not have the kind of SOT rule Latin does, but cf. the discussion in 3.5.4.
number. Therefore they characterize the Latin infinitives as [+T/-Agr] and the issue that arises is that PRO is apparently incompatible with +T inflection.

Their discussion starts with data that show that Latin subject and object control verbs take [ut/ne + subjunctive] clauses as complements and not infinitives. This could be taken as a strategy that Latin employs in order to get out of this incompatibility problem: lexical subjects in this case are licensed by the finite inflection of the subjunctive. Latin infinitives are typically used as subjects and objects to verbs; this, according to C&O hints that they are verbal nouns, headed by an NP/DP. In these cases they claim that there really is a PRO that can receive its (agent) theta-role from this verbal noun. The other cases where there really exists a PRO in Latin are with verbs that also take ut/ne clauses as complements, so infinitival and finite embedded clauses are in free variation. The major characteristic of these infinitives is that they are always in the present tense, they do not obey SOT and consequently they are characterized as –T. According to the authors the presence of PRO forces the infinitive to become –T. Consider the following example (C&O, 2001:54):

(26) [IP Ei [VP promisi [VP PRO dolium vini dare.]]]

  to-him promised-1 sg jar-acc wine-gen to-give

  ‘I promised that I would give him a jar of wine.’

Infinitival clauses in these cases are bare VPs, with PRO remaining VP internally and TP (or even CP) not projecting at all. This is a very clear distinction in their system: the few cases of control infinitives are bare VPs while true AcI constructions are clauses (CPs). The apparent counterexample of their generalisation is the verb volo ‘want’ that can take a tensed infinitive, like in the following example with a past infinitive (C&O, 2001:65):

(27) Vellem hoc scripsisse.

  Would like-I this-Acc to-write-Pst

  ‘I would like to have written that.’

Their explanation for these cases is that this is an actual instance of a ‘concealed AcI’ with a personal pronoun functioning as the infinitival subject but remaining unexpressed. Their overall generalization goes like this:
In the second part of their paper, C&O establish the distinction between true and pseudo AcI (which exists also in AG) based on the following examples (C & O, 2001: ex. 73 & 74):

(28) Hortantur me venire
    exhort-3 pl me-acc to-come
    ‘They exhort me to come’

(29) Dicunt me venire
    say-3 pl me-acc to-come
    ‘They tell me to come.’

The former is a pseudo-AcI since the main verb is a ditransitive taking an accusative and an infinitive as two distinct objects, while the latter is a true AcI, and they argue that while the infinitival complements of *dico* can show variation in tenses and obey SOT, the complements of *hortor* cannot. Then, they proceed to investigate the source of the accusative in the subject of the true AcI cases. They reject an ECM analysis based on the arguments by Bolkenstein, 1976 and Pillinger, 1980 and they also reject a ‘default’ Case approach based on the fact that default Case assignment mechanisms should be extremely limited in the theory.

In their own analysis they stress the alternation of AcI with NcI, the latter being regarded as an instance of raising. They claim a null C is responsible for the accusative in AcI, much like the null C, counterpart of *for* postulated for English by Kayne, 1984 as an alternative for ECM. NcI results when this null C fails to project, which is when the infinitive is a bare VP, without tense (and consequently the T and C levels). This null C is licensed by the rich inflection of the Latin infinitives and it has an affixal character: it has to be incorporated with the main verb and in order to achieve that they postulate covert movement of the verb at LF to the C position.

The data that C&O try to account for in their paper are directly equivalent to the AG data: there is the availability of Case for infinitival subjects in some cases but not in cases of Control. To account for them they argue that the difference in the
syntactic behaviour signals significant differences in temporal and consequently categorical nature of the infinitival clauses in question. So to sum up, in the case where Accusative for the subject is available C&O argue that the infinitival clause is a CP with an active T head (where morphological tense also has semantic reality with the infinitive following the SOT rule) where the (essentially temporal) relation between C and T is manifested with the ability of C to license Case for the infinitival subject. In these cases PRO is disallowed so the incompatibility problem does not arise. The C/T relation in their system is established via covert movement of the verb into the C position at LF, something that seems unnecessary, given the alternative of long distance agreement between the two elements. In cases of Control (that are quite limited due to the use of ut / ne clauses) the infinitive is a bare VP, it does not show tense distinctions (not even purely morphological, since only the present one is used) and therefore PRO is allowed as its subject. Consequently no Case is available. Their analysis captures neatly the alternation between AcI and NcI and they predict raising to be allowed only out of infinitival VP complements.

Their intuition is basically a variant of Aux-to-Comp: if in infinitival clauses, C and T establish an adequate (temporal) relation (supported by some kind of morphology on the infinitive), Case can be available for the subject. Diverging from Raposo’s analysis, C&O do not take C as a mediator that essentially transfers Case properties of main V. This is a point that our analyses have in common, since we think that Case for the infinitival subject comes from within the infinitival clause without the help of the main verb as well. With this paper we conclude the discussion on Aux-to-Comp type analyses for lexical infinitival subjects. We will now move on to discussing the analyses put forward for Southern Italian dialects and Spanish, which both have similar phenomena.

3.4 Lexical infinitival subjects in more Romance languages and dialects

3.4.1 Southern Italian dialects: Ledgeway, 2000

As it must be clear by now, the situation of infinitives with overt subjects in Romance is not homogeneous. Italian dialects are not uniform with respect to the behaviour of their infinitival and finite complement clauses and in this section we will focus on the alternation between finite and infinitival complement clauses in Southern Italian dialects (mostly Neapolitan) as they have been presented in Ledgeway, 2000. The
interchange between overt and null subjects in infinitival clauses (and their Control properties) as well as the dual complementation system of Neapolitan that consists of both finite and non-finite clauses are the central issues in this section.

Neapolitan data pose serious problems for a theory of PRO and Control due to their fairly unexpected behaviour with respect to the obviation effect or more accurately the lack thereof. Contrary to Italian and French, Neapolitan does not have the obviation effect, i.e. it does not follow the pattern whereby a complement clause is infinitival when its subject is the same with that of the main clause and finite when the two subjects have disjoint reference. This situation is exemplified with the following data from French, taken from Chapter 2 (ex. 18-21):

(30) Christina veut partir
    Christina wants-3 sg to go

(31) *Christina veut Rita partir
    Christina wants-3 sg Rita to go

(32) Christina veut que Rita parte
    Christina wants-3 sg that Rita goes-3 sg-subj

(33) *Christina veut que elle parte
    Christina wants-3 sg that she goes-3 sg-subj

Moreover, Neapolitan displays OC with the finite complements of verbs like prummuttere (“promise”) that are introduced with the complementizer che. On the contrary, when the same verb takes a finite complement introduced with ca it yields a NOC structure. This is the main paradigm that Ledgeway tries to account for and it is exemplified below. All the data in this section are taken from Ledgeway, 2000.

(34) Ciro promette di non ubriacarsi
    Ciro promise-3 sg of PRO not to get drunk.inf
    “Ciro promises not to get drunk”

    Italian (Chapter 3, ex.2.a)

(35) *Ciro prummette ‘e nun se mbriacá
    Ciro promise-3 sg of PRO not to get drunk.inf
    “Ciro promised not to get drunk”

    Neapolitan (Ch. 3, ex. 4.a)

(36) Ciro prummette che Ø / isso accatta ‘e purtualle
Ciro promise-3 sg that Ø_i/*j_ hej/*i_ buy-3 sg the oranges
“Ciro promises that he will buy the oranges”

Neapolitan (Ch. 3, ex 9.a)

(37)Ciro se crereva ca Ø / isso venceva ‘a premio
Ciro, believe-3 sg that Ø_i/*j_ hej/*i_ win-3 sg the prize
“Ciro believed that he would win the prize”

Neapolitan (Ch. 3, ex 9.b)

In the analysis he proposes, Ledgeway attributes the different complementation patterns to a combination of factors, namely to the tense properties of the embedded verb as well as to the Case properties of the main predicate. He claims that there is no such thing as a PRO vs. pro distinction: instead what it reduces to is the instantiation of the properties of OC and NOC Infl respectively. Infinitival T regulates the licensing or not of the (controlled) null subject. The system of double finite complementation in Neapolitan, which employs the two complementizers che and ca is also viewed as a reflex of the different temporal properties of the embedded predicate: clauses introduced with the former have irrealis modality and anaphoric tense, while the latter introduces what have traditionally been called indicative clauses with deictic tense. The control properties of the two types of clauses follow from this temporal dichotomy.

Infinitival clauses in Neapolitan (unlike standard Romance languages) have a restricted distribution, but they are crucially found in two more contexts than those we discussed: they can be complements to inherent Case-licensing predicates with overt prepositions (ex. 38) as well as subjects introduced with a preposition a(d) (ex. 39).

(38)nun te miette scuorno ‘e me veni a dicere pure chello ch’e fatto?
Not you put-3 sg shame of me to come to say … ?
‘Aren’t you ashamed to come and tell me what you as well?’

(Ledgeway. 2000: Ch. 3, ex. 22. f)

(39)muito le piaccea a vedere Constancio
much him-dat pleased-3 sg to see C.
‘It pleased him much to see Constantius.’

(Ledgeway. 2000: Ch. 3, ex. 26. c)
Ledgeway’s proposal is based on a three-way licensing of sentential complements in Neapolitan\textsuperscript{10}:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Licensing of sentential complements in Neapolitan:
\begin{enumerate}
\item Intrinsic structural Case: finite CPs
\item Incorporation: Restructuring infinitival CPs
\item Inherent Case: infinitival CPs
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

Further to that, the licensing conditions for the infinitival subjects and their interaction with the controlled ones lie in the content of infinitival T and its interaction with C. Based on data from binding, Ledgeway argues that Tense plays a role in the determination of binding domains and he follows Anderson, 1982 in assuming that long-distance binding is only possible when there is tense agreement between main and embedded clause. Moreover, assuming Reichenbach’s, 1947 three temporal variables (R=reference time, E=event time, S=speech time) he claims that the embedded C position hosts features encoding the reference time of the infinitival (R), which serves to mediate a T-chain between the R time of the main verb and the event time of the infinitival (E). This is the way he establishes that ECM and Raising infinitivals (that lack the C position) don’t allow for long-distance binding etc. As we have discussed before, the availability or not of a C position in infinitival clauses and an establishment or not of an ‘appropriate’ relation with T has been a standard way of accounting for their different temporal properties and the availability of a distinct subject. This insight is also extended to finite clauses where the dependency between C and T is analogous to that of infinitival clauses and ‘the shape of the complementizer is also considered a reflex of agreement between C and T, spelling out the reference time of the embedded verb.’ What is important to keep from this discussion is that there is an interesting correlation in Neapolitan between finite and non-finite embedded clauses with respect to their subject: its Case and the availability of Control that can be accounted for in terms of the temporal properties of the clause and the relation between C and T.

\textit{3.4.2 Infinitives with overt Nominative subjects: Sitaridou, 2002}

\textsuperscript{10}We have not discussed any data about restructuring or the details of the analysis that has been put forward, because they lie beyond the scope of this thesis. We include Ledgeway’s proposal in full for the sake of completeness.
The main data that Sitaridou wants to account for are the differences between two types of constructions in Romance, namely the Spanish (and the Sardinian) personal infinitive and the European Portuguese Inflected infinitive (which we already discussed in section 3.3.2). The main characteristic of these two constructions is the fact that both can license an overt subject in Nominative case. Sitaridou’s aim is to determine what makes this licensing possible and also how it is related to the infinitives’ distribution. Before we move on to the presentation and the discussion of Sitaridou’s proposal, let us look into these two constructions (Sitaridou, 2002: ex. 3/92 and 4, Chapter 4).

(41) Eu lamento (os deputados) perderem os documentos
I regret-1 sg the deputies-Nom to lose-3 pl the documents
“I regret that they/the deputies lost the documents”

(Portuguese)

(42) Ante de actuar Caballé, el público estaba expectante.
Before of perform-inf C-Nom the audience be-3 pl expectant
“Before Caballé performed, the audience was expectant.”

(Spanish)

Example (41) illustrates the European Portuguese inflected infinitive and displays its main property: when it is in complement position, it receives NOC interpretation. This type of infinitive, as we have already seen, has overt agreement morphology, which in this case forces the NOC interpretation, even in the absence of an overt subject: the infinitive has third person plural agreement, contrary to the main verb that is in first person singular. This way the two subjects have disjoint reference, something that is not usual for verbs with infinitival complements. The infinitival clause can also have an overt Nominative subject however and the question is how this element is licensed.

In (42) the Spanish personal infinitival construction is exemplified. Contrary to the Portuguese infinitive, it does not have overt agreement morphology, it is a “simple” infinitive. As an adjunct, it is introduced with the complex preposition *ante de* and it also has an overt Nominative subject *Caballé*. The main question that links the two issues posed by these infinitival constructions is what licenses the Case (and
the position, as they are arguably two distinct things) of their subjects that yields the NOC interpretation that they receive. It is important to see the situation in Sardinian that completes in a sense the situation in Romance. Consider the following example (Sitaridou, 2002: ex. 91, Chapter 4):

(43) Non keljo a vénnere tue

not want-1 sg a to come you

“I don’t want you to come”

(Sardinian)

In Sardinian, which also has the personal infinitive, the situation is different with respect to the distribution of the construction. While in Spanish the personal infinitive can function as an adjunct, subject and topicalised clause, in Sardinian it can also function as a complement, as in the above example. The difference in the distribution between the two infinitival constructions is not due to their morphology but to the fact that the Sardinian infinitive is introduced with the overt complementizer a. This, according to Sitaridou, is what enables the infinitive to function as a complement in the absence of the overt agreement, which is the case in the European Portuguese inflected infinitives. The generalisation that emerges from the data presented here as well as from a number of Romance languages and dialects, put forward by Sitaridou is as follows:

A. For an infinitive to surface with a subject in an adjunct/subject clause requires:

(i) Tense

B. For an infinitive to surface with a subject in complement position requires:

(ii) Tense and

(iii) Agr or (iv) a C position filled with overt material

In her system Spanish and Sardinian personal infinitives constitute a minimal pair that is distinguished solely by the presence of the complementizer. Crucially however, this is what makes it possible for the latter but not the former to appear in a complement position and to license Nominative case to its subject in that position. The Nominative case in the subject of the Spanish infinitive relies on the presence of (semantic) tense, much in the spirit of various other analyses of infinitives, most notably Landau, 2000.

Sitaridou adopts a modification of Landau’s, 2000 analysis of Control that
relies on the establishment of an Agree relation between some functional element of the main clause and infinitival T. She argues that this agreement relation can be blocked either due to the presence of an overt complementizer (Sardinian) or agreement morphology (European Portuguese) or semantic Tense (Spanish). Consequently it is when Agree fails that NOC interpretation obtains, as is normally the case with these infinitives. Another important aspect of her analysis is the fact that while T is responsible for Case licensing, the preverbal subject position relies on the presence of C and/or Agr, something that links it to the possibility of the infinitival clause appearing in a complement position.

Sitaridou’s analysis raised important issues such as the role of morphology in determining the syntactic behaviour of infinitives, the exact definition of (non) finiteness as a non-trivial issue in linguistic theory and the difference in licensing conditions as well as availability of an overt subject in an infinitival clause in complement as opposed to other, adjunct and subject clauses. The generalisation she provides, concerning the existence of agreement morphology or overt material on C, is very important and can be given support from the AG data as well. In Chapter 4 we will discuss in detail how we can implement her intuition in our analysis of AG infinitives.

3.5 AG null and overt subjects: the first intuitions

3.5.1 AG PRO does not exist: Horrocks, 1987

Horrocks, 1987 discusses AG infinitival constructions and argues that PRO is not an element whose existence is sufficiently supported in AG. According to him PRO theory is problematic in AG because (as C&O, 2001 point out for Latin, as well) null and overt subjects of infinitives are not in complementary distribution in AG. Consider the following examples (Horrocks, 1987: ex. (4a) and (4b))

(44)dikaion esti [CP ton So:krate: touto poiein]  
Right-Acc is the Socrates-Acc this-Acc to do  
‘It is right for Socrates to do that.’

(45)dikaion esti [CP PROarb touto poiein]  
Right-Acc is this-Acc to do  
‘It is right to do that.’
From the above cases it is clear that the subject of the infinitival clause that is an argument of the impersonal expression *dikaion esti*, can either be lexical or null with an arbitrary reference. The same pattern can also be found with control predicates, as in the following examples (Horrocks, 1987: 5a/b) with *boulomai* ‘want’.

(46) O Plato:n bouletai [CP [IP ton uion sophon einai]]

The Plato-Nom wants the son-Acc wise-Acc to be

‘Plato wants the son to be wise.’

(47) O Plato:n i bouletai ([CP) [IP PRO, sophos einai]]

The Plato-Nom wants wise-Nom to be

‘Plato wants (himself) to be wise.’

In order to get the co-reference between the matrix subject and the PRO in (47) Horrocks postulates the deletion of the C node (hence the parentheses), which is reminiscent of C deletion as a prerequisite for ECM. The difference between controlled and non-controlled infinitives is therefore attributed to the difference in their clausal status, the former being IPs while the latter being CPs. He also claims that PRO in AG is not simultaneously anaphoric and pronominal but *either* anaphoric *or* pronominal in quite distinct environments and he extends his proposal to English following Koster, 1984 and Bouchard, 1984. The crucial point that he makes, which is also evident from the data we presented in Chapter 2, is that the null subject of the AG infinitives does not fit the description of PRO, at least not without any modification. Also, assuming the rich tense inflection of the AG infinitives, we see that even without the ‘incompatibility problem’ the category PRO is problematic for AG. From our discussion in Chapter 2, it is evident that we will retain this intuition in our analysis as well.

3.5.2 AG infinitives and Tense: the first association

Philippaki-Warburton & Catsimali, 1989 discuss the interaction between AcI and PRO in AG. The main aim of their paper is to account for the accusative in the subject of AcI. They point out that within standard GB assumptions the infinitival subject gets its Case either from the main verb or from a null C, crucially though never from inside the infinitive and their purpose is to challenge this approach through discussing the properties of AG infinitives as denoted with construction that involves both overt and null subjects.
Firstly, they argue against an ECM analysis of the AG AcI based on examples where the infinitive is the subject of impersonal verbs and phrases like the ones we presented earlier (cf. example (13) in this chapter). The other alternative, namely null C, is also disregarded based on the adjunct infinitival clauses introduced with *prin* ‘before’ and *ho:ste* ‘so that’. Consider the following examples (P-W & C, 1989: examples (16a), (17a) and (19a)):

(48) diebe:san [prin tous allous apokrinasthai]
    moved on-3 pl before the others-acc to answer
    ‘The moved on before the others replied (to them).’

(49) prin geneseo:s
    before birth-gen
    ‘Before of the birth’

(50) oute tote ienai e:thele [prin he: gune: hauton epeise]
    neither then to go wanted-3 sg before the woman-nom him-acc persuaded
    ‘He didn’t want to go even then, before the woman persuaded him.’

Example (48) is a temporal infinitival clause. Such examples, with an overt complementizer would initially seemingly support an analysis that attributes Case-licensing properties to C, which remains null in all other cases. However, as we see in example (49) where the same complementizer heads a PP, the Case it assigns is genitive. And also when it heads an embedded clause with a finite verb (example (50)) the subject surfaces canonically in Nominative. P-W & C disregard the null C hypothesis on the basis that the same complementizer cannot be able to license three distinct Case features, in three distinct contexts. Their tentative proposal is that the infinitive itself is responsible for the accusative in its subject. This however, contradicts the existence of PRO as the null subject of infinitives, since this position is a Case position under their assumptions. This can be shown in the following example (P-W & C, 1989: example (22)), where in the absence of an overt infinitival subject, the predicate of the copula *genesthai*, which always agrees with its subject, still takes accusative Case.

(51) Houtoi edee:the:san Athe:naio:n [sphisii boe:thous PRO genesthai]

11 In example (50), which is the finite clause, it is not the case that the nominative subject is actually licensed from the complementizer. In cases like that what can be said is the complementizer is compatible with a nominative subject and does not have a different Case feature to assign, something that could lead to an ungrammaticality.
they-Nom asked Athenians-Gen them-Dat assistants-Acc to become

‘They requested the Athenians, PRO, to become their assistants.’

This reminds us of example (84) in Chapter 2, which we argued looks like an exception to the correlation that Control is manifested through CAAC. Instead we argued it to be an instance on NOC, with this being the reason that a null accusative subject is licensed in the infinitival clause. P-W & C follow Horrocks, 1987 and they too claim that PRO does not exist in AG. They moreover argue against the mechanism of (subject) raising in AG, based on the lack of trigger for this construction: if the subject of the infinitive is a Case position, then there is no need for it to raise to the subject position of main verbs in raising structures. They therefore conclude (following also Theofanopoulou-Kontou, 1973) that personal and impersonal passives are not transformationally related in AG. Their tentative proposal for an account of the facts lies in two major differences between English and Greek: the difference in the nature of the subject (following Philippaki-Warburton, 1987) (overt subject vs. verbal inflection, respectively) and the difference in the nature of infinitives, where AG is [+T/-Agr] and the Accusative in its subject is a default case. Finally, they suggest that infinitives that act as complements of control predicates are not CPs and also that ambiguities cannot be avoided concerning which accusative is the subject of the infinitives, given that accusative is the canonical case for objects in AG.

This paper is very important because it is the first one to fully lay out the problem the AG data pose: they try to account for the availability of accusative as the Case for the infinitival subjects in addition to the Control data. Their approach, the specification of AG infinitives as (+T/-Agr) as well as the characterisation of accusative as default case, is a very influential first step into an account of the data that is not Aux-to-Comp or ECM.

3.5.3 Aux-to-Comp in AG?
The paper we will present next is by Tantalou, 2003 who also discusses the familiar Aci data of AG and argues for the null C hypothesis, essentially adapting Cecchetto & Oniga’s analysis for AG. However, since she provides us with AG data we will briefly go through the (similar) argumentation again. She begins by distinguishing
true AcI and pseudo-AcI constructions that involve ditransitives that we have seen in section 2.4.5.2 in Chapter 2 (ex. 32 & 33) as well as in Latin (examples 28 & 29, this chapter) (Tantalou, 2003: example (7)):

(52) Didaskousin hauton, [ PRO, ballein]  
teach-they him to shoot  
‘They teach him how to shoot.’

In order to argue against a raising analysis she discusses the adjunct infinitival clauses introduced with prin and ho:ste and she claims that they are good evidence against raising since they function as adjuncts and not arguments of the verb and therefore cannot have anything to do with its case licensing properties. She consequently moves on to the other standard argument against the raising hypothesis, namely that of infinitives as subjects of passive verbs and unaccusatives. She claims that the reason that passives cannot be responsible for the accusative on the subject of the infinitive is Burzio’s generalization: they have no external theta-role and therefore no accusative for their internal argument either.

Although her analysis treats infinitival clauses as CPs, she thinks that ECM is not entirely absent from the grammar of AG and the example she uses to illustrate her point is with verb boulomai ‘want’ (cf. our examples 27 and 28 in Chapter 2). This seems to us a weakening of her thesis and it does not seem very insightful to say that although AG has a well-established mechanism of assigning Case to the subjects of infinitives from inside the infinitival clause (whatever that may be), another exceptional mechanism, like ECM is also needed.

Her arguments for the existence of the null C position involve SOT: she claims that given that AG infinitives display SOT\(^{12}\), they are characterized [+T/-Agr]. Therefore, following Stowell, 1982 if an infinitive is tensed there is also a C position needed for the T operator to move to at LF in order for it to take scope over the whole clause and the correct temporal interpretation to be established. An additional point is that infinitives in AG are both interchangeable and coordinated with finite clauses and this underlies their CP status and their temporal properties.

\(^{12}\) There is little consensus among AG scholars as to whether AG displays any SOT in finite or infinitival embedded clauses other than in oratio obliqua, contrary to Latin where things look much more straightforward. If we regard SOT as a formal tense agreement of some sort, the embedded tense being dependent on the main one, we do not think that it is actually exhibited in AG. We will not discuss this point extensively and we will come back to the temporal properties of the infinitival clauses in the following section.
The final point we want to comment on is the operator analysis of T moving to C. There exist various interesting approaches in the literature whereby Tense is not an operator (like Enç’s, 1987 for example that we will discuss extensively in the following section) and the relevant relationship between C and T is anchoring and not LF movement. Tantalou, much as all other Aux-to-Comp-type approaches, envisages the C/T relation as a temporal relation although the exact implementation of this intuition differs from analysis to analysis. Be it overt or covert (operator) movement of T to C, the crucial point is that the trigger for such movement is some kind of temporal/finiteness feature on C. As we said earlier, our analysis relies on a different kind of C/T relation.

3.5.4 Identity Crisis? Against Sevdali, 2003
In this section we will present our earlier approach about AG infinitives and their subjects, which is significantly different to the one we argue for in this thesis. It is important to see it in relative detail and understand the reasons that we abandoned it. The main idea behind Sevdali, 2003 is that AG infinitives have rich tense morphology and this implies temporal properties and a syntactically active T head as well. The claim about morphology could be seen as fairly straightforward since, as we discussed already, AG infinitives have morphological temporal distinctions, being found in the present, the aorist, the future and the present perfect form. In traditional grammars (Binnick, 1991, Jannaris, 1897 among others) these distinctions have been taken to signal solely differences in aspect, the tense of the infinitive being considered either invariable or entirely dependent on that of the main verb. The aspectual distinctions that are supposedly available are imperfective (present infinitive), perfective (aorist and future infinitive) and perfect (present perfect infinitive). Sevdali, 2003 initially shed doubt on this claim based on the availability both of future and aorist infinitive. The argument goes like this: if both forms are used to signal perfective aspect, and given that they cannot be used invariably, why do both of them exist, what is the difference between them? Apparently the future infinitive is exceptional insofar as it can denote tense (in oratio obliqua) contrary to all other infinitives. Consider the following two examples that illustrate the difference between the future and aorist infinitive:
In example (53) the aorist infinitive \textit{kathelein} denotes an instantaneous event, while it is temporally dependent on the past main verb \textit{egno}: that contributes the overall ‘pastness’ and makes the verb and infinitive behave like one complex with respect to tense. Moreover, the temporal adverb \textit{pro:ton} modifies the infinitive. The situation is different in example (54) however, where the future infinitive expresses only tense, perfective aspect being easily ruled out as a possible interpretation due to the nature of the event depicted by the verb: the act of an apology cannot be instantaneous, hence some duration is implied. Sevdali, 2003 took the temporality of the future infinitive (albeit exceptional, as we said already) to be indicative of the true nature of the AG infinitive in general, it being closer to a finite verb in that respect than other, more prototypical non-finite forms and she linked this property to the infinitive’s ability to have its own distinct, overt subject.

Naturally, the idea that infinitives have Tense is not new, ever since Stowell, 1982 it has been a fairly straightforward assumption. Stowell however, argued that only control infinitives (but not ECM and raising ones) have tense, the unrealised future that stems from their \textit{irrealis} interpretation. Setting aside questions about the nature and relation between tense and modality and where the notion of \textit{irrealis} fits, there is an issue with the differences in the distribution of infinitival clauses between English and AG. In AG infinitival clauses are (among other things) complements of verbs of saying, essentially substituting what are finite clauses in direct speech. In
these cases therefore, as we have seen in the above examples, the main verb and the
infinitive denote two distinct events with two distinct temporal frames, that
sometimes are simultaneous and some other times they are not. In these cases, the
tense of infinitives cannot just be *irrealis* in the sense of Stowell and it needs to be
defined differently.

Sevdali, 2003 defined the tense of infinitives in AG as *relative* tense, in the
sense of Comrie, 1985 that essentially is on par with dependent tense of all embedded
clauses, finite or not: ‘…the reference point (of the relative tense) for location of some
situation is *some point in time given by context*, not necessarily the present moment.’
*Irrealis* tense of control infinitives is also considered as relative tense under this
approach. The crucial point for the interpretation of relative tense is that it can only be
linked to speech time through the tense of the main clause. Therefore there needs to
be established a T-chain between the tense of the main clause and the embedded,
relative tense. A way to do this is with Enç’s, 1987 theory of temporal *anchoring*.
Enç’s main assumption is that Tense is not a sentential operator but a referential
expression, DP, argument of the verb. Verbs therefore select a tense argument (T) in
the same way they select their subjects and objects. In Enç’s terms temporal
anchoring is established via an agreement relation between (relative) T and its *local*
complementizer, and consequently between embedded complementizer and matrix T
that denotes speech time. This way she captures (among other things) the distinction
between clauses that do not need temporal anchoring i.e. matrix, adjunct and relative
clauses (that have a certain kind of complementizer) and complement clauses
(including infinitives) whose C position encodes certain features that allows them to
enter anchoring relations. In order for Enç’s theory to work in AG infinitives one
needs to argue that they are CPs across the board. Sevdali, 2003 does so by giving a
range of arguments such as infinitives being co-ordinated with finite clauses among
others. We will discuss these extensively in Chapter 4, section 4.3, so we will not
elaborate on them at this stage.

Sevdali’s, 2003 analysis is essentially as follows: AG infinitives have
morphological and semantic richness of their T node, therefore this can be considered
as evidence that it can be syntactically active, licensing the Case feature of the
accusative infinitival subject. Given the ‘defective’ character of non-finite T (both
morphological, because it lacks the entire tense paradigm and semantic, because it is
relative and not absolute tense) it needs anchoring through its C: only anchored relative T (or T with a filled C) can license an overt subject. Infinitives in English do not tolerate an overt subject because apart from being morphologically impoverished they are not CPs, therefore the relative T remains unanchored and they cannot license a Case feature for their subjects. The relation between C and T in this analysis is also a temporal relation that leads to the establishment of a T chain. A different way to view this approach is by following Demirdache & Uribe-Extebarria, 2000 (in the spirit of the claim made by Giorgi & Pianesi, 1997, “there are two active heads in the T domain”), whereby T and Asp are one complex and there cannot be the one without the other. Reichenbach’s, 1947 three temporal variables, E (event time), S (speech time) and R (reference time) are arguments of T and Aspect. If either T or Asp are active (as in some cases of AG infinitives when only Aspect is active, like with the aorist infinitive: cf. example 53) the whole complex is still syntactically active and can license a subject.

The prediction that this analysis makes that is also its main problem is that the accusative feature is always available: if temporal properties are linked to morphology, which is invariable, then the syntax of these infinitives should also be invariable. The extensive paradigm we presented in the previous chapter, with overt AcI, CAAC and null accusative pro undermines this approach. A tentative solution for this problem would involve the idea either that (a) the Accusative Case feature is purely optional and its existence is not controlled by anything in particular or (b) that Case is parasitic on EPP, so if there is an EPP feature then accusative is available but not vice versa. The problem that this claim would run into is twofold. Firstly, in a theoretical vein there is important literature that argues quite convincingly that Case and EPP are distinct from each other (for example Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou, 2000 among many others). Secondly, on the empirical side, this would imply that there is no such thing as null accusative infinitival subject and as we have seen in the examples about referential, accusative pro in AG infinitives, this is not the case.

Other important problems with this analysis, pointed out to us by Sabine Iatridou (p.c.) are the following: the very existence of Tense being in operation in the AG infinitives can be doubted since futurity can be seen as irrealis modality and anteriority can be regarded as an effect of perfective aspect. If one looks at all the examples that allegedly denote infinitival tense, it is unclear if we are dealing with
relative/defective T or Aspect in the first place. And while T can be argued to have some relation to (subject) Case licensing, it is not the same for Aspect, which is arguably related to the Case of the object (cf. Svenonius, 2002 and Ramchand, 2004 among others) but not the subject. Secondly, relative, defective T cannot be shown cross-linguistically to have anything to do with Case, the way finite T has. Non-finite T arguably assigns Null Case (Chomsky & Lasnik, 1993) but this makes the wrong predictions both about the overt and the null accusative subjects. Finally, this approach overgeneralizes since it implies that whenever you have T in a non-finite clause you can get a subject. The obvious counterexample to such a claim is English that has non-finite T both in infinitives and in gerunds but only the latter have overt subjects (ECM cases excluded, naturally). But as the standard analysis, it is left unexplained why the latter but not the former can have overt subjects.

3.5.5 The new role of C: Spyropoulos, 2005

The last analysis we will comment on in this Chapter is the one by Spyropoulos, 2005, who modifies the familiar idea that C is involved in Case licensing by arguing that it is actually the only head that is responsible for the Accusative subjects in AG infinitives. One of his major claims, which directly contrasts with our intuition, is that AcI is a purely optional construction, which alternates freely with the non-availability of Case in the subject position of AG infinitivals, as this is manifested in the CAAC data.

Spyropoulos discusses all the variations of the AG data: apart from the familiar AcI construction, which is a puzzle in its own right, he also discusses CAAC and the exceptions with the predicate in the accusative and tries to account for this alternation. In the heart of his argumentation lies the claim that AcI and case agreement interchange freely and AcI is a Last resort operation. Our disagreement with this claim does not lie on the fact that the two constructions interchange

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13 Concerning this, Ian Roberts pointed out to me that not all non-finite T’s need to have the same feature content. We find difficult however to formalise this alleged difference: morphology in English non-finite forms is minimal and it has nothing to do with agreement or tense that could be two features employed to differentiate infinitives from gerunds. The marker ‘to’ in the former and the ending ‘-ing’ in the latter cannot be seen to be able to express the difference between the two forms other than them being associated arbitrarily with one or the other.

14 Another thing that would be very difficult to account for would be the variation in the value of the case feature in gerunds, it being accusative, nominative or genitive. For different accounts of it see Reuland, 1992 and Johnson, 1988 among others.
(something that we undoubtedly agree with and want to account for), but to the claim that they do so freely in an unconstrained manner; contrary to Spyropoulos we argue that different focus needs regulate when each of them will surface.

Initially, Spyropoulos argues against the two logical alternatives regarding the source of accusative in AcI: ECM and the T-hypothesis. Regarding ECM, he argues against its two assumptions that are of central importance for any kind of variant of such an approach: firstly that accusative is a structural Case that is licensed by the matrix verb and secondly that the infinitival clause has to be an IP (TP) and not a CP so that this relationship between the main verb and the infinitival subject will not be obstructed. The AG data that he presents (among others\(^{15}\)) are the following:

\[(58) (=23 \ a&b \ Passivisation)\]

\[\text{(a) } \text{es touton ton cho:ron legetai aphikesthai ton straton} \]
\[\text{in this the place-acc say-pass.3sg arrive-inf.aor the army-acc} \]
\[\text{‘It is said that the army has arrived in this place’} \]

\[\text{(b) es touton ton cho:ron legousin aphikesthai ton straton} \]
\[\text{in this the place-acc say-3pl arrive-inf.aor the army-acc} \]
\[\text{‘They say that the army has arrived in this place’} \]

\[(59) (=26 \ AcI \ as \ complements \ of \ nouns)\]

\[\text{he: aggelia tous helle:nas ta hopla tithesthai…} \]
\[\text{the announcement-nom the Greeks-acc the weapons-acc put-inf.med.prs} \]
\[\text{‘the announcement that the Greeks hand over the weapons…’} \]

In example (58) we can see what happens when a verb that takes an AcI complement is passivised. An ECM type of account would predict that the subject of the infinitive would be turned into the main clause subject by virtue of it being the Case-marked object of the main verb. However in the (b) example we see that the whole infinitival clause is turned into the subject and the accusative of the infinitival subject is

\(^{15}\) Spyropoulos’s full range of data against ECM include evidence that AG infinitives are CPs from coordination with finite complement clauses introduced with overt complementizers (\textit{oti}) as well as association of an infinitive with an \textit{it}-expletive. Moreover, concerning the ability of the main verb to license structural Case on the infinitival subject, he argues against that claim based on data where the infinitive is a complement of an ‘impersonal verb’ (cf. also our example 12), and adverbial (temporal and result) infinitival clauses introduced with \textit{prin} and \textit{ho:ste}.
retained. Following standard assumptions on passivisation according to which the ability of a verb to license case for its internal argument is absorbed by passive morphology, Spyropoulos takes this paradigm to suggest that the accusative in AcI does not come from the main verb\textsuperscript{16}. Example (59) is a straightforward case of an infinitive with AcI as a complement of a noun, like the ones in Latin offered by Bolkenstein (cf. ex. 8). It is standardly assumed both for AG and Latin that nouns do not have Case assigning properties, therefore the accusative cannot be taken to come from the noun but from inside the infinitival clause instead. Based on this kind of data Spyropoulos concludes that an element from within the infinitival clause is responsible for the accusative on the subject. The most natural assumption on a par with standard case assignment in finite clauses would be that this element is T. This is the T-hypothesis, as the one put forward by Sevdali, 2003 (and that we discussed in the previous section) and Spyropoulos argues against it quite extensively. We will now move on presenting his arguments against it.

As we already saw, according to the T-hypothesis AG infinitives can license the Case of their subjects because they are specified as $+T$ due to their morphological richness. As we have already discussed Sevdali, 2003 argues for this analysis also based on the semantic interpretation of infinitival tense invariably as dependent tense (in the sense of Comrie, 1985) that needs anchoring through its (null) C (in the sense of Enç, 1987). Spyropoulos argues that there exist three types of infinitival clauses: free infinitives (FI) that are complements of verba dicendi et sentiendi, which exhibit full sequence of tenses, license accusative subjects and generally function just like finite clauses in all relevant respects. Secondly, there also exist what he calls the dependent infinitives (DI) that have a fixed temporal interpretation (future to that of the main verb) and the variation among the infinitival forms denotes aspectual variation. Finally he argues that there exist the anaphoric infinitives (AI) that have no temporal properties at all and their event time is identical or simultaneous with that of the matrix predicate. The different Case patterns that are exhibited (what he refers to as the optionality of Accusative) as well as the mere existence of Raising and Control phenomena, are attributed to the fact that there is not one homogeneous class of AG infinitives: all of them are CPs but their C positions have different feature content and

\textsuperscript{16} Spyropoulos’s argument is that the passivisation of the whole infinitival clause is a possible alternative not the only alternative. As we will see in Chapter 4, there are instances of direct subject-to-subject raising, also known as NcI. We will discuss them in section 4.3.5.2
properties and this results in the difference in the availability of Case. So, contra the T-hypothesis that predicts that accusative should always be available and is forced to treat the case agreement examples as exceptions, Spyropoulos’s analysis relies on the assumption that different interpretative value of (non finite) T licenses different Cs and this results in the different Case patterns. All other things being equal, if the availability of Case had to do only with the morphological richness of T, this would not explain its non-uniform behaviour with respect to Case licensing.

The key to Spyropoulos’s analysis is that he regards AcI as the AG analogue of for-insertion in English infinitivals. The analysis he puts forward relies on the presence of a null complementizer, like Ø_for that is responsible for Case licensing. The two main issues he addresses in the remainder of his paper are the conditions of the licensing of this null element and its exact position and status. Concerning the former and after comparing it with data about that-deletion in English, he concludes that the two elements are not licensed by the same conditions. AG Ø_for is not like its English counterpart that is affixal and is licensed through incorporation under strict adjacency conditions: on the contrary AG Ø_for is licensed in the same environments where (semantic) tense is licensed, namely FIs and DIs. The formal relation between C and T is characterised as a covert movement / feature checking relation. FIs and DIs have a T feature in their C domain and Ø_for can optionally appear when a T feature is licensed in the C domain but not vice versa. The fact that we have AcI with infinitives that are introduced with overt complementizers (in the temporal / result clauses with prin and ho:ste) shows us that Ø_for is compatible with a filled C position and thus is arguably in the lower C domain, namely under C_fin. As for its exact status, Spyropoulos argues that it is a bundle of Agr features that agrees with the parasitic Agr features on T (following Landau, 2004).

Spyropoulos’s analysis does justice to the complexity of the problem. However his analysis is an updated version of Aux-to-Comp, since he argues that differences in Case licensing are linked to the different temporal properties of infinitival clauses, which are also reflected on their C positions as well. We mainly disagree with two of his major claims (a) that the interchange between the availability of accusative on the one hand and direct Case agreement between the infinitival subject and its controller in the main clause is an optional phenomenon and (b) that Control infinitival clauses do not count as tensed, despite their irrealis interpretation.
This goes against various intuitions in the literature, including that of Stowell, 1982. Finally, we think that he misses an important generalisation in favour of the more conservative one: he does not see emphasis as playing any role in the licensing of overt accusative subjects, linking the phenomenon, as so many before him, to infinitival tense. The fact that it is not connected solely to T but also to C, does not provide any new insight to the syntax of infinitives, it merely restates the problem.

3.6 Conclusion

In this Chapter we discussed the data and previous analyses about infinitives with overt subjects in a variety of (Romance mostly) languages. These analyses tried to account for two types of subjects: nominative and accusative ones. The proposed analyses fall under three categories, with respect to where they attribute the source of the Case of the infinitival subject: (a) ECM-type (b) C/T (linked with a temporal relation of some sort) and (c) non-finite T. Apart from ECM that attributes overt infinitival subjects to an exceptional mechanism, all other analyses (apart from Sitarioudou’s) employ the same intuition, namely that infinitival subjects are licensed whenever semantic tense is licensed. The exact implementation of the proposals of course differs. We think that the way the AG data were presented in Chapter 2 gives rise to a different generalisation: overtness and to certain extent Case of the infinitival subject is not related to tense but to emphasis/contrast. OC environments do not differ to all others because they have no tense, but because there is no emphasis on the infinitival subject. This is the analysis that we will try to pursue in the following Chapter.
Chapter 4: The role of contrast in AG infinitival subjects

4.1 Introduction
As we saw in the previous Chapter, most analyses until now relate the availability of Case in infinitival clauses to their tense specification: (semantically) tensed infinitives can license Case for their subject, be it Accusative (Latin: C&O, 2001, AG: Spyropoulos, 2005) or Nominative (Neapolitan: Ledgeway, 2000). Crucially, this distinction is not only found cross-linguistically: it can also be within the same language. As Spyropoulos argues this is the reason some infinitives in AG tolerate an overt subject and some others do not, this behaviour can be reduced to the temporal properties of infinitival clauses and consequently their categorical status (CPs vs. TPs or even VPs). Sitaridou, 2002 on the other hand argued based mainly on Spanish and European Portuguese data that while T licenses the Case of the subject, its position is licensed by either C or Agr.

What we want to argue in this Chapter is that it is a contrastive discourse feature on C that licenses the position of the infinitival subject, while non-finite T hosts the actual Case feature. Our proposal is in accordance with a long line of thought whereby the availability of the Case of a subject is dissociated from its position, the later often cast theoretically as the much discussed EPP property (cf. Marantz, 1991, Chomsky, 2000, Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou, 2002). We identify C as the regulator of subject availability in the case of AG infinitives. The recently much-discussed relation between C & T is linked not to feature sharing, but to the co-existence of two distinct features (a contrastive one on C and Case on T) that are both responsible for overt subjects. However it is only if a non-finite T has a Case feature that C can also license a position for the subject (if it has the appropriate feature content itself). The opposite is not necessarily true: an infinitival CP need not license an overt subject by itself, if the non-finite T does not have a Case feature. The availability of a Case feature on a non-finite T node is linked to its rich morphology. Our proposal differs from earlier proposals in the following respects: it capitalizes on the role of discourse (in addition to syntax) in argument licensing (at least in infinitives) and it links the EPP feature to discourse factors, at least in non-finite contexts.

In particular we will argue for the following:
(a) That overt realisation of a pronoun in a null-subject language (even in the non-finite domain) can be linked to Focus. The overwhelming drop of infinitival subjects in Control contexts (and the CAAC exhibited in these cases) indicates that the insertion of the subject, when it happens, must have some kind of discourse related effect. This claim, put forward initially by Larson & Lujàn, 1986 is further supported by Spanish data.

(b) That subject availability can be linked to Focus. Belletti’s, 2001 theory of Focus as a licensing mechanism of arguments takes us half way there, since contra the Case Filter she argues that arguments licensed by Focus do not need Case. The AG data show us that when an element is emphatic or distinct from another prominent (agent-like) element in the discourse, it can be overt and bear its own Case. In cases of Control, CAAC is exhibited and Case is unavailable. In other cases (null pro, referential and arbitrary) Case is available but an overt element is never licensed either due to independent considerations or due to discourse related considerations (like lack of overt expletives or lack of focus on the subject, in the arbitrary pro cases).

(c) That all AG infinitival clauses are CPs. We will provide a variety of arguments that involve co-ordination of infinitives with finite clauses, adverbial infinitival clauses with overt complementizers, the two negative markers’ system of AG among others.

Our analysis is not novel, because it argues that C is involved in Case-licensing: previous analyses also attribute Case properties to C, but in the sense that C and T are the same head somehow. This is illustrated by the fact that the temporality of an infinitival clause is immediately taken to adhere to its status as a CP for some researchers. This is the position taken by Spyropoulos, 2005. It furthermore seems that saying that the sharing of finiteness/tense features between C and T is responsible for the Case on the infinitival subject is like claiming that finiteness/tense features that are found in different heads in this language need to agree in order for features like Case to be licensed. What we are arguing here instead is that two distinct features (contrast and Case), on two distinct heads (C and T) result in argument licensing in

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1 This claim is reminiscent of Giorgi & Pianesi’s, 1997 “feature-scattering principle” whereby bundles of features can opt to be instantiated in one single head in some languages or to be “scattered” in various heads in another language. Mood, Agreement, Tense and Aspect features are natural candidates for such a mechanism, being found in one or more heads in different languages.
non-finite contexts of morphologically rich languages. The exact value of the Case feature (Accusative) comes from infinitival T’s defective nature (following Sevdali, 2003), while the “overtness” of the pronoun/DP relies on the contrastive feature on C.

The next section will discuss the notion of contrast that is relevant to our discussion. Our analysis relies crucially on reducing emphasis to contrast, since these are the contexts where we have overt subjects in the infinitival clauses.

4.2 Contrast and Focus

The notion of contrast plays a central part in our analysis since we argue that it is a contrastive feature that regulates the availability of an overt infinitival subject. The environments where Accusative can appear overtly are when the infinitival subject has disjoint reference from that of the main clause or when it is emphatic/contrastive. Our proposal relies on the premise that both disjoint reference and emphasis are related to contrast. In contexts of disjoint reference, the notion of contrast is quite literal: the overt infinitival subject is (physically) contrasted to some element in the main clause, usually the thematic subject (Nominative structural subject or Dative experiencer in impersonal constructions). In the following section we will try to determine what the emphatic subject is contrasted against by clarifying the notions of contrast and emphasis through some current theories of Focus.

4.2.1 Contrast and emphasis

Let us look again into the prototypical emphatic AcI example:

(1) Oiomai [ eme phaulon einai ze:te:te:n ]

Think-I me-acc bad-acc to be researcher-acc
‘I consider myself to be a bad researcher’

Plato, Charmides: 175e

Discussing pragmatic issues like emphasis in a dead language is not very straightforward, since standard focus theories are based on question-answer pairs that are unavailable for AG. The reason however that traditional grammars do use such a term to explain subjects like eme in (1) has to do with the frequency of the constructions available: in the vast majority of cases overt subjects are distinct from those of the main clause while co-reference is achieved by dropping of the infinitival subject. In other words, Accusative is by and large used to mark obviation while
Control is achieved by keeping the infinitival subject null. Examples like (1) above, are rare and it is thus inferred that these overt infinitival subjects have some additional contribution to the information structure of the clause. Given that emphasis is indeed involved in such constructions, the question to address is in what sense it is related to contrast. The notions of focus, contrast and emphasis are interrelated but under no circumstances can they be collapsed.

Here we want to argue that the emphatic infinitival subject contrasts the presupposition that an overt accusative has disjoint reference and marks obviation. An infinitival subject that is both overt and co-referential goes against this ‘presupposition’ and is thus considered emphatic. Presupposition in this context is used non-technically and quite loosely. In order to make it clearer consider Dik et al’s 1981 point that Focus can be seen as contrast with a presumed presupposition of the addressee (among other things). Consider the following example (adapted from Dik et al, 1981: p.45, ex.11-13):

(2) I gave Ariane [a DVD]

The focused constituent in the above example (which is in brackets) can be viewed as contrastive to three alternatives: (a) I gave her a DVD, and you wouldn’t believe it, it is such a big surprise (maybe because I don’t give her anything, ever), (b) I gave her a DVD, not a book that we were talking about before (where the focused element is d-linked) and (c) I gave her a DVD, not a CD compilation, which I usually give Ariane. The last alternative can be regarded as the one contrasted to a presupposition. The difference between this example and the AG emphatic examples is that what is presupposed in the latter is the association of accusative with disjoint reference.

The relevant notion in syntax and semantics that can be linked to contrast is Focus. However it is neither necessarily nor exclusively linked to contrast. Kiss, 1998 was notably the first to extend the well-known semantic distinction of identificational and informational focus into syntax, whereby the former can be dubbed also as contrastive focus and is linked to what we want to discuss here, while the latter merely conveys the new information of the clause. Identificational/contrastive focus however, can be manifested syntactically through the use of special constructions, like clefts in English, or overt or covert focus movement, like in Hungarian. What is important to keep from Kiss’s theory is that different types of focus operators across languages involve different features such as, +/-exhaustive, +/- distributive and
crucially +/- contrastive. In our analysis we will argue that only elements that have a +contrastive feature can function as (overt) subjects of AG infinitival clauses.

A proposal whereby emphasis can sometimes be seen as contrast is also in line with Rooth’s, 1995 theory of alternatives. This theory implicitly incorporates the notion of contrast in Focus, since the latter’s function is to pick out one element from a group of possible referents that are available from the discourse, contrasting it to all others. In order to see how this works, consider the following example:

(3) Christina made a [Jazz]_e compilation for Rita

In this example the bracketed constituent [Jazz] receives its focus interpretation by picking out this variable from a set of relevant alternatives. This discourse related set of possible alternatives would be \{[Jazz], [Electronica], [Dance]\}, since these are the types of compilations that Christina usually makes. By focusing the constituent [Jazz] we are implicitly contrasting it to the other relevant ones. If every focused constituent is interpreted in that manner and assuming that the Accusative infinitival subject eme in example (1) is indeed emphatic, then we can argue that it receives its focus interpretation by being implicitly contrasted to a set of alternatives available in the discourse. This mechanism is the standard focus interpretation mechanism and has nothing to do with the particulars of the construction.

4.2.2 Morphological Focus marking in AG

The goal of this section is twofold: (a) to argue that morphology, in addition to phonology and syntax, can be a domain where Focus can be shown to operate and (b) to argue that certain enclitic focus particles cannot attach to accusative pronouns due to the inherent focus interpretation of the latter.

Concerning the first point we will discuss AG focus particles, especially the enclitic ones that attach to the elements that they modify. Phonological prominence (e.g. emphatic stress) is an additional focusing option to be found in AG, whereby wh-pronouns for example are distinguished from the homophonous indefinite ones because they bear (emphatic) stress, cf. tis (=wh) vs. tis (=indefinite). Syntactic operations like (focus) movement or cleft constructions are syntactic ways that languages can achieve focus interpretation. We want to argue that morphological operations like Case assignment or enclisis are also an option. As shown in Denniston, 1956 and Arad & Roussou, 1997 AG has a wide variety of focus particles
available, which are e:, de:, gar, ara, men...de, ge, i among others. We do not want to get into a discussion concerning the semantic differences among all these particles, but it would be fairly safe to say that all of them are focus particles in some way or another, denoting contrast, limitation, determination etc (see Denniston, 1956 for a detailed description). Two of these particles, namely i and ge can be enclitic. In the following examples we illustrate the latter.

(4) Alla phe:mi men ego:ge [o: So:krates] kai autos toioutos einai
But say-1 sg men I-nom-ge oh S and he-nom such-nom to be
[hoion su huphe:ge:i]
who-acc you-nom indicate-2sg

Plato, Gorgias, 458b

‘I too, Socrates, claim to be of the sort you indicate.’

(5) Pantes eran emoige edokoun autou
All-nom to-love to-me-dat-ge seem-3 pl him-gen

‘It seemed to be that all people liked him.’

Plato, Charmides: 154c

(6) Emoige dokei, o: So:krates
To me-dat-ge seems-3 sg oh Socrates-voc

‘To me it seems, oh Socrates.’

Plato, Laches: 199.d.3

(Arad & Roussou, 1997: ex. 24.)

What is important about these examples, is that they show these particles being attached to various Case-marked pronouns. We can therefore see the particle ge being attached on a Nominative subject pronoun (in ex. 4) and also on a Dative experiencer argument (in ex. 5 & 6). Curiously however, and this leads us to our second point, ge cannot attach to an accusative personal pronoun, rendering a combination like emege ungrammatical\(^2\). One might think the reason is that enclitic particles are incompatible with accusative elements in general. This assumption is challenged by data like the

\(^2\) As we have previously said the notion of ungrammaticality in a dead language is not a notion we would like to overuse: what we mean by it in this case is that combinations like emege seem unattested in texts and they are not reported to the grammars either. We therefore think that they do not exist.
following, which have to do with the particle *i*. While examples (7) and (8) demonstrate the particle attaching on Nominative elements, this is not the case in examples (9) and (10).

(7)  *Emoi gar dokei houtosi panu einai hubriste:s kai akolastos*  
To me-dat seems-3sg he-nom always to be violent-nom and unrestrained-nom  
‘Because this man seems to me to be violent and unrestrained’  
Plato, *Apologia*: 26e

(8)  *Tis houtosi (eisi)?*  
Who him-*i* is  
Who is it?  
Aristophanes, *Acharnians*: 1048

(9)  *Oi theoi ouk apodechontai tas poluteleis tautasi pompas te kai*  
The gods-nom not accept-3 pl the costly-acc these-acc-*i* processions and thusias  
sacrifices-acc  
‘The Gods cannot accept these costly processions and sacrifices.’  
Plato, *Alcibiades II*: 149c

(10)  *Toutoni dei mathein humas ton nomon ti pot’ebouleth’*  
Him-*i* must-3 sg to learn you-acc the law-acc what wanted-3 sg  
ho theis  
the enacter-nom  
‘You must be informed what the man who enacted this law intended.’  
Demosthenes, *Against Aristocrates*: 37

(Devine & Stenven, 1999. Ex. 53, p. 28)

(Devine & Stevens, 1999. Ex. 75, p. 87)

In example (9) *i* is found attached on the Accusative form of the demonstrative pronoun, *tautas* that functions as the direct object of the main verb. Example (10) is more interesting since the particle *i* is found on an Accusative demonstrative pronoun functioning as the infinitival subject. What all these data seem to suggest is that there is something that disallows the focus particle cliticising on an Accusative personal
pronoun like *eme* that is used in cases of emphatic ACl. This cannot be attributed to
the incompatibility between an enclitic particle and oblique Case (cf. 5 and 6) or
Accusative in particular (cf. 9 and 10). What we want to argue is happening is that
Accusative Case-marking in this context (emphatic ACl) is an instance of
morphological Focus-marking and that any additional focalisation of the same
element, via another morphological process like enclisis of a focus particle, is
superfluous and thus disallowed. The way to achieve focusing of an accusative
infinitival subject is through the *kai*...*kai* construction exhibited in the following
example, because this is syntactic focusing and it can be paired with the
morphological focusing given by the Accusative. Much in the same way that syntactic
and phonological focus can co-exist on the same sentence (n.b. Markopoulos &
Sevdali, 2002 and their claim about determiner spreading (DS) in MG as a focus
construction and its co-existence with other phonologically prominent elements in a
sentence) syntactic focusing of the *kai*...*kai* kind can co-exist with morphological
Focus marking, manifested via Accusative Case.

(11) Ego  oimai **kai eme**  kai se  to adikein
tou  adikeisthai  kakion  he:geisthai
the-gen wrong-doing-inf-pass  worse-acc consider-inf

‘I believe that both you and me consider that ill-treating is worse than been ill-
treated.’

Plato, *Gorgias*: 474

Note that in the above example, syntactic focusing of the *kai*...*kai* kind and
Accusative on the infinitival subject are not focusing the same thing: the syntactic
construction intensifies the (fact that there are) two infinitival subjects and the
Accusative is, as previously argued, contrast to the presupposition that overt
Accusative infinitival subject implies disjoint reference with the main clause subject.

The pairing of the particle *ge* with the subject of the infinitival clause can also
be an argument regarding the structure of the infinitival clause. As Denniston, 1956
first notes and Arad & Roussou, 1997 further elaborate on, all these AG particles are
found quite early in the clause. Arad & Roussou therefore, following Rizzi’s 1997
extended left periphery, argue that AG particles can also be hierarchically placed on a
split C system. *Ge* is a particularly difficult particle to place, but as a focus particle it
too is somewhere in C and its presence on infinitival clauses can thus function as an argument for the existence of a C layer on infinitives.\footnote{For more arguments concerning the status of infinitival clauses as CPs, see the following section.}

\subsection*{4.3 On the nature of AG infinitival clauses as CPs}

Our analysis relies on the existence of a contrastive feature in the left periphery of AG infinitival clauses. For this reason it is crucial that we argue that a C position is available, in order to be able to host such a feature in the first place. In English Raising/ECM and control infinitives are arguably TPs and CPs respectively. Although we want to maintain a difference between these two categories (excluding ECM, which we do not think exists in AG) we do not wish to do so retaining the CP vs. TP alternation. The reason for this is that the AG data do not show a clear cut distinction between the two: CAAC is exhibited both with control and raising predicates, and this seems to argue that both clauses have the same status. We think that the distinction between them is better envisaged as difference between the feature content of their respective Cs, rather than a cruder CP vs. TP distinction. We will elaborate on this point in section 4.4. For the time being we come back to providing arguments for the existence of a C position in all AG infinitives.

In the previous section we briefly presented AG morphological focus markers that according to Arad & Roussou, 1997 provide both semantic (pertaining to the content of C) as well as syntactic (on a par with Rizzi’s, 1997 theory of an articulated left periphery) evidence for the existence of infinitival C. In this section we will give a more diverse range of arguments concerning the status of AG infinitival clauses as CPs, which involve co-ordination of infinitives with finite clauses (section 4.3.1), the existence of adverbial infinitival clauses with overt complemetizers (section 4.3.2), general modality issues such as the potential marker an and the system two negation markers (section 4.3.3) and finally principle A effects (section 4.3.4). In section 4.4. we will come back to the natural question of whether raising out of CPs exists and why, as we will outline our analysis concerning the difference between raising and control in AG, despite the similarities with respect to CAAC.
4.3.1 Co-ordination with finite clauses

In AG many verbs can take both finite and infinitival clauses as complements. Such a case is the verb *oida* ‘know’ that subcategorizes both for a declarative clause introduced with an overt complementizer and for an infinitival one. Usually it *either* takes a finite clause *or* an infinitival one, while in the following example however we see the rare occasion of them being co-ordinated.

(12) Ημενας παντας ειδανε η:γουμαί [hoti ego men
>You-pl-acc all-pl-acc to-know think-1 sg that I on the one hand
>ortho:s lego:[,] [touton de skaion einai.]
correctly speak-1 sg him-acc on the other hand stupid to-be.
‘I think that you have all perceived that I speak correctly, whereas he is stupid.’

*Lysias, Against Theomnestus I*: 15, 3

The two bracketed clauses are linked with the *men...de* (‘on the one...on the other hand’) type of co-ordination. The first clause is a finite declarative clause, introduced with the overt complementizer *oti* while the second one is an infinitival clause, which displays the AcI construction. However controversial the syntax of co-ordination may be, it is standardly assumed that co-ordinated elements have the same (amount of) structure, all of them being DPs or VPs or CPs for example. In English for example, the verb *believe* that takes both an ECM infinitive (standardsly assumed to be a TP) and a that-clause as complements cannot take them both simultaneously in a structure of co-ordination:

(13) *I believe [*CP that John is cute*] and [*TP Mary to be ugly*]

The fact that AG infinitives are found co-ordinated with finite clauses is suggestive of their status as CPs, examples like the one above, rare as they may be, argue even more convincingly in favour of such a claim.

4.3.2 Adverbial clauses with overt complementizers

AG has a variety of adverbial clauses, such as temporal, causal, conditional, result clauses etc. Such clauses are introduced with complementizers and being finite, they can be expressed with various moods that are available in AG such as indicative, subjunctive and optative. As we have said before in Chapter 2, exceptionally there are
two types of clauses that can be also realised with infinitival verb forms: temporal and purpose clauses. More interestingly, in these two types of clauses infinitival forms can only be paired with two specific complementizers: *prin* ‘before’ for temporal clauses and *ho:ste* ‘so that’ for purpose clauses. These infinitival clauses can have either an AcI or a control construction and we will look into each of the possibilities in the following examples. The following three examples illustrate the first possibility, that of AcI where the adverbial infinitival clauses are the bracketed ones.

(14) Anankaion, houto:s ho:sper kai tauta estin, houto:s kai te:n he:metar
Necessary-acc such as and these-nom are-3 pl such and the acc our acc
phuche:n einai kai [prin gegonenai he:mas]
soul-acc to be and before to become us acc
‘It’s necessary that our soul exists even before we came into life, just as these things do (exist before us).

Plato, *Phaedo*: 76 e

(15) Eboulome:n d’an touto se proteron noe:sai
Wanted-1 sg an this acc you acc before to understand
[ prin eme tas ple:gas labein]
before me acc the wounds to receive
‘I would like you to understand this before I am beaten.’

Aristophanes, *Frogs*: 672-673

(16) Hoi proteron en Amphipolei oikountes [ prin Philippon labein, ]
The nom before in Amphipolis live prt nom before Philip acc to get past
te:n Athe:naio:n cho:ran eichon.
the fem Athenians gen country had-3 pl.
‘Those who inhabited Amphipolis, before Philip took it, were holding Athenian territory.’

Demosthenes, *Halonessus*: 28

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* We have nothing insightful to say concerning the constrained pairing of infinitives only with these two adverbial complementizers. This fact does not seem to us to undermine our claim in any way, while it moreover does not seem related to any properties of the infinitival T. It could be related to some idiosyncratic properties of the complementizers in question related to their lexical semantics, which can be uniquely paired both with finite and infinitival T.
So in all three above examples, we see the temporal clause introduced with the complementizer *prin*\(^5\) ‘before’ and expressed with the infinitival instead of the finite form. Moreover in all three examples there is an overt infinitival subject and in examples (14) and (16) it has disjoint reference from that of the main clause. Example (15) is an interesting case of contrastive AcI, where the subject of the infinitival adjunct clause *eme* is the same as the main clause subject but distinct from that of the infinitival clause, which is the complement of the main verb. The structure of the example is the following:

(17) [Main V (Subj) [ inf V \(_1\) Subj [ prin inf V \(_2\) Subj.]]]

This may remind us of the cases discussed in Chapter 2, where the two infinitival clauses were both the complements of the main verb. Example (15) however illustrated that the use of contrastive AcI is not reserved only for infinitival complement clauses: it also extends to infinitival adjunct clauses, whose subject is contrasted against the subject of a complement infinitival clause.

As we mentioned in Chapter 3, AcI in adjunct clauses constitutes important evidence against an ECM-type analysis concerning the source of the Accusative: adjunct clauses are neither thematically related nor categorically selected from the main verb and an accusative subject is still licensed in these contexts. Therefore the main verb cannot be responsible in any way for the Case of the infinitival subject. However the option of control in an adjunct is also available with these clauses as can be seen in the following example.

(18) Apopempousin auton, prin akousai

Send off-3 pl him-acc before to hear-inf

‘They sent him off, before listening to him (to what he had to say).

Thucydides, *Historia II*: 12.2

A possible account for AcI in these contexts, especially in the light of *prin* being considered akin to a preposition, is that the accusative is licensed by it. However as

\(^5\) The element *prin* can function both as a complementizer and as a preposition (e.g. example (49) in Chapter 3: *prin geneseos* ‘before the birth-gen’), in the latter case taking a genitive NP as a complement. In the cases we are discussing, when it introduces finite or infinitival adjunct clauses, we assume that it is a complementizer and as such we are placing it in the C system. The alternative of it being a preposition heading a CP, does not seem to undermine our claim, so we do not need to commit ourselves to an answer at this point.
we already said such temporal clauses introduced with *prin* can also surface with a finite verb in the indicative, the subjunctive or the optative mood (in *oratio obliqua*). Quite predictably in these cases the subject appears in the Nominative. The example below demonstrates this with a *prin* clause in the indicative.

(19) Oute tote Kuro:i ienai e:thele, prin he: gune:
    Neither then Cyrus-dat to go wanted-3 sg before the wife-nom
    auton epeise
    him-acc persuaded-3 sg
    ‘And he didn’t even want to go to Cyrus, before his wife persuaded him (to).’
    Xenophon, *Anabasis I* : 2.26

A similar pattern is observed with result *ho:ste* clauses: they can be found with an infinitive exhibiting either AcI (examples (20)-(22)) or control (example (23)):

(20) Kai moyi hoi theoi –houto:s en tois hierois ese:me:nan-
    And to me-dat the Gods-nom so in the sacrifices-dat give signs-pst-3 pl
    ho:ste kai idio:te:n an gno:nai hoti (…)
    so that and layman-acc an to know-pst that …
    ‘And the gods gave me such signs in the sacrifices that even a layman could perceive that (…)’
    Xenophon, *Anabasis VI* : 1.31

(21) Hoi tektones (...) pantes polemika hopla kateskeuazion, [ho:ste
    The builders-nom all-nom of-war arms produced so that
    te:n polin onto:s oiesthai polemou ergaste:rian einai ]
    the city-acc really to-think-prs war-gen institution-acc to-be-prs
    ‘The builders were all producing arms for war, so that one really thought the city was an institution of war.’
    Xenophon, *Hellenika III* : 4.17

(22) Egno: Praxitas pro:ton men to:n teicho:n kathelein
    Decide-3 sg-pst Praxitas firstly men the walls-gen to-tear-down-pst
    [ho:ste diodon stratopedo:i hikane:n einai ]
    so that way-acc camp-dat possible-acc to-be-prs
‘Praxitas firstly determined to take down (a portion of) the walls, so that the way to camp was free.’

Xenophon, *Hellenika IV*: 4. 13

(23)Echo: trikreis [ho:ste helein to ekeino:n ploion]
Have-1 sg triremes-acc so that to seize-prs the-acc their-gen-pl ship-acc
‘I have (enough) triremes so that I can seize their ship.’

Xenophon, *Anabasis I*: 4.8

Finite result clauses with *ho:ste* surface with (potential) indicative and with potential optative in addition to the infinitival structure. Again, as with the temporal clauses, in such cases the subject appears in Nominative as in the following example with the indicative:

(24)ho:ste (...) de: tisin edosan touto geras hoi theoi,
so that then them-dat gave-3 pl this-acc gift-acc the gods-nom
ex’ Haidou aneinai palin te:n psuche:n
from Hades-gen to raise-prs again the soul-acc
‘So the Gods gave this as a gift to some, so that their souls would rise again from Hades.’

Plato, *Symposium*: 179c, 10-12

As this section showed, infinitival adjunct clauses behave similarly to complement infinitival clauses: they display AcI with disjoint reference (eg. ex. 14), contrastive AcI (ex. 15), control with a null subject (ex. 18). An open question that remains regards Case agreement patterns in constructions with control into adjuncts. Our analysis predicts that infinitival syntax should work the same way whatever syntactic role the infinitival clauses has (complement or adjunct etc), and we therefore expect that CAAC should also be established in adjunct clauses because the existence of an overt C should not interfere. The reason is because we argue that CAAC is generally allowed unless the infinitival CP is a strong phase, which we will define as having an active focus head, with a contrastive feature. Adjunct infinitival clauses, although they have overt Cs, do not count as strong phases because these complementizers head the Finiteness Phrase low on the left periphery and have nothing to do with
focus. The following example with a ho:ste infinitival clause verifies this prediction concerning control and CAAC:

(25) oudeis houto: kakos hontina ouk an autos ho Ero:s entheon
no-one-nom so bad-nom whom-acc not an he-nom the Love-nom godly-acc
poie:eie pros arete:n, [ ho:ste homoion einai to:i aristo:i phusei:]
made-3 sg-opt to virtue-acc, so that same-acc to be the perfect nature-dat
‘No-one is so bad that Love himself cannot make him godly with respect to
virtue, so that he is the best in nature.’
Plato, Symposium: 179 a, 15-17

CAAC is not easily traced in the above example since it constitutes an instance of pseudo-AcI, i.e. object control with an accusative object⁶. The bracketed adjunct infinitival clause has a null subject and a copular infinitive, the environment we used to test whether Case agreement holds in a control environment. The predicative adjective homoion surfaces in the accusative in the absence of an overt accusative element in the infinitival clause. Moreover the null infinitival subject does not have a pro interpretation, arbitrary or referential, which are the instances of null, non-controlled accusatives. This example therefore demonstrates that an overt (adverbial) C does not block CAAC, while whatever licenses overt accusative infinitival subjects, leading to AcI, does. Let us move on to the next set of arguments about an infinitival clause being a CP, irrespective of its focus feature, and that is mood distinctions within the non-finite domain.

4.3.3 Mood distinctions in AG infinitives
As we said in section 2.2 of Chapter 2, AG has four morphologically distinct Moods: Indicative, Subjunctive, Optative and Imperative. In this section we wish to argue that these distinctions can be partly carried over to the AG infinitives, insofar as they express the realis vs. irrealis distinction. This claim effectively goes against Vincent,

⁶ Ideally, we should test the existence of CAAC into adjuncts with subject control that would yield a predicate in nominative, object control with a genitive object or dative experiencer control. The overall rarity of the environment to test CAAC made such examples quite elusive. While we think example (25) is indeed an instance of CAAC as opposed to concealed AcI, we think that it does not constitute conclusive evidence. In the opposite case, we could argue that the reason that adjunct infinitival clauses do not allow CAAC in the absence of left periphery able to host discourse features, is because they are generally considered islands and therefore opaque from any operation that extends to the main clause as well.
1998, who argues that a verbal form that can denote mood distinctions, cannot be non-finite, essentially regarding Mood as a diacritic for finiteness in a sense. His claim therefore is that while inflected non-finite forms can have agreement markers (e.g. European Portuguese inflected infinitives) and tense markers (e.g. Neapolitan infinitives) they can never have mood ones. If the claim that we will make here however is correct, and if we also assume Rizzi’s 1997 placement of the Mood head in the C system, this can be an additional argument for the existence of a C layer in AG infinitives. The arguments that we will provide concerning the modal properties of AG infinitives are threefold: (a) the double negation system of AG finite clauses that carries over to the non-finite domain, (b) the particle *an*, and finally (c) the use of the infinitive substituting the imperative in root clauses.

4.3.3.1 Declarative vs. Final infinitive: two negative markers in AG

AG infinitival complement clauses have traditionally been divided into declarative and final infinitives, based on the predicates that select them: verbs of saying, thinking and perception verbs, the former and volitionals and verbs of potential the later. This distinction can also be translated into the mood properties of the two types of infinitives: the declarative infinitive signifies realis modality while the final infinitive signifies irrealis modality. This distinction in the finite domain is instantiated both by specific mood inflection on the verb and by the use of a different negative marker: *ou(k)* for realis and *me:(n)* for irrealis. This is illustrated in the following two examples, with indicative and optative finite forms respectively:

(26) Oud’ esti Zeus
Not exist- 3 sg- ind Zeus-nom
‘Zeus doesn’t exist’

Aristophanes, *Clouds*: 367

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7 English infinitives arguably can also denote this distinction: ECM infinitives are *realis* while control ones are *irrealis*. The way this observation has been captured theoretically has been by claiming that a *realis* interpretation need not correspond to a specific feature in C and therefore ECM infinitives do not have a C position. Control infinitives however, because they bear the irrealis interpretation are CPs and moreover ‘unrealised future’ is the tense of infinitives par excellence. This is the position of Stowell, 1982 and what is evident from his analysis is that he regards *irrealis* as a temporal property, not a modal one. Here, we adopt a view whereby *realis* and *irrealis* are modal notions and the temporal interpretation of such clauses is a different thing.
(27) Me: pleio: kaka pathoien
Not more-acc bad-acc get-3 pl-opt
‘Hopefully there won’t be any more bad things happening to them.’
Sophocles, Antigone: 927-8

The system of two negation markers is also observed with infinitives where the declarative infinitive bears the ou(k) type of negation while the final\(^8\) infinitive has me:n, as can be seen in the following examples, respectively.

(28) \[\text{Ei de ti chalepon horo:ien ouk ananke:n einai}\]
If then something-acc bad-acc see-3 pl-opt not need-acc to-be
koino:nein autois.
to-share they-dat
‘But if they saw anything unpleasant, they were under no compulsion to share it with them.’
Xenophon, Hellenika IV: 3. 13

(29) \[\text{Egeneto de pse:phisma me: exeinai peri touto:n sumbouleuein.}\]
Was-3 sg then vote not to-be-possible about these-gen to-advice
‘There was a vote for it not to be possible to advise about these things.’
Xenophon, Hellenika II: 2. 15

This way of distinguishing realis from irrealis interpretation in infinitival clauses i.e. employing the two negations renders them more on a par with finite clauses, by associating a negative element with a particular mood and keeping this association constant even across the finite vs. non-finite continuum.

\[\text{4.3.3.2 ‘Potential’ infinitive}\]

An idiosyncratic use of the AG infinitive is that of the infinitive in oratio obliqua. In this context the infinitive substitutes what in direct speech were finite verbs and for this reason it needs to be able to express all modal distinctions found in finite clauses.

\[\text{\(^8\) According to traditional grammars the final infinitive is almost always found in the imperfective and the aorist, the perfect and the future being very rare and it always has future (irrealis) reference.}\]

\[\text{\(^9\) This example illustrates another curious use of infinitives instead of a main verb, here in the apodosis of a conditional. We will see another use of this sort in the following section, where we briefly discuss again the potential infinitive (cf. example 31).}\]
As we already discussed in chapter 2, optative and indicative finite forms can sometimes be accompanied by the ‘potential’ particle *an*, to demonstrate a ‘doubtful, unspecified action a condition’ yielding what grammars call the ‘future condition’ like the English ‘would’. So does the infinitive in indirect speech, as can be seen in the following two examples, demonstrating the direct \(^\text{10}\) and indirect speech, respectively:

(30) Elthoimi \(\text{an eis logous, [ ei home:rous laboimi ]}\)

Come-1 sg-pst-opt *an* to words if hostages-acc receive-1 sg-pst-opt

‘I will start negotiating, if I receive hostages’

(31) Eipen hoti ethoi \(\text{an eis logous,}\)

Said-3 sg that come-3 sg-pst-opt *an* to words

[ei home:rous laboi ]

if hostages-acc receive-3 sg-pst-opt

In example (30) the clause outside of the brackets is the apodosis of the conditional, and is expressed with the potential optative. In example (31) when the same conditional is reported through the verb *eipen* ‘said’, the potential optative is expressed through the infinitive, the latter being equally capable of expressing the counterfactual reading.

4.3.3.3 Infinitive instead of the imperative

Finally, concerning the modal uses of infinitives, remember the exceptional use of the infinitive substituting the imperative in main clauses.

(32) O: xein, angellein Lakedemoniois hoti te:ide keimetha

Oh foreigner-voc to-announce Lacaedemonians-dat that here lay-1 pl

tois keino:n rhe:masi peithomenoi.

the-dat their-gen words-dat loyal-prtcl-nom.

‘Oh foreigner, tell the Lacaedemonians that we lie here, being loyal to their orders.’

Herodotus, *Historia VII*: 228

In the above example the main verb *angellein* has infinitival form and is used instead of an imperative. This very rare use of the infinitive in a sense completes the picture

\(^{10}\) Example (30), which denotes the direct speech, equivalent of example (31), is a constructed example.
with the infinitive being able to express all the possible mood distinctions that are found in finite clauses: *realis*, *irrealis*, counterfactual and imperative. These data argue therefore that, just like finite clauses AG infinitival clauses are capable of expressing a wide (if not the full) range of mood distinctions. If Mood is syntactically instantiated on the C system then these data not only function as arguments for a modal interpretation of infinitival clauses but also as arguments for the existence of infinitival C, in *all* infinitival clauses.

4.3.4 Apparent Principle A effects

The familiar example that illustrates emphatic AcI, where the infinitival subject is co-referential with that of the main clause, is the following:

(33) Ὁιομαὶ ἐμε ἁπαλον εἶναι ζετετεν

Think-1 sg me-acc bad-acc to be researcher-acc

‘I consider myself to be a bad researcher’

Plato, *Charmides*: 175e

The element used as an infinitival subject in such cases is the pronoun *eme*. This fact provides some additional evidence about our claim that emphasis is indeed at play in these cases. The personal pronouns of AG have strong (stressed) forms, like *eme* ‘me’ as well as weak forms (at least in the first two persons): *me* and *se*. In almost all examples that we have provided and in the vast majority of the examples used by the grammars to illustrate the construction, the strong form is used instead of the weak one. The following two examples from Chapter 2, (15) and (32) respectively illustrate the situation clearly.

(34) Ἡος δὲ δελτίον (ἐστί) ἰσαὶ αὐτὰ ἀποκρινομένον μᾶλλον

Maybe then better is-3 sg you-acc to say-pres these-acc answer-prtcl-acc more

[ e: eme huper sou polupragmonein] than me-acc for you-gen be busy-pres

‘But perhaps it is better that you say these things in answering, than I should take all the trouble for you.’

Plato, *Theaetetus*: 184e

(35) Ὑσ αρτὶ ἡμὲν ανακαν ἡπερ ἕκεινο ἰος

As just me-acc forced-he the [for him-gen] speech-nom
eit’eboulome:n eite me: [ toiouton einai.]

either wanted-I or not this-acc to be

‘The speech in his favour forced me to be like this, whether I wanted it or not.’

Plato, *Theaetetus*: 179 b

In (34) we can see the constrastive case illustrated from the following schema:

(34’) [Main V (Subj) [ inf V1 Subj1 [inf V2 Subj2]]]

The main verb has an impersonal null subject, while the first infinitival clause has a distinct subject, expressed with the weak form of the pronoun *se*. The second infinitival clause has a subject, which is distinct from the first infinitival clause and thus clearly emphatic: in this case the strong form of the pronoun is used *eme*. Example (35) was analysed as an instance of pseudo-AcI, or a concealed object control: in this case the null infinitival subject is controlled by the overt object of the main verb, in which case the weak unstressed form, *me* of the pronoun in used. Only the strong pronoun can bear emphatic stress or in general be emphasised in the discourse through some means. This therefore is an additional argument in favour of our position that overt co-referential subjects of AG infinitives are indeed emphatic.

Moreover, the use of a pronoun in this position is in accordance with our proposal that all infinitival clauses are CPs since according to Principle B (Chomsky, 1981) ‘a pronoun needs to be free in its governing category’. As a matter of fact we expect never to find an anaphor in this position, since it would undermine our argument. Traditional grammars however give examples of the anaphoric element *eauton (emauton) ‘himself-myself* functioning as an infinitival subject. We will not engage into a discussion about the nature of the element in question and whether it actually is an anaphoric element directly comparable to English *himself*, because it falls outside the scope of our work. Instead we assume its anaphoric status for the purposes of this discussion. In this section we will present and discuss examples with that element and we will argue that in each case the anaphoric element in question is not the infinitival subject. Let us look into the first relevant example:

(36) Eboule:then ouen toutois emauton epideixai karterein dunamenon

Wanted-1 sg then about these myself-acc to demonstrate to wait being able-acc

‘With respect to these things, I wanted to demonstrate that I am able to wait.’

Isocrates, *Nicocles* (3): 39
In the above example, the accusative anaphor *emauton* could either be the object of the infinitive *epideixai* as well as the subject of *karterein*. Here we want to argue that its syntactic function is the former and not the latter, with example (36) therefore being an instance of object control, where the null subject of *karterein* is controlled by the object of *epideiksai*, which is the anaphoric element *emauton*. Let us also consider the following example:

(37) Hostis pene:s o:n ze:n en astei bouletai,

    Whoever-nom poor-nom being-prtcpl-nom to live in town-dat wants-3 sg
    athumoteron *eauton* epithumei poiein
    weaker-acc himself-acc wants-ε sg to make

‘Whoever wants to live in the city, although he is poor, he wants to make himself weaker.’

Menander, *Fragmenta*: 405-406

In the above example, the confusion of the syntactic role of *eauton* is due to semantics: the verb *epithumei* and the infinitive *poiein* have the same (null) subject while the anaphor is the object of the latter. The fact that the two null subjects and the anaphor indeed refer to the same person creates ambiguity with respect to the role of *eauton*. Such an example however does not seem to be a counterexample to the generalisation that anaphors cannot function as infinitival subjects because that would be a principle A violation. Let us move to the following example:

(38) Ethize *seauton* me: skuthro:pon einai alla sunnoun

    Used to-2 sg-imp yourself-acc not moody to be but concerned

‘Get used to being not moody but concerned’

Isocrates, *Ad Demonicum I*: 15.4

Our interpretation about the above example is that it’s an instance of pseudo-AcI, a concealed object control where the accusative element (in this case the anaphor *seauton*) is the object of the main verb and not the subject of the infinitive. The null subject of the infinitive is co-referential with the object of the main verb but crucially it is not the overt element. This is the last example involving an anaphor, which can be reduced to a concealed instance of object control and which conforms to our generalisation that all infinitival clauses are CPs and therefore binding domains, where only pronominal elements can be found in the subject position of these clauses.
We will now briefly discuss some counterexamples to this generalization and see a way to account for them. Consider the following three examples:\(^{11}\):

(39) Kuros enomisen eauton einai anthropo:n apanto:n olbiotaton

Cyrus thought-I sg-pst himself-acc to be people-gen-pl all-gen-pl happiest-acc

‘Cyrus thought that he was the happiest of all men.’

Herodotus, Historia I: 34

(40) Hege: samenos emauton (…) epieikesteron einai

Thinking-prtpei-pl-aor-nom myself-acc honourable-acc to be

‘Thinking that I was too honourable’

Plato, Apology: 36b

(41) Oud’ an antho:pon nomisaimi emauton einai

Not an human-acc think-I sg-pst-opt myself-acc to be

‘I should not account myself so much as a man;

Plato, Amatores: 133b

These examples raise an obvious problem for our previous claims, since we cannot argue that the main verbs *nomizo* (39/41) and *hegoumai* (40), both meaning broadly ‘think/consider’, take two internal arguments, an accusative and the infinitival clause, simply because these verbs are never reported to be ditransitives with such a complementation pattern. It is quite clear therefore that in these cases the accusative anaphors *eauton/emaution* are the subjects of the infinitives in an apparently exceptional manner with respect to binding theory, given our previous arguments that all infinitival clauses are CPs. The way we want to tackle these examples is by challenging the status of these elements as true anaphors in these particular cases. It is well-known that AG does not have a third person (personal) pronoun: the paradigm is incomplete and AG only has the first and second person in the singular (*ego:*, *su*) and all three in the plural (*he:meis, humeis, spheis*). This gap is either filled by the emphatic *autos* (which resembles Latin *ipse*) or by the anaphor *eautos*. The problem with a potential use of *autos* in the above examples is that it could be taken to mean ‘somebody else’ other than the main verb subject, contrary to the intended interpretation. For this reason the anaphor is exceptionally used, in order to achieve

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\(^{11}\) I would like to thank my examiner Geoff Horrocks for providing me with examples (40) and (41) and his useful suggestions for the issue at stake. I would also like to thank both him and Anna Roussou for a very fruitful discussion on the matter.
the intended co-referential interpretation. Albeit sketchy, we feel that this account is on the right track in arguing that the exceptional character of examples (39) to (41) has more to do with the nature and use of AG pronouns and less with the status infinitival clauses. Although we feel that these examples do not compromise our previous generalisation, we think that more work needs to be done on the pronominal system of AG. This concludes our discussion on apparent principle A effects.

To sum up this section, we have argued that all infinitival clauses are CPs based on a variety of evidence. If this is correct, we need to account for raising out of infinitival clauses that we have argued does exist in section 2.6.1 of chapter 2. We will come back to this point after we discuss the details of our analysis concerning control and we will present the differences between the two constructions.

4.4 The role of C in AG infinitives

Let us examine the situation so far: we are claiming that a notion of contrast can unify the two environments where we can see overt accusative subjects in AG infinitival clauses, namely obviation and emphasis. In the former case, there is contrast with an element in the main clause, while in the latter case there is contrast observed with a null element (or with the presupposition that accusative marks obviation). Moreover we have argued, based on a variety of independent factors, that AG infinitival clauses are CPs across the board.

The subsequent section seeks to formulate an approach whereby the availability of a position for the infinitival subject is fully dissociated from Case. The former, often theoretically cast as a language’s EPP property, will be envisaged as a discourse feature, a contrastive feature placed on C, linked to Chomsky’s, 2005 edge feature. The idea behind this is that we no longer regard the EPP as a purely formal feature but instead one that has an effect on the interpretation of the clause. The stronger version of this proposal is that the EPP feature in null subject languages should always have an effect on interpretation. Along these lines there are several proposals in literature such as Larson & Luján, 1984, and Dimitriadis, 1995 & 1996, which we will present in the following section.

Concerning the difference between overt and null AcI on the one hand and CAAC on the other, we will argue that although all infinitival clauses are CPs, their C positions do not share the same feature content. Following Chomsky’s, 2001 distinction between $v$ and $v^*$ whereby the former is the unaccusative $v$, which is a
weak phase while the latter is the transitive v, which is a strong phase, we argue that the same distinction is found within the non-finite domain. AG infinitival clauses with availability of overt subjects are C*Ps, strong phases and therefore do not allow Case transfer from outside. Control clauses however, are CPs, weak phases that allow Agree to operate from outside. In the latter case, this dependency is manifested with CAAC between the controller in the main clause and the null infinitival subject. A crucial part of our analysis is the assumption that what turns our non-finite CPs into strong phases are their discourse properties: a contrastive feature on C illustrates that these CPs are full CPs, with an upper left periphery, i.e. a discourse domain. Our proposal therefore is that a non-finite clause with an upper left-periphery is a strong phase. Haegeman, to appear argues that control infinitival clauses resist focalisation and topicalisation in English. This would seem surprising under accounts that simply regard control clauses as CPs, while under our proposal, where a CP does not necessarily imply the existence of the discourse-related part of CP, this is expected. Control CPs are weak phases and do not have the upper part of C available and therefore they do not have a discourse domain and are also transparent for agreement from outside.

Our proposal concerning the syntactic status of infinitival CPs has consequences for the nature of infinitival null subjects in addition to the mechanics of Control. Specifically, we argue that null infinitival subjects can be distinguished based on their Case properties: null pronominal infinitival subjects, like arbitrary and referential small pro, bear accusative, while null anaphoric infinitival subjects, like controlled PRO, bear the Case of their controller in the main clause. This offers a straightforward explanation for the process involved in Control in AG: it is marked with Case-agreement between the controller in the main clause and the null infinitival subject. Controlled PRO of AG, as an anaphoric element, agrees in Case with its controller. This assumption also gives us a neat way of distinguishing between Control (or obligatory control, OC) and non-obligatory control (NOC). The latter is not marked with CAAC, and the null infinitival subject surfaces in null accusative Case.
4.4.1 Overt subjects of NSLs

In this section we will discuss the difference between overt and null subjects in an NSL, and we will consider the differences in their interpretation. Consider the following two examples from Modern Greek:

(42) I Eleni ide tin Maria ke pro tis eipe oti tha erthi to vradi

The Helen saw the Mary and her-cl said that will come in the evening

‘Helen saw Mary and told her that she will come in the evening’

(43) I Eleni ide tin Maria kai afti tis ipe oti tha erthi to vradi

The Helen saw the Mary and she her-cl said that will come in the evening

‘Helen saw Mary and she (Mary) told her that will come in the evening’

MG is a null subject language (NSL) with pro-drop readily allowed in both main and embedded clauses, as in (42), where the subject of the second clause is null and therefore interpreted as co-referential with that of the main verb. When the pronoun auti is inserted in example (43) however, co-reference between main and embedded subjects is lost although there is no agreement mismatch between the two subjects, both being 3rd person singular and the pronoun is interpreted as referring to the object Mary. The intuition behind this observation is that overt and null subjects in NSLs are not freely interchangeable without a difference in meaning. Overt subjects function as deictics and manage to shift the interpretation of the embedded subject so as not to be co-referential with that of the main clause. The gist of this observation is that the overtness of an element is enough to create a significant effect in the interpretation of a clause. There is indeed contrast between an overt and null element, even with the same set of φ-features and this contrast often yields differences in interpretation.

Dimitriadis, 1995 & 1996 argues for a similar case with a corpus-based analysis for MG. He claims that overt and null pronouns select different antecedents in the context. Consider the following example taken from Dimitriadis, 1996 (p.1: ex.1):

(44)a. O Aris, diplose tin efimerida.

‘Aris folded the newspaper.’

b. pro, tin efera sto Jhiani.

‘(He) brought it to John.’

c. pro, tek den milise.

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12 I want to thank Dora Alexopoulou for bringing the contrast of these data into my attention.
‘(He) did not speak.’
c’ Aftosk/fi den milise.
‘He did not speak.’

What the previous example demonstrates is that the use of either the overt or null subject in examples c/c’ results in a shift in the selection of the antecedent. Dimitriadis’s analysis concerning the correct choice of the antecedent is based on Centering theory, whereby the use of pronouns is contingent upon the transition of possible centres of discourse. He argues for an Overt Pronoun Rule, which states that an overt pronominal subject in Greek never refers to the subject of the previous utterance. Our analysis concerning emphatic AcI, does not argue that an overt and a null pronoun pick different antecedents in discourse: on the contrary emphatic AcI and control both signal co-reference with the main clause subject. What is important however, and the point we share with Dimitriadis is that the overtness of an element can be associated with discourse effects and its non-default interpretation, and that overt and null pronouns do not interchange freely in all environments.

Larson & Luján, 1984 also discuss the interchange between overt and null subjects in NSL and how their interpretations vary. Their work is based on Spanish data and their main point is that overt subjects in a NSL are equivalent to focused/stressed subjects in a language like English. The parallelism is illustrated in the following data from MG.

(45) Agapo tin mitera mu
Love-1 sg the mother my
(46) Ego agapo tin mitera mu
I-nom love-1 sg the mother my
‘I love my mother’
(47) I love my mother
(48) [I]f love my mother

Example (45) with the null subject is the ‘unmarked’ case, equivalent to the simple English example (47). The insertion of the overt pronominal subject in (46) implies some focus in the construction and the sentence could be continued like ‘I love my

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13 For more details on his analysis as well as a very informative and detailed presentation of Centering theory, the reader is referred to the aforementioned papers and references therein.
mother, not like you, who hates her’. Such a continuation would render example (45) odd. MG example (46) therefore, is analogous to the focused English example (48).

What we want to argue here is that we could regard AG infinitival clauses as environments where pro-drop can take place. Pro-drop is not a phenomenon usually associated with infinitives since it is the canonical syntax of infinitives in a sense; null infinitival subjects are the norm, only they are referred to as Control and not pro-drop. Moreover, the lack of agreement morphology on non-finite forms makes it difficult to assume a pro infinitival subject, which would have difficulty valuing its φ-features. The use of the term pro-drop can retain its meaning with AG infinitives however since they have the possibility of generalised overt infinitival subjects in addition to control: the case of the infinitival subject that gets expressed even if it is coreferential with that of the main clause, can seem comparable to the MG (and NSLs in general) paradigm in (45) and (46) above, whereby the null subject (control) is the unmarked construction and the expressed one is the emphatic, focused one. This discussion can be further illuminated if we recall Chomsky’s, 1981 ‘Avoid Pronoun’ principle, which states that if it is possible to choose a null over an overt pronoun, one should choose the former and not the latter. This principle controls the distribution of PRO as opposed to overt pronouns in the position of infinitival subject. Our analysis predicts that anaphoric PRO and an overt pronoun are not really in competition in this position because they force a different interpretation even if they have the same φ-features.

Finally, another analysis that argues for a related point is Montalbetti, 1984. His main incentive is to discuss the difference in the behaviour of overt and null pronominal subjects with respect to principle B of binding theory. The situation is exemplified by the following Spanish data (Montalbetti, 1984: 26):

\[(49) \text{Nadie cree que él es inteligente} \]

Nobody thinks that he is intelligent

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14 In section 4.4.3 we will explicitly argue that some null infinitival subject is pro and we will elaborate there where it receives its φ-features from.

15 A language where the term pro-drop would not make sense for infinitives even if it has the availability of overt infinitival subjects is Latin. Latin, as we will extensively discuss in Chapter 5, has what we refer to as vacuous AcI that is comparable to obligatory subject insertion in English finite clauses: infinitival subjects need to be obligatorily expressed even when they are co-referential with the subject of the main clause. We will elaborate on the differences between AG and Latin in the following Chapter.
Nadie cree que pro; es inteligente
Nobody thinks that is intelligent

The generalisation, which is similar to the situation observed before for MG, is that while the null pronominal subject receives a co-referential interpretation with the subject of the main clause (ex. 50) and actually functions like a bound variable, the overt pronominal subject does not allow such an interpretation and instead it forces a disjoint reading interpretation. Montalbetti refers to Bouchard (1984:11) and his null hypothesis: “... the distribution, type and content of [NP e] must be fully determined by conditions and principles that apply to the category NP, without determining as to whether it is lexical or not’ and he furthermore wonders whether this can be extended to their interpretation as well. His answer, based on data like (44-45) is negative and his analysis is stated in terms of an Overt Pronoun Constraint (Montalbetti, 1984: 94), which states that overt pronouns cannot link to formal variables iff the alternation overt/empty obtains.

This concludes our discussion concerning the overtness of subjects in NSLs and their differences in distribution and/or interpretation from null ones. The main idea that we want to adopt in our discussion concerning AG infinitives is that the lexical realisation of an element has an interpretive effect that is not achieved by the null one. An overt element is either contrastive to another element in the context (like in the cases discussed by Dimitriadis and Montalbetti) or receives a generic focus interpretation like in the cases discussed by Larson & Luján.

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16 The same contrast can be seen on MG as well:
(i) Kanis den nomizi pos ine eksipnos
Nobody not think-3 sg that is-3 sg clever
‘Nobody thinks is clever’

(ii) Kanis den nomizi pos aftos ine eksipnos
Nobody not think-3 sg that he is-3 sg clever
‘Nobody thinks that he is clever’

The first example with the null subject in the embedded clause receives an interpretation as co-referential to the main clause quantifier subject, achieving a pair-list reading. In the second example the overt embedded subject aftos functions like a deictic and cannot refer to the individual denoted by the main subject. So (ii) could be paraphrased as ‘Nobody thinks that he, John is clever’

17 For reasons of space, we are leaving aside the details of his analysis, which is very interesting but, as we already said, is mainly designed to deal with binding issues. The reader is referred to Montalbetti, 1984 for all relevant details.
4.4.2 A note on EPP

The idea of overt and null subjects of NSLs not having the same interpretation seems to have a deeper consequence however: in the words of Montalbetti again (1984: 74) ‘if the interpretation of an element is sensitive to its being lexical or not, then the null subject parameter cannot be solely considered a PF phenomenon’. This can be taken to mean a number of things. The curious EPP property of language that has been taken to be responsible for the necessarily filling of Spec, TP with overt material in languages like English maybe cannot be reduced to the same thing in a NSL. The strong version of this claim also argued for (with different evidence) in Sifaki, 2004 could be that the EPP feature in all NSLs is not a purely formal feature but instead a discourse related one. This would imply that the EPP property of NSL is not exactly the same as that of a non-null subject language and since the possibility of a null element satisfying the EPP is always there in languages of the former kind, there must be a different feature that requires the overt realisation of a subject when this is actually realised. This feature can either be a purely discourse feature (like our contrastive feature) or we can argue that EPP is a discourse feature. Insofar as EPP is a feature that requires the filling of a position (finite T, Spec, TP) that a null element (pro) (Rizzi, 1982) or morphology on the verb (Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou, 1998 among others) can also satisfy, then it cannot be linked to our contrastive feature. Suppose however that in non-finite (or in general embedded) contexts, where the domain for contrast is bigger, the EPP is a purely discourse related property, then our prediction concerning overt subjects would be the following:

\[(51)\) The discourse/EPP constraint:

The EPP property of non-finite clauses is purely discourse (contrast)-related.

This generalisation raises a number of further questions, some of which we will not have the time to address at this stage:

(a) In a typology where languages are distinguished by the role discourse plays in their structure (traditionally referred to the difference between configurational and non-configurational languages), where does this generalisation fit in?

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18 What we mean by this statement is the fact that, if the subject is contrastive in main clauses, then it must be contrasted to something else in the context. In such cases then, contrast must be viewed rather loosely, not like a syntactic relationship between two elements that is regulated by some locality considerations. In an embedded clause, there is always the very natural possibility that the embedded subject should contrast that of the main clause. In that sense, the EPP property of an embedded clause (finite or not) could be distinct to that of a main clause and also related to discourse.
(b) Can a language be mixed, in the sense of it being purely formal EPP constrained in main clauses and discourse/EPP related in embedded contexts?
(c) Even more refined, can the dichotomy between finite and non-finite embedded contexts be made more rigid?
(d) Can all this relate to the well-established root vs. embedded clause asymmetry that is observed with some phenomena (cf. Haegeman, to appear among others)?

If the EPP is a discourse-related property/feature, at least in some embedded contexts, then we expect to find it in C and not in T, as it is commonly assumed for finite clauses. If moreover the EPP is a contrastive feature, then we furthermore expect to find it in the upper part of the left periphery, in the discourse domain. With all this in mind we move on to the next section, where we will link the availability of accusative in some AG infinitival clauses and not in others (control) to the feature content of their C positions. Our proposal will also have natural extensions to phase theory.

4.4.3 CPs vs. C*Ps
Recall that the pattern we want to account for is tripartite and it consists of (a) Overt AcI (ex. 52), (b) null accusative subject (arbitrary ex. 53 and referential ex. 54) and (c) CAAC in control contexts (subject control ex. 55 and object control ex. 56):

(52) Ego: oun (...) ouch he:gosoumai [ didakton einai arete:n. ]
I-nom then not think-1 sg taught-acc to-be virtue-acc.
‘I then think that virtue cannot be taught.’
Plato, Protagoras: 320b, 4

(53) Philanþrop:on einai dei
Friendly-ace-3 sg to be must-3 sg
‘One needs to love people’
Isocrates, Nicocles: 15

(54) All’ emoige, ephe: o: So:crates, didakton einai dokei
But me-dat ge said-3 sg oh Socrates taught-acc-fem to be seems-3 sg
‘But, he said, for my part Socrates, I think it is teachable (wisdom)’
Plato, Euthydemus: 282c
The main questions we want to answer are (a) what licenses Case and (b) what licenses the position of infinitival subjects (c) to what extent are these two inter-related. The reason we think that our data argue for a split between Case and overtness of the subject (EPP) (which has been extensively discussed in the literature cf. Marantz, 1984, Alexiadou &Anagnostopoulou, 2000, Nevins, 2004 Sitaridou, 2002 among others) is because of the possibility of null accusative subjects, where we see the possibility of Case availability for the subjects, from within the infinitival clause, but not the overtness of this subject. If Case was parasitic on EPP we would then expect that when the infinitival subject is overt it would be accusative and when it is null, it should get the case of the controller. This is definitely not so, since as we said, there is also the possibility of the null accusative infinitival subjects. The question that we will address in this section (and given that we have argued that all AG infinitives are CPs) therefore is why do some infinitival clauses allow Case agreement from the outside while some others do not.

Syntactic relations that are subject to locality considerations are restricted by phase theory as developed in Chomsky, 2001 and 2005. Assuming that CAAC is a kind of Agree relation, then we have to assume that CAAC is constrained to apply within a phase. Why are control CPs phases therefore and not the other infinitival clauses? The aforementioned Chomsky papers argue for a distinction between $v^*$ and $v$, where the former, that is the transitive $v^*$ is a strong phase, while the latter, the unaccusative $v$, is a weak phase. This distinction has never been extended to the C domain, although a full parallelism between C and $v$ is highly desired. What we want
to argue here is that this distinction also exists in the C level\(^{19}\) and it is manifested with the availability of CAAC as opposed to the availability of accusative in AG infinitives. Our core assumption is that control CPs are differentiated from other infinitival CPs that allow for AcI because the latter are full CPs, also with the discourse part of their C projected. Our claim therefore can be summarised in the following statement:

\((57)\) The non-finite C/phase rule:

Non-finite CPs can be strong phases if they have discourse properties.

The prediction made from this rule is exactly that locality-restricted operations can operate within a phase or across a weak phase but crucially not across strong phase.

The next question we need to address has to do with the dissociation of Case from the EPP and in particular the relation between phasehood, overtness and Case. Recall the following generalisations from the data put forward in Chapter (2):

\((58)\) When overt, the infinitival subject surfaces always in accusative.

\((59)\) When covert, the infinitival subject can be accusative or have the Case of its controller.

The relation between Case and EPP therefore is not a bi-conditional: when there is an EPP feature available the overt subject must be in the accusative, but not the other way round, i.e. absence of EPP does not imply absence of Case. Let us see a way to formulate this. We have argued that accusative Case is in principle available with contrastive elements, licensed by a contrastive feature on non-finite CPs. A plausible possibility would be to postulate that the Case feature itself is also on C. The non-finite C enters the derivation with a contrastive and a Case feature. Subsequently it inherits the Case feature on T and this results in the familiar AcI constructions. Note that with this assumption we fully equate instances of overt and null accusative subjects: both are contrastive and thus accusative morphology can appear either on the subject (overt AcI) or on the morphology of the predicate (covert AcI)\(^{20}\). In both

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\(^{19}\) An interesting question regarding our claim is why it is restricted only to infinitival clauses and whether it is also found in finite contexts. We leave this question open until the next Chapter when we will discuss other finite and non-finite constructions that resemble the AcI vs. CAAC alteration and especially MG na clauses.

\(^{20}\) Recall the instances of null infinitival subjects with arbitrary interpretation that do not have an overt realisation of accusative on a subject or on a predicate, e.g. Chre: grammata manthanein (must letters to
cases it is crucially linked with overtness. This is in accordance with our intuition that it is accusative morphology that marks obviation and contrast, for instance in example (52) above the accusative on the predicate didaktōn disambiguates the structure in favour of a non-control interpretation.

When the infinitival clause is a control clause and under our assumptions a CP, it enters the derivation without a contrastive feature and consequently without a Case feature either. In these cases, non-finite T, albeit morphologically rich, does not host a Case feature and cannot license an overt subject. Morphological richness of the non-finite T node, therefore, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for Case assignment in infinitives.

Case and EPP (with the latter viewed as purely discourse feature at least in non-finite clauses of NSLs) are dissociated only partially: there is no EPP without Case but not vice-versa: absence of EPP does not necessarily imply absence of Case. The generalisation we arrive at is therefore this: if a non-finite T is morphologically rich it can host a Case feature. Whether it will and what exact value this feature will have are issues contingent upon the existence and the feature of infinitival C in this construction as well as the existence of Agreement (node or features) on T. This of course is strongly reminiscent of Sitaridou’s, 2002 proposal of the existence nominative subjects on infinitives in Romance. We depart from Sitaridou however in two ways: (a) that our analysis does not rely on C being lexically filled and (b) that we envisage the feature on C as the EPP property, only discourse related.

4.4.4 Null infinitival subjects

The theory we have just outlined has some consequences for the nature of null infinitival subjects. So far we have not specified in detail the kinds of infinitival subjects we assume and whatever denotation we have used was representational. At this stage however it is time to spell out the predictions of our analysis for the nature of AG null infinitival subjects.

As we have already noted in various parts of this thesis, the biggest problem in the definition of PRO, in standard GB accounts was it being both pronominal and anaphoric at the same time. AG data however, seem to be pointing in the direction of
Bouchard’s, 1984 claims, whereby PRO is at times a pronoun and at other times an anaphor, but never both simultaneously. The relevant facts, have to do with the Case patterns of the null infinitival subjects when they are controlled or not. We argue that only a (null) pronominal can bear accusative Case, while a controlled subject, which essentially functions like an anaphor copies the Case of its controller. We will now move on to the more detailed laying down of this proposal talking about each null subject in turn.

4.4.4.1 Case marked PRO and the mechanics of control
Let us repeat the control examples that exhibit CAAC:

(60) Estin oun hostis bouletai [ athlios kai kakodaimo:n einai ] ;
         Is then whoever-nom wants-3 sg petty-nom and sad-nom to be-pres
‘Is there anyone who wants to be miserable and sad?’
         Plato, Meno: 78a

(61) Kurou edeonto [ ho:s prothumotatou genesthai. ]
      Cyrus-Gen pleaded-they as most willing-Gen to-be
‘They pleaded to Cyrus to be at most willing.’
      Xenophon, Hellenika: I.5.2

As we have already discussed, example (60) is an instance of subject control and example (61) is an instance of object control from a genitive object. In both cases above the constructions involve a copular infinitive and an adjectival predicate, which surfaces in the Case of its controller in the main clause, nominative in (60) and genitive in (61). Given that in copular constructions the predicate always agrees in Case with its subject, we can easily infer that the null infinitival in such cases is Case-marked with the Case of its controller. This generalisation naturally reminds us of the familiar data from Icelandic. Consider the following example from Sigurðsson (1991: 331, ex (8.a)):

(62) Strákarnir vonast til [ að PRO komast allir i skóla ].
       the boys-nom pl hope-3 pl for to get-inf all-nom to school
‘The boys hoped all to go to school.’
Examples like (62) led Sigurðsson to argue for the existence of Case-marked PRO in the position of infinitives in Icelandic. What we want to do here is extend this claim for AG but also modify it a bit. Our claim is that in AG when the infinitival subject is controlled it always copies the Case of its controller. Sigurðsson’s claim is that the controller DP heads a Case chain and PRO is in the tail of this chain, and therefore they share the same Case. Our assumption is that it is only in controlled cases that the infinitival subject is a PRO, and therefore PRO is a purely anaphoric element (also following in this Landau, 2004). As with other anaphoric null elements, such as DP traces, it is established that they share the Case of their antecedent. The relevant relationship between the main clause element and PRO is Agree and control is manifested via CAAC. As we said in the previous section, CAAC is subject to phase-based locality constrains and that’s why it is only found with control infinitives that are weak phases.

4.4.4.2 Raising vs. Control in AG

We will now come back to the question of the relationship between control and raising also in the light of all infinitival clauses being CPs, whose consequence is that we should not find raising because raising out of CPs should not be allowed. As we saw in chapter 2, section 2.6.1 AG data however show otherwise. In this section we will firstly give a short introduction to raising in general and then we will present the AG data and their relation to control, the problems raised by them and finally the tentative solution we will propose.

4.4.4.2.1 Standard Raising

Raising is the phenomenon where a DP is moved from the subject position of an embedded clause to the subject position of the main clause. This is illustrated in the English examples below:

(63) It seems that Christina is always on time
(64) Christina seems to be always on time

The theoretical issues related with this construction are: (a) that the raising predicate ‘seem’ does not have an external theta role (and that is why it takes an expletive subject in (63) and can have a DP raised in this position in (64)), (b) that the infinitival clause, which is the complement of the raising predicate is not able to
license Case for its subject and (c) that in order for the subject to be able to move out of the embedded clause, it needs to be infinitival (n.b. the interchange between finite and infinitival clause, as a complement of ‘seem’ in the above examples). Raising therefore takes place only with predicates that do not have a theta-marked subject and only from complements that cannot assign Case to its subjects. The status of the embedded clause cannot be a CP since this violates locality constraints on movement (at least in GB terms). In the older system Case was actually the trigger for raising, and more precisely it was claimed that the infinitival subject DP raised into the main clause in order to receive Case. In more recent versions of the theory, there also exists the possibility of covert raising, manifested as Long Distance Agree (LDA) so physical movement of the DP into the main clause is not required. The difference between overt and covert raising relies on the existence of an (optional) EPP feature on matrix Spec, TP. Most of the AG examples that we will discuss on the next subsection we will argue that are instances of LDA, so we will come back to that then.

Apart from the standard English cases, demonstrated in (63) and (64) there also exist constructions like hyper-raising that seem closer to the situation in AG (which we will present right away). Consider the following examples from Brazilian Portuguese (BP) taken from Martins & Nunes, to appear (p. 17, ex.30. a/b) :

(65) a. Parece que o João comprou um carro novo.

seems that the João bought a car new

'It seems that João bought a new car.'

b. O João parece que comprou um carro novo.

the João seems that bought a car new

'João seems to have bought a new car.'

The puzzle of the BP data is the fact that there seems to be raising out of a finite clause, with an overt C and a clear availability for Case marking of the subject in the unraised version. This problem posed to the theory seems directly comparable to the situation in AG, where there is raising out of a CP with clear availability of Case if the embedded subject stays in situ. The difference between the two constructions is that in BP the embedded clause is finite, while in AG it is infinitival. The analysis that Martins & Nunes provide for the BP data is in line with ongoing historical developments in BP, and more specifically the weakening of verbal morphology that
according to them has led finite T to be an *optional* Case assigner. Our analysis is somewhat different and relies on the Cs with different feature content available in each case.

4.4.4.2.2 *AG raising data: problems and consequences*

In this section we will present raising examples\(^{21}\) with some impersonal verbs of AG and we will discuss a possible way of accounting for it. The data we will discuss involve personal and impersonal variants of verbs like *dokei* ‘seems’ and *legetai* ‘is said’\(^{22}\) and we will start with the former. Consider the following example:

\[(66)\text{Lelusthai moi dokei kai he: ekeino: n hubris} \]

To have finished to me-dat seems-it and the-nom their-gen arrogance-nom

‘Their arrogance seems to me to have come to an end’

Xenophon, *Anabasis III* : 1.21

In example (66) the main verb *dokei*, is ambiguous between the impersonal and the personal construction because it surfaces in the 3rd person. Traditional grammars said that since there is a nominative argument in addition to a dative experiencer, the former can (exceptionally) only be the structural subject of the infinitival clause, and the whole infinitival clause would be the structural subject of the main verb. The reason for claiming that is because it could not be conceived that a predicate can have both a thematic subject manifested with a dative quirky subject and a structural subject, in nominative Case. If however we analyse the nominative as being raised from the infinitival clause, things look less exceptional and (63) is a standard case of raising. If this is the correct analysis for the above example, we should expect to find that the nominative argument should always control subject agreement of the main verb, leading to the ‘personal’ variant of the construction. Precisely this is illustrated by the following example.

\[(67)\text{Pantes eran emoige edokoun autou} \]

All-nom to love to me-dat seemed-3pl him-gen

\(^{21}\) In Chapter 2, section 2.6.1 we made the first reference to raising and LDA in the context of which argument of *dokei*, the nominative or the dative can control CAAC. In this section we are discussing the possibility of raising out of a CP and the full paradigm of constructions found with such verbs.

\(^{22}\) Impersonal verbs in AG can have both active and passive morphology. In this section we constrain the discussion illustratively to only one of each category, deponents (*dokei*) and passivised ones (*legetai*) for reasons of space.
‘They all seemed to love him’

Plato, *Charmides*: 154, c

Example (67) is exactly the same as (66) apart from the fact that the nominative argument is plural and triggers agreement with the verb, which thus surfaces with 3rd person plural inflection. This shows more clearly than before that the nominative must be the subject of the main verb, irrespective of the existence both of the dative argument and the infinitival clause. As we also said in Chapter 2, this argues that the so-called nominative subjects of non-finite clauses are indeed raised subjects of the impersonals and there is nothing exceptional in their existence. In order to complete the picture we also expect to find the ‘un-raised’ version, whereby the infinitival subject stays *in situ*, yielding a [impersonal V Dat [AcI]] type of sentence like in the following constructed example:

(68) Pantas eran [emoige edokei] autou

All-acc to love to me-dat seemed-3 sg him-gen

The following example (69) could be such a case, but the fact that DP *ta deina* is of neuter gender, where nominative and accusative forms coincide renders it ambiguous.

(69) Ho:ste oude *ta deina* eti deina dokei humin einai

So that not the misfortunes-acc then misfortunes seem-3sg to you-dat to be

‘So it doesn’t seem to you that misfortunes are (real) misfortunes anymore’

Lysias, *Andokides*: 50

If the highlighted DP is not accusative but instead nominative then we are either dealing with an agreement mismatch example, where the main verb and its structural subject agree only partially (in person but not in number) or this is a counterexample in the generalization that infinitival subjects are in accusative, with this being in nominative. Concerning the former possibility, we can tentatively suggest that this example could be an instance of the *Attic* construction, whereby the subject and the verb can only partially agree in person and not in number only when the subject is a neuter plural DP. However we find it more probable that *ta deina* is actually accusative and the example is an instance of [V Dat [AcI]] and thus the unraised counterpart of (66) and (67). Our suggestion is further verified by the following example, where the subject is not in neuter gender.
In the above example, we see the impersonal variant of *dokei* with its dative argument, and the bracketed constituent being the AcI construction. The infinitival subject is of masculine gender and is thus appearing clearly in the accusative, since it has not raised but has remained inside the infinitival clause.

The difference therefore between instances of raising, exemplified in (66) and (68) and control as illustrated in examples (60) and (61) is that in control there is no possibility of having the two versions: the raised and the unraised. This is clearly associated with the lexical semantics of the main verb, as we said for the English case as well in (64) and (65), since a raising verb does not have an external theta role associated with it. Raising and Control infinitives in AG on the other hand can result in the same mechanism: CAAC. Recall the following raising and control examples from Chapter 2 that remind us the Case patterns involved.

(71)Doko: moi **adunatos** einai

Think-1 sg to me-dat weak-**nom** to be

‘I think that I am weak’

Plato, *Republic*: 2. 368b

(72)Épieikei an moi doko: pros touton legein

Lenient-**dat** an to me-dat seem-1 sg about these-acc to speak

‘I think I speak fairly to him’

Plato, *Apology*: 34d

(73)Dokei moi aporon einai

Seems-3 sg to me-dat difficult-acc to be

‘It seems to me to be difficult’

Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes*: 1
The pattern we observe is the following: in (71) we have a straightforward case of a raising verb triggering (nominative) CAAC, which can be accounted for in terms of a standard raising structure. In (72) we have a raising verb that triggers CAAC with its dative experiencer argument. This cannot be accounted for in terms of raising, because we cannot imagine an element being raised from the embedded clause to receive (presumably inherent) dative in the main clause. Example (72) is again an instance of the unraised version of a raising verb, leading to the impersonal construction and an AcI infinitive. Finally (73) is an instance of a control verb triggering nominative CAAC. Initially it seems that the verb *doikei* can be raising, control and with an AcI complement. The reason we cannot reduce (71) to control resulting in nominative CAAC is because of examples like (66) and (67) where the nominative subject of the raising verb is overt. In a similar vein we cannot reduce (74) to a case of raising because it never has the unraised version, parallel to (73). We can therefore argue that both raising and control constructions involve the same mechanism, CAAC, either by a nominative or by a dative argument, in which case they involve the same type of C, namely CP, a weak phase. The difference between raising and control predicates has nothing to do with their syntax or with the type of complement they select: it has only to do with their different semantics and theta grid. And much like there are no exclusively control predicates in AG, most of them being able to subcategorise both for a weak CP (CAAC) and a strong C*P (AcI), raising predicates can also allow both a raised (CP/CAAC) and an unraised (C*P/AcI) construction.

We now come back to illustrate a similar phenomenon with passive verbs. The following two examples illustrate the same raising / non-raising paradigm with the verb *legetai* ‘it is said’: example (75) is the raised and (76) is the unraised version.

(75) *He Kilissa legetai [ de:the:nai Kurou [ epideiksai to strateuma aute:i] ]*

The Kilissa is said to have asked Cyrus-gen to show the army to her

‘The Cilician queen is said to have asked Cyrus to show the army to her’
Xenophon, *Anabasis*: I.2.14

(76) Legetai [ ton Archidamon peri tas Acharnas meinai ]
Is said the Archidamus-Acc around the Acharnes to stay
‘Archidamus is said to stay around Acharnes’

Thucydides, *Historia II*: 20.1

In example (75) the nominative is the structural subject of the verb, where it has raised from within the infinitival CP, while in (76) we have the unraised version, where the impersonal verb takes the whole infinitival clause with its accusative subject, as an argument. The only difference between the syntax of *dokei* and that of *legetai* is confined to the existence of the dative argument with the former but not with the latter. This can be attributed to lexical idiosyncrasies of each verb, and is of no importance to us here since the dative argument plays no crucial role in the problem we are dealing with. Having thus established that classical raising out of AG infinitival clauses exists, we are ready to lay down the question this poses to the theory. First of all we need to establish what triggers raising, since it is no longer done for Case reasons: the subject of the infinitival clause can receive Case in situ and does not need to raise to matrix Spec, TP to get it. Secondly, consider the following examples from European Portuguese (EP) taken from Martins & Nunes, to appear (p. 2, ex. 2. a/c):

(77) Calhou vermos o acidente.
‘It happened that we saw the accident’

(78) Nós calhámos a ver o acidente.
‘We happened to see the accident.’

In the above examples, both the embedded forms are infinitival. In example (77) however, which is the unraised version, the infinitival form is the inflected infinitive while in example (78), which is its raised counterpart, the verbal form is the simple uninflected infinitive introduced with the marker (preposition) *a*. The question this
raises concerning the AG raising data, is why there is no morphological instantiation between the infinitival clause in examples (66) and (75) on the one hand and (70) and (76) on the other. Given that AG does not have two infinitival forms available, like EP, we would expect a different type of morphological instantiation of the difference of clause types between the raised and the unraised version of infinitival clauses, maybe in the line with the English paradigm, demonstrated in (64) and (65). Lastly, and more importantly for our analysis here, the question we need to answer is why is raising out of CPs allowed. The answer we will give to this final question is by following Ura, 1997 and his theory about long-distance raising and multiple feature checking.

The data Ura discusses are slightly different from ours and they involve copy-raising and super-raising in Jordanian Arabic and the question is what licenses such constructions under his theory of multiple feature checking. The answer he gives is that these operations are licensed through multiple specifiers projected by a single head, H. The way of constraining this operation is by saying that multiple specifiers are allowed iff H has multiple sets of formal features. If the relevant head, H is T then the problem with Ura’s data is that we cannot see a morphological instantiation of these multiple features. If the same theory is applied in AG infinitives however, things are more straightforward. A way of restating the generalisation is that raising out of a CP is allowed only if T is morphologically rich. As we have already discussed AG infinitives are morphologically rich and raising out of them should be allowed regardless of whether they are CPs or not. So, rich morphology of AG non-finite T makes it possible for the subject to raise out of it. The generalisation seems somewhat stipulative and it still leaves open the question of what triggers raising in these cases. Allowing for a construction is one thing but licensing it is quite another. The question of how it is possible for an argument to raise out of a Case position to another Case position remains open and should be subject to further scrutiny and research.

4.4.4.3 Accusative pro

In this section we will discuss the other instance of null infinitival subject, whose interpretation is not controlled and is marked with accusative. Consider the following two examples from Chapter 2 that are instances of what we referred to as null accusative infinitival subjects:
(79) All’ emoige, ephe: o: So:crates, didakton einai dokei
   But me-dat ge said-3 sg oh Socrates taught-acc-fem to be seems-3 sg
   ‘But, he said, for my part Socrates, I think it is teachable (wisdom)’
   Plato, Euthydemus: 282c

(80) Philanthropon einai dei
   Friendly-acc-3 sg to be must-3 sg
   ‘One needs to love people’
   Isocrates, Nicocles: 15

Both these null infinitival subjects are pronominal and are also marked with accusative. Example (80) has the familiar arbitrary interpretation while (79) is the unique example of AG, where the null infinitival subject is referential, resembling the use of pro in finite clauses. As a matter of fact AG having both uses of pronominal null subjects, referential and arbitrary, and these two uses being marked with the canonical Case of infinitival subjects (a.k.a. accusative) seems to suggest that this element is an accusative pro. As we’ve said in Chapter 2, a clear prediction made by such a claim is that AG should have object drop, since if accusative pro exists nothing can stop it from appearing at the position of objects23 (following Rizzi’s, 1986 analysis of object drop involving a pro). The following data show that this prediction is borne out.

(81) Autos prothumoteros egenou to:n strate:go:n eme labein e: sauton
   He-nom more willing-nom became the generals-gen-pl me-acc to get or him-acc
   ‘You from all the generals became more willing that I get this (the prize) than yourself.’
   Plato, Symposium: 220 e, 6

In example (81) the object of the infinitival verb labein is dropped and is further identified from the context as ‘the prize’. What is interesting here is that this is an example of definite object drop, of the kind not found in MG for example (Dimitriadis, 1996)

23 I want to thank Sabine Iatridou for pointing this prediction out to me.
If we argue that the pronominal subject of AG infinitives is *pro*, the biggest problem that we are facing has to do with the identification of its φ-features. It is commonly assumed that finite clauses can license *pro* as a subject because they have agreement features that help them identify its φ-features. AG infinitives do not have any agreement morphology and the question of what identifies *pro* is left open. Recall that the two instances of null pronominal subject are heavily dependent on the context. The arbitrary null subject however can be either singular, as in example (82) above as well as plural as in the following example:

(82) Dro:ndas he:don thanein

Acting-prtcl-acc 3 pl sweeter-neut to die

‘It is better to die in action’

Euripides, *Helen*: 814

What can be said about this alternation is that it is accidental. What is important is that arbitrary *pro* is 3rd person, and this seems like an inherent feature. Whether it surfaces as singular or plural is not something that needs to be accounted for by feature checking24.

This problem can be seen under a different light if we consider the following data from English, brought to my attention by Winnie Lechner:

(83) It is important [ PROarb to respect each other’s needs ]

(84) It is important [PROarb to shave oneself (*themselves) ]

Under some assumptions arbitrary PRO has only one number-feature per language, it being plural in Italian for example following Rizzi, 1986. This does not seem to be the case for English however, as shown from the previous two examples. In (83), the reciprocal each other can only be bound by a plural element, and we can thus infer that arbitrary PRO is plural in such an example. In (84) however, the anaphor oneself is singular and thus bound by a singular element. The conclusion seems to be that either there are two arbitrary null pronominal subjects in English, a singular and a plural one, much in the same way as in AG or that there is one whose number freely varies. The English infinitive clearly does not have any agreement inflection, and can

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24 An alternative view on arbitrary *pro*/PRO is that it is controlled by a null operator. This is essentially the view taken by Manzini, 1983 and Manzini & Roussou, 2000. If one takes such a position then the two sets of number features that can be found on the arbitrary null subject can be seen as consequence of two types of operators that control arbitrary *pro*/PRO.
therefore not license two elements with two sets of number features. The problem of arbitrary null pronominal subjects being both singular and plural is not a problem restricted to AG and therefore need not concern us here. If we find the answer as to what licenses two arbitrary PROs in English, with the two $\varphi$-features, it could be the answer of what licenses the two arbitrary pros in AG.

4.5 Conclusion

In this Chapter we have argued for three main points: (a) that the notion of contrast can be related to focus, although it is not identical to it, (b) that all AG infinitival clauses are CPs, (c) that the correct analysis for AG infinitival subjects involves both a contrastive and a Case feature. Regarding this third point we claimed that all overt subjects in NSLs are emphatic and we also formulated the discourse/EPP constraint, whereby EPP is a discourse feature in non-finite clauses of NSLs. Our analysis about overt and null subjects of AG infinitives relies on two types of infinitival CPs, a weak and strong phase (with phasehood envisaged as a discourse property) that regulate the existence of an overt infinitival subject as well as the locality of operations like CAAC. Finally, the Case detected in null infinitival subjects argues for a more rigid split in the sense of Bouchard, 1984, whereby null infinitival subjects are either pronominal or anaphoric, but never both at the same time.

Naturally a big open question of our analysis and our generalisations concerning infinitives and their subjects has to do with similar constructions in other languages. In the following Chapter we will extend our claims to variety of constructions in a number of languages: Latin infinitival constructions, AG absolute participles and MG subjunctives.
Chapter 5: Two types of Cs? Some cross-linguistic evidence

5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we proposed a mechanism that regulates the appearance or not of accusative Case on AG infinitival subjects. The generalisations that led us to our proposal were the following:

(a) When overt, the infinitival subject appears in the accusative Case.

(b) When covert, the infinitival subject can either be assumed to be in accusative (essentially when it is a null pronominal either with a referential or with an arbitrary interpretation) or, when it is controlled, it is assumed to bear the Case of its controller.

The split in the Case realisation of null infinitival subjects has led us to argue that the availability of Case is not parasitic on EPP but instead it is related to the notion of contrast. We argued that in the non-finite domain the EPP feature can be solely seen as a discourse feature, that requires the overt realisation of a contrastive subject. This contrastive element can either be distinct to the subject of the main clause or co-referential but emphatic. Moreover and crucially, in instances of null pronominal subjects what counts as contrastive is the morphological instantiation of accusative morphology on the predicate, which is the crucial thing that marks obviation. Our theory argues for two types of non-finite CPs, a strong and a weak phase, where phasehood is dependent upon the existence of discourse features, such as the contrastive feature relevant in the valuing of accusative and arguably it is these kind of features that can turn an infinitival CP into a strong phase. The correlation we have therefore established is that when a non-finite clause has an upper left periphery, a discourse domain then it is a strong phase and given that its core functional element is morphologically rich, it can also value Case on its subject.

The role of this chapter is to try to extend this analysis to other non-finite constructions with overt and null subjects, which are the most obvious candidates where our predictions can apply. This way we can test the cross-linguistic validity of the mechanism we have argued for and we will also try to refine it, when faced with constructions that differ minimally from AG infinitives.

Firstly we will discuss Latin infinitival clauses. These have always been considered identical to AG ones in the literature and have been treated alike. However
in this section we will demonstrate the crucial differences between the two constructions and will show how they can be accounted for by our theory. Secondly we will discuss AG absolute participle constructions in comparison with other ‘nominal’ non-finite forms with overt subjects like Latin gerundives. The main question these clauses pose is whether a verbal form that is itself Case-marked (like participles and gerundives are in these languages) can license an overt, Case-marked subject. Finally we will discuss the most relevant construction, namely the Modern Greek na clauses. These clauses have replaced AG infinitives and exhibit finite control. After discussing the relevant literature as well as some diachronic remarks in the loss of infinitives and development of na clauses, we will adopt Alboiu’s to appear and Roussou’s 2000 and 2001 analyses that argue for two types of Cs in these clauses.

5.2 Latin Acl and control

5.2.1 Accusative subjects
In this section we will briefly present the paradigm in Latin and highlight its minimal but significant differences from AG. At the end of the section we will attempt to account for these differences based on the analysis for AG infinitives that we illustrated in the previous Chapter.

Starting from the differences in morphology, Latin infinitives inflect in three tenses: present, future and present perfect in both active and passive voice. Interestingly, the present perfect of the active voice as well as the future and the present perfect of passive voice are periphrastic forms, which are made up with the verb’s participles and the infinitive of the auxiliary ‘to be’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Active Voice</th>
<th>Passive Voice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>amare</td>
<td>amari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr. Perfect</td>
<td>amavisse</td>
<td>amatus,-a,-um esse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>amaturus,-a,-um esse</td>
<td>amatum iri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: the morphological paradigm of the infinitival forms or the verb ‘amo’ (to love)*

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1 The data of this section are taken from the paper of Cacchetto & Oniga, 2001 and the Latin grammars: Ernout & Thomas, 1993, Hale & Buck, 1903 and Gildersleeve & Lodge, 1895.

2 This could lead some to believe that Latin infinitives are inflected for subject agreement. Cacchetto & Oniga, 2001 investigate and argue against this possibility, as we have also noted in Chapter 3.
In terms of their morphology therefore Latin infinitives are similar to AG ones and Cechetto & Oniga, 2001 characterise them as +T/-Agr. With respect to their syntactic behaviour Latin infinitives are again similar to AG ones: first of all they take generalised overt accusative subjects in cases of disjoint reference, exhibiting AcI as exemplified in the following examples:

1. **AcI (as a complement of a ditransitive)**
   
   ```
   eam admoneo [ eos profectos esse ]
   Her-Acc admonish-I them-Acc left-Acc-pl to-have
   'I admonish her that they have left.'
   ```

2. **AcI (as a complement of credo)**
   
   ```
   Gallos esse altissimos omnes credunt.
   Gauls-Acc to be very tall-Acc all-Nom believe-they
   'Everybody believes that the Gauls are very tall.'
   ```

3. **AcI (in a subject clause)**
   
   ```
   [ eos venisse ] constat
   them-Acc to-have-come is-certain
   'It is certain that they have come.'
   ```

What seems not to be available in Latin is the use of emphatic AcI as illustrated in the following AG (famous by now) example:

4. **Oiomai [ me phaulon einai ze:te:te:n ]**
   
   Think-1 sg me-acc bad-acc to be researcher-acc
   ‘I consider myself to be a bad researcher’

   *Plato, Charmides: 175e*

As we have extensively discussed, AG can have emphatic AcI with any kind of predicate that takes infinitival (and consequently AcI) complements. In Latin, the situation is a bit more complicated: Ernout & Thomas, 1993 in their survey of Latin report that while an accusative infinitival subject is normally dropped after

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3 The other piece of evidence that C&O use for characterising Latin infinitives as +T is that the obey SOT. For a full discussion on C&O’s analysis we refer to the reader to section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3.
volitionals, it is nonetheless retained after *verba dicendi & declarandi*; in these later contexts, where infinitives are found in the vast majority of cases, the infinitival subject is overtly expressed even when it is co-referential with that of the main verb without any apparent effect in the interpretation of the clause. Consider the following example (C&O, 2001: ex. 7):

(5) Ad portum se aiebat ire (Pl. Rud. 307)

to the port himself-ACC said to-go

‘He said that he was going to the port’

In the above example, the anaphoric element *se*, which is the subject of the infinitival clause, is co-referential with the main clause subject but nonetheless does not seem to be emphatic. An important reason that leads us to this remark is the overwhelming frequency of examples like (5) in Latin as opposed to their relative rarity in AG, where co-referential AcI is indeed considered emphatic. Given our analysis for the AG infinitives, where the emphatic use of AcI was a key to arguing about focus playing an important role in the licensing of the infinitival subject, it is important to look into Latin closely and try to establish why do they exhibit this difference.

A second important reason has to do with the element that is used in example (5), namely the anaphor *se*. The Latin pronoun system is very elaborate. Details aside, we focus on the two anaphoric elements *se* and *ipse*. They both mean ‘himself’ but their uses are fairly distinct. More specifically and interestingly *ipse* is never to our knowledge used as an infinitival subject, while *se* usually is as we saw in (5). Latin grammars such as Ernout & Thomas, 1993 and Gildersleeve & Lodge, 1895 claim that *ipse* is the emphatic anaphoric element, contrary to *se* that is a mere reflexive, carrying no emphasis whatsoever. This remark is corroborated by Harris, 1978 and Vincent, 1997 who further elaborate on the role of *ipse* as an emphatic reflexive pronoun, which is used to bring back the focus on an element that has been used before in the discourse but has fallen into the background of the conversation. *Ipse*’s emphatic use is arguably what prevents it from appearing in environments as that of an AcI subject, a position, which in Latin does not carry any emphasis. It is what can be referred to as ‘vacuous’ AcI, where an overt infinitival which is co-referential with that of the main clause is not at all focused and has no effect in the information structure of the clause. Therefore and since Latin has a choice between an emphatic (*ipse*) and a non-emphatic reflexive pronoun (*se*), the use of the latter
instead of the former in these environments lends further support on our claim of the
difference between AG and Latin.

Another important difference between Latin and AG, which is also evident
from example (5) has to do with the nature of *se* as an anaphor that obeys Principle A
of binding theory. In example (4) on the other hand, AG uses the pronoun *eme*, which
obeys Principle B of binding theory. As we extensively discussed in section 4.3 in
Chapter 4, we argue that AG infinitives are CPs across the board and we expect only
pronouns to be able to surface as their subjects. A certain way to account for the
difference between Latin and AG would be to argue that their different choice of
pronoun as an infinitival subject also implies a difference in the status between AG
and at least some Latin infinitival clauses, the latter lacking the C position. However
consider the following example, where an infinitive is found co-ordinated with a finite
clause.

(6) Constituerunt optimum esse domum suam quemque reverti et (…)

Determined 3-pl  best-acc to be home-ace their-acc them to return and (…)  
undique convenirent
from all the sides assemble 3-pl (Caesar, de bello gallico, 2, 10, 4)
‘They were determined that it would be best for all to return to their
homes and should assemble from all sides.’

In section 4.3 in Chapter 4 we used similar AG sentences to argue that AG infinitives
are indeed CPs across the board. Most of the other examples we used cannot be
duplicated for Latin for independent reasons, since for example Latin does not have
adjunct infinitival clauses with overt complementizers\(^4\) or a system of double
negation. Example (6) however is suggestive of the categorical status of Latin
infinitival clauses as CPs. Moreover it shows that things are not as straightforward as
to attribute the use of reflexive pronouns in the position of infinitival subjects to the
infinitival clauses lacking the C layer. Another related issue for example that needs to
be taken into consideration is the non-local binding of anaphors in Latin. This is
illustrated from the following example:

\(^4\) For example, the reason that Latin does not have adjunct infinitival clauses could be related to the
nature and the idiosyncratic properties of the relevant complementizers and not to the nature of
infinitival clauses.
In (7) the anaphor is inside a PP object of the infinitive while its antecedent is the main clause subject *is*. This illustrates that possibly the nature and the licensing conditions of anaphors may very well be different in English and Latin, where their use as infinitival subjects may be related to more things other than the categorical status of infinitival clauses.

5.2.2 Raising

The next section is dedicated to exemplify raising and control constructions in Latin. The former, also misguidedly known as Nominativus Cum Infinitivo (NcI) is illustrated with the following examples:

(8) NcI/Raising:

\[\ldots qui unus omnium justissimus fuisse traditur.\]

‘who alone is said to have been the most just of all.’

Cicero, *pro Sestio*, 67.141

(9) NcI/Raising:

\[Dicitur Homerus caecus fuisse\]

It is said that Homer was blind, too

(10) Raising with full agreement:

\[Galli dicuntur in Italiam transisse (Ernout & Thomas)\]

‘The Gauls are said to have passed through Italy.’

In (8) and (9) the subject of the passive verbs *traditur* and *dicitur* respectively are raised from the infinitival clauses and thus appear in Nominative. Obviously the diagnostic for raising in these cases is the Case of the subject (nominative) and not the position of the subject, since they constitute instances of Long Distance Agree (LDA)
and not raising in the traditional case, much like the AG cases. Interestingly in both these examples the raised subject controls CAAC inside the infinitival clause. Example (10) illustrates more clearly that this is true raising we are dealing with, since the raised subject is in the plural and it agrees with the main verb, the latter being most definitely not impersonal.

(11) *Acl subject of a passive:*

[Gallos esse altissimos] creditur.

The Gauls-ace to be very tall-acc is-believed

‘It is believed that the Gauls are very tall.’

Example (11) is an instance of the ‘unraised’ version where the infinitival subject stays inside the infinitival clause, resulting in AcI and the passive verb, remains impersonal, with the whole infinitival clause as its argument. This situation is directly comparable to the AG data repeated here:

(12) *Ho Kuros legetai [ genesthai Kambusou ]*

The K-Nom is said to be of Cambyses-gen

‘Cyrus is said to be born from Cambyses’

Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*: I. 2.1

(13) *Legetai [ ton Archidamon peri tas Acharnas meinai ]*

Is said the Archidamus-Acc around the Acharnes to stay

‘Archidamus is said to stay around Acharnes’

*Thucydides, Historia II*: 20.1

The Latin raising data, exactly like the AG ones, pose the question of trigger of raising in such cases: if the infinitival subject can receive Case *in situ* (as it does in (11) and (13)) what forces it to raise in the other examples. And more importantly is there something that forces it or does it simply allow it?

5.2.3 *Control and the use of ut/ne clauses*

Perhaps the most interesting difference between Latin and AG comes in the domain of Control and the strategies that the two languages employ. Although by and large AG and Latin follow the same pattern as a mechanism of control, namely CAAC, Latin has also other strategies not available in AG, which we will discuss shortly.
Firstly let us look into the following examples that illustrate two standard control verbs (subject and object control respectively), employing the CAAC strategy:

(14) statui | EC esse | bonus
decided-1 sg | to-be good-nom
‘I decided to be good’

(15) cogo | te EC | servum | esse
force-1 sg | you-acc | slave-acc | to-be
‘I force you to be a slave’

So, in (14) there is a subject control verb *statuo* ‘decide’, which takes a complement infinitival clause with a copular infinitive and a predicate in Nominative. Case agreement of the adjectival predicate and the main clause subject makes us infer two things, (a) that the EC, which is the subject of the infinitive must also be Nominative (assuming uncontroversially that Subject-Adjectival predicate agreement is the same in Latin and AG) and (b) that CAAC is the mechanics of Control in Latin as in AG. Example (15) further corroborates this point with object control verbs, such as *cogo* ‘force’, where the adjectival predicate of the copular infinitive appears in the accusative because it is controlled from the object of the main verb *te* ‘you’.

However, as we also saw in AG, there are exceptions in Control/CAAC as demonstrated in the contrasting patterns exhibited in the following two examples.

(16) **Dative control with CAAC**

Mihi | neglegenti esse non licet
To me-dat careless-dat to be not allowed (Halle & Buck)
‘I am not allowed to be careless’

(17) **Dative control without CAAC**

civi | Romano | licet | esse Gaditanum.
Citizen-Dat Roman-Dat is permitted to be Cadizian-Acc
‘It is permitted for a Roman citizen to be from Cadiz.’

Example (16) illustrates control by a dative experiencer argument of an impersonal verb, which is of course reminiscent of the situation in AG. Like in AG then in (17) although there is a clear controller in the main clause, the dative argument *civi Romano*, nonetheless it fails to control the Case of the adjectival predicate of the
copular infinitive, which surfaces in the accusative. The similar data from AG were analysed as instances of non-obligatory control. However Latin has one more construction that we have to present before we are able to make some generalisations about how control works in this language.

The final important difference between Latin and AG that we will discuss here is the extensive use of *ut* and *ne* clauses instead of controlled infinitives. Volition and impersonal verbs take quite freely either the infinitive as a complement or the *ut* clauses, like in the following two examples:

(18) Placuit ei legatos mittere
    Is liked/is accepted ambassadors send off
(19) Placuit ei ut legatos mitteret

Some verbs (like for example *impero*) prefer one over the other but in general the two types of complements alternate quite freely. Thus, in the following three examples we can see the verbs *impero* ‘order’, *moneo* ‘warn’ and *persuado* ‘persuade’ taking finite (subjunctive) *ut/ne* clauses as complements with controlled subjects.

(20) **Object control with an *ut* clause:**
    Messenis imperavit ut exules reducerent (Liv. 36,31,9)
    Messenis-dat commanded-3 sg *ut* exiles-acc recall-3 pl-subj
    ‘He ordered the people of Messene to recall the exiles’

(21) **Object control with a *ne* clause:**
    Flaccus (...) Gallum monuit ne terreret abeuntes (Tac. hist. 4,19,3)
    Flaccus-nom Gallus-acc warned-3 sg *ne* frighten-3 sg-subj leaving-acc
    ‘Flaccus warned Gallus not to frighten those who were leaving’

(22) **Subject Control with an *ut* clause:**
    Statuuunt ut decem milia hominum (...) mittantur (Caes. Gall. 7,21,2)
    Stated-3 pl *ut* 10.000 people were-sent-3 pl-subj
    They decided to send 10.000 people

There are several interesting things to be pointed out concerning the use of *ut/ne* clauses in Latin and Control. First of all there is the somewhat surprising fact about finding control inside finite clauses. This is not a unique characteristic of Latin and it
will be discussed more in the final section of this Chapter, in relation with Modern Greek subjunctive *na* clauses that also allow controlled subjects. MG however does not have the alternative of infinitives and this is the most interesting fact about Latin: the alteration between both infinitival and finite control clauses, as illustrated in (14)-(16) on the one hand and (20)-(22) on the other. So the real issue that we need to address is the interchange between finite and non-finite control in a sense and what this implies also for the nature of the null controlled subject: if control into non-finite clauses is extremely limited, can we still justify the existence of PRO or does this imply that Latin lacks this category entirely? In order to take this issue a step further, we should answer the following questions:

(a) What does it mean for a language to lack the category PRO? What kind of evidence do we need for that and what are the implications for the language?

(b) If we have control inside a finite clause does this imply that we have PRO as a subject of a finite clause or that *pro* can be controlled?

(c) Can we reduce the infinitival control cases to restructuring? If we follow Wurmbrandt’s, 2003 theory of restructuring, where she argues for a lack of a position for the infinitival subject in these constructions and consequently for non-existence of PRO, we could get away with a theory for Latin, where PRO does not exist at all and thus we don’t need to postulate two kinds of controlled null subjects.

In order to address these issues we will have to look into one last piece of data, which has to do with the possibility of the existence of other types of null subjects in Latin infinitival clauses.

### 5.2.4 Arbitrary null subjects and other null accusatives

The other instance of a null infinitival subject is that with an arbitrary interpretation, commonly referred to as arbitrary PRO. As we saw in AG, arbitrary PRO is marked with accusative. This is also true for Latin, as can be seen from the following data.

(27) Difficile est esse bonum  
Hard is to-be good-acc  
‘It is hard to be good’

(28) Non esse cupidum pecunia est  
Not to be covetous-acc is wealth (Par. 6,3,51)
Again, as in AG, the infinitival verbs are copula and their adjectival predicates appear in the accusative. Based on standard rules of subject/predicate agreement we can thus infer that the missing infinitival subject is also in accusative. This conclusion is fairly uncontroversial and in a sense in accordance with what we have seen so far. Consider however the following example as well.

(29) Iam hic adfuturum aiunt eum. Nondum advenisse miror (Pl. Truc. 205)

now here to-come-fut (they) say him(ACC); not-yet to-have-arrived (I)
am-surprised

‘They say he is arriving here. I am surprised that he has not arrived yet’

(30) Miror [nondum pro advenisse]

According to Cecchetto & Oniga, 2001 example (29) is an instance of an accusative pro, which is licit only when its content is very easily recovered from the context. It seems to us is that this is some kind of ellipsis like in the English cases: ‘will you do the washing up? –will do’. Such contexts, which leave practically no room for ambiguity, can license this particular case of pro-drop/ellipsis, even in English. The above example is supposed to be fairly unique and moreover we cannot check the Case of the null subject. For our analysis of AG, we argued for the existence of a category of accusative pro because (a) we saw the clear difference in Case pattern between true control/CAAC on the one hand and accusative arbitrary and referential pro on the other and (b) because of the existence of object drop. Latin arguably did have object drop as has been argued in Van der Wurff, 1994 but not necessarily of the pro kind. According to Van der Wurff, 1994 not all null objects are of the same kind, they can be a variable, either base-generated or a trace or they can be a pro identified by Agr (in languages with object Agreement) or by a preceding DP. Latin according to him had null objects that are variables. Following therefore his claim and also because we cannot check the Case of the null subject in (29) we do not want to commit to the existence of accusative pro in Latin.

5.2.5 Discussion-extension of the AG analysis

Let us recapitulate in a table the properties of AG and Latin infinitival syntax (including related issues). What we will do in this section is to try to extend the analysis that we provided for AG infinitives to account for the Latin and more importantly to account for the differences between the two languages.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AG</th>
<th>Latin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disjoint reference AcI</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphatic AcI</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>⬜?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAC in Control</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No CAAC in NOC</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control in finite clauses</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overt co-referential infinitival subject</td>
<td>(strong) Pronoun</td>
<td>(non-emphatic/weak) Anaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raising out of infinitives</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No raising out of infinitives (impersonal &amp; AcI)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null accusative subject (arbitrary)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null accusative subject (referential)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>⬜?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object drop</td>
<td>✓ (pro)</td>
<td>✓ (variable)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: comparison of properties of AG and Latin relevant to infinitival syntax

The biggest differences between Latin and AG therefore as they emerge from this table are that Latin does not seem to have (a) emphatic AcI, (b) null accusative referential subject and (c) object drop. AG on the other hand does not exhibit control inside finite clauses and when the infinitival subject is co-referential it uses a pronoun while Latin uses an anaphor.

The analysis we provided in the previous Chapter relies on the discourse properties of infinitival C in order to account for the pattern: AcI/CAAC/null acc pro. While we argued that all AG infinitival clauses are CPs, we also argued that there is a distinction between C and C* whereby the former is the head found in control clauses, which exhibit CAAC and this is a result of infinitival C being a weak phase that allows relations like Agree to be operative from outside the infinitival clause. Infinitival C*Ps on the other hand, exactly because they have a contrastive feature on
their left periphery, can license an overt subject in the accusative Case. The differences between Latin and AG therefore can be accounted for in terms of the C vs C* (and therefore weak vs. strong phase) distinction. As we saw, Latin infinitival clauses can be co-ordinated with finite clauses and this is an argument in favour of their CP status. However, the fact that they do not allow for emphatic Acl, means that contrast plays no role in the licensing of the infinitival subject.

The tentative proposal then, concerning Latin infinitives is that the distinction between C and C* need not only be instantiated in the non-finite domain. Controlled ut/ne clauses can also be considered CPs that are weak phases. Crucially we do not want to argue that all subjunctive clauses are weak phases, but it could be the case that subjunctives that allow obligatory control are. This could be a way to view Landau’s 2004 and 2005 idea on the calculus of control. According to Landau, control has nothing to do with whether the complement is a finite or a non-finite clause, it only has to do with the feature specification of T and C, where both are specified for +/-Agr and +/-T features. The combination of these features on both these heads can predict which clauses can be controlled or not, cutting across the finite/non-finite continuum. In our system, the feature content of C is crucially different and this is a welcome result, since Landau’s theory does not have anything to say about emphasis.

Latin infinitival clauses moreover show us a further split between infinitives that are complements of volitionals on the one hand and complements of declarative verbs and verbs of saying. As we said the ‘vacuous Acl’ paradigm (co-referential but not emphatic accusative subject) is more robust in the latter than in the former and this could show us that the feature content of infinitival C is not robust either.

5.3 AG absolute participles
5.3.1 The data
The second construction we will discuss here is that of absolute participles. Absolute participles are adverbial participles that function like an independent adjunct clause and whose subject does not need to play any other syntactic role in the clause. Their distinctive characteristic is that they appear in an oblique Case, most usually genitive, and their subject also appears in the same Case. Consider the following example:\n
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\]

5 The following example is also an instance of the Attic construction, (that we also saw in Chapter 4) which is an agreement mismatch schema, where if the subject is a neutral plural DP, the verb need not
The bracketed constituent consists of a participle in genitive case, *strate:gountos* and its subject *Kono:nos*, which also appears in the genitive case. From the translation it is evident that the participle functions like an independent adjunct (and in this case, temporal) clause and its subject does not have any other syntactic function in the clause. Moreover the genitive case of the participle that is also shared by its subject does not seem to be dependent on any other element in the clause, rather it seems to be inherently determined. Another example of the genitive absolute is the following:

(32) [Druos pesouse:s, ] pas ane:r ksuleuetai

Oak-gen fallen-gen every-nom man-nom be a woodcutter-3 sg

‘After the oak has fallen, every man can be a woodcutter.’

Menander, *Gnomai* : 185

Again, in the above example the bracketed absolute participle has its own genitive subject that has no other syntactic function in the clause. The participle with its subject is translated as a temporal clause, like in the previous example. Initially it might seem that the overtness of the participial subject seems to be crucial for the licensing of the construction but this is not the case. Consider the following two examples.

(33) Houto: d’ echonto:n eikos (esti) tois polemiois

This way-adv having-prtcl-gen natural-nom is-3 sg the enemies enantious einai tous theous

against-acc to be the Gods-acc

‘Things being so, it is fair to assume that the Gods are against our enemies.’

Xenophon, *Anabasis III*: 2.10

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agree with it in number and can surface in 3rd person singular. This obviously does not interact with the absolute participle that follows it.
(34) (Alkibiades) ane:gageto epi te:n Kuzikon huontos pollo:i
Alcibiades-nom sail-3 sg towards the Kysicus-acc raining-gen a lot-dat
‘Alcibiades sailed towards Kyzicus, while it was raining a lot.’
Xenophon, Hellenika I: 1.16

In both examples (33) and (34) the italicized elements are the absolute participles. In neither of these cases does the participial subject appear overtly. However none of these cases are instances of control, on the contrary these are arbitrary null subjects. In example (33) the meaning of the absolute participle is something like ‘since things are that way’ (with ‘things’ missing) and in (34) we can see a ‘weather’-type of impersonal phrase, the absolute participle having the meaning ‘it (the weather/the sky) is raining’ with the expletive subject missing. Both such constructions would be instances of pro-drop in the finite domain and can be regarded as such even in participial clauses.

Although much rarer, there are arguably instances of absolute participles with null controlled subjects. A unique such example is the following taken from Catsimali, 2002 (ex. 14, p.152) unfortunately without the actual reference of the text:

(35) To pse:phisma touth’ houtos egrapsen ouch ina
The voting-acc this-acc this way wrote-3 sg not that
ontos akouro [ ] meden ae:des humin sumbe:
being-gen void-gen nothing bad-nom you-dat happen
‘He wrote the voting in such a way so that nothing bad would happen to you, if it was found void.’

Demosthenes, Aristocrates

In the above example the genitive participle ontos is followed by its adjetival predicate akouro but not by its subject, which remains null and presumably refers to the object of the main verb to pse:phisma. The structure is supposed to be that of object control with the object in question controlling the interpretation of the null subject of the participle. There are several issues that need to be taken into account in this example that could explain the dropping of the participial subject:

(a) The controller to pse:phisma, which is the object of the main verb cannot be dropped since it cannot be construed from anywhere earlier in the context.
(b) Repeating it as the participial subject would not be very economical, since it is very close in the sentence.

(c) In the sentence as it is there is another element accompanying the participle, and it being the predicate, it agrees in Case both with its missing subject and with the participle itself and therefore appears in genitive. It could also be argued that absolute participles do not easily appear with three genitives in a row, which is what would happen if the participial subject was overtly expressed.

More importantly however, we think that (35) is not a proper instance of object control because the absolute participle is inside the result clause introduced with hina. Perhaps the best way to describe it is as accidental co-reference of the participial subject with the object of the main verb. If our remarks on example (35) are on the right track then control is not found with absolute participles. Other types of null subjects are left unexpressed again due to independent reasons, namely because the language avoids cognate subjects like in example (33) and does not have overt expletives like in example (34). Having therefore considered these issues, we can say that absolute constructions do need some other overt element to accompany them, usually their subject but maybe their adjectival predicate if they are copular, unless they cannot have one, due to independent reasons (ex. 33-34). Similarly to infinitives therefore one could claim that overtness of the subject of a non-finite form (or a Case marked adjectival predicate) seems to be crucial for the interpretation and the licensing of an external argument for these constructions.

As seen from the examples that we presented earlier, there are several reasons that absolute participles\(^6\) are relevant to us.

(a) They are non-finite forms with overt subjects.

(b) There seems to be a syntactic dependency (licensing) between the participle and its subject.

\(^6\) Absolute participles in AG are not only found in genitive Case: they can also be found in nominative, dative and accusative absolute (the latter being found mostly or solely with impersonal verbs). Moreover, the same construction is found in Latin, only in the ablative Case, called the ablative absolute. We will not discuss all these instances of absolute constructions here due to space limitations and also because we think that the differences among them are more idiosyncratic than anything else, since they do not seem to be constrained in any principled manner. A possible interesting exception is the accusative absolute that is predominantly found with impersonal verbs and could receive a explanation on a par with AcI. This is an issue open for further research.
(c) The overtness of the subject seems to play a crucial role in this construction.

However, there are also various differences between absolute participles and infinitival AcI that should be taken into account:

(a) The participles have more ‘nominal’ morphology than infinitives, being able to appear with a Case of their own.
(b) The Case of the participial subject seems to come through concord with the participle.
(c) Absolute participial clauses are only adverbial and are never complements or subject clauses, as the infinitival clauses are.
(d) CAAC is never an option for absolute participles.

The challenge for us here is to see whether the analysis we provided for AG infinitives can be extended to account for the differences and the similarities of the two constructions.

5.3.2 Some previous analyses
Catsimali, 2002 discusses the genitive absolute in AG and presents its characteristics as we have done in the previous section. Her proposal concerning these constructions, incorporates a notion she calls ‘loose embedding’. The idea behind it is that although these clauses are not selected by the main verb and moreover have adverbial function, they are still ‘part of’ the main clause, not entirely external to it. Their status is that of an IP, without an agreement node however. They receive their Case inherently and their subject agrees with it, more or less automatically.

Belletti, 1990 on the other hand discusses Italian absolute small clauses (ASCs) that are similar to AG ones and could be related to them. They are exemplified in the following two examples:

(36) Arrivata Maria, Gianni tirò un sospiro di sollievo
    Arrived-fem Maria John was relieved

(37) Conosciuta Maria, Gianni ha subito cambiato il suo stile di vita
    Known-fem Mary John has immediately changed his style of life

Initially these ASCs may seem quite similar with the AG absolute participles but actually they have plenty of crucial differences. In Italian ASCs always have V initial
order and what follows the participles can be its subject, its object or even an adverb. Interestingly the participle agrees in gender and number with the following DP (although Italian has no other instance of object agreement with full DPs) but since participles are not Case-marked there is no issue of Case concord between the two elements. In addition to that (and contrary to the AG construction) Italian ASCs cannot be negated. Belletti, 1990 argues convincingly that unaccusative ASCs like in example (36) are followed by their subject in nominative while transitive ASCs like in example (37) are followed by their object in accusative and are always control constructions.

Careful comparison of AG and Italian absolute clauses shows us that we are not dealing with the same phenomenon. Their biggest and most crucial similarity is that they are appositives, parenthetical adjunct constructions that have a very loose relationship with the main clause. Moreover the structure of Italian ASCs is very rigid. They allow only two elements: the participle and an element that follows it, with which they agree in number and gender. The obligatory presence of an overt element to the right of the participle is suggestive of an overtness constraint similar to the one we are trying to argue for in AG. The differences however that are exhibited between Italian ASCs and AG absolute participles are wide enough not to allow us to extend one analysis for both. Intriguing as these constructions are, we will refrain from making any substantial comments about them and we will not employ them in order to draw any conclusions for the AG cases.

5.3.3 Discussion & extension

Before we get into our analysis of absolute participles in AG we want to make one passing reference to Latin gerundial forms. Gerund and gerundive in Latin are used to substitute the other Cases of an infinitive. Therefore, when AG employs the substantive infinitive that is introduced with a determiner and can be used in any Case, retaining the ability to licence an overt Accusative subject on these cases as well, Latin uses its gerund forms instead because it does not have overt determiners that are essential in forming the substantive infinitive. The following examples illustrate some uses of Latin gerunds:

(38) Ars legendi-gen
    art of reading
Both Latin gerund forms require the subject to be subject controlled or arbitrary ones. Moreover, they display object agreement: their objects do not surface in the Case they would if the gerund was a verb, based on the complementation properties of the predicate, but instead they can surface in the Case of the gerund itself (e.g., Placandi-dat dei-dat). Again there is no straightforward independent reason to explain this behaviour.

When we compare Latin gerundives with AG participles their most striking similarity is that both forms appear (probably inherently) in an oblique Case. Concerning therefore the way their subjects receive their Case, it may initially seem that it is a simple instance of a subject getting its Case through Concord with the participle or with the gerund, as we implied earlier. This simple story however, plausible as it may seem, does not take into account two facts: (a) that subjects usually do not get Case via concord but via structural Case-licensing instead and (b) that with this reasoning any non-finite form with an inherent Case feature can license an overt subject agreeing in Case. The latter prediction is clearly falsified by the Latin gerundial data presented above. Therefore there seems to be something more to be said for AG and Latin absolute participles and the licensing of their subjects. A natural way to move would be by extending our analysis of AG infinitives and the feature content of their C positions. Absolute participles could be another instance of a focus feature in the left periphery being responsible for the overtness of the subject of a non-finite form. The actual value of that Case feature may come from the T node of that form, which is itself specified inherently (due to the nominal character of the construction) but the availability or not of a position for that subject crucially depends on the content of C. Therefore the difference between Latin gerunds that have inherent Case but no overt subjects and Latin and AG absolute participles that do, may lie on the fine structure of their left periphery.
5.4 Modern Greek na clauses

5.4.1 Introduction

In this last section of this chapter we will discuss the relation of AG infinitival clauses with the construction that replaced them in MG, namely na clauses. Our goal is twofold and interrelated, we will firstly try to see what are the thorny issues in any attempt to analyse na clauses and whether our analysis for AG infinitives can provide any insight to them and we will attempt an overview of the loss of AG infinitives and the development of na clauses that might further illuminate the latter’s synchronic status. We will not embark on an extensive diachronic analysis of these two issues because such a goal would require careful analysis of all the stages of the infinitive loss, throughout the history of Greek until the 17th century where the last traces of infinitives can be found, which lies beyond the scope of this work. However, some comments regarding the loss of the infinitive from Greek and the development of na clauses will be made.

5.4.2 Na clauses: distribution and problems

Since MG lacks infinitives, there is no prototypical environment for (obligatory) control structures. This is perhaps the most recurrent question in any analysis of na clauses: whether they allow OC, in spite of being finite. In order to be able to answer this question we will move on to some relatively detailed presentation of the (temporal and clausal) properties of na clauses and their distribution. The main points of disagreement in the literature have been (a) the nature and the placement of na, which is the element that introduces them, (b) the nature of the null subject involved in the relevant structures and (c) the temporal specification of na clauses and its relation to case valuation of the subject.

Na clauses are not homogeneous in their properties. As a matter of fact, it seems that na clauses consistently display two types of characteristics, one of subjunctive clauses with free reference for their subjects and one of more ‘reduced’ dependent clauses found in traditional infinitival contexts that are arguably T-defective (in various possible ways that we will discuss later), cannot license an overt,

7 ‘Finite control’ is a phenomenon found in almost all of the Balkan languages like Romanian, Albanian etc, which nonetheless are part of different language families. Precisely because of this it has been attributed to the loss of infinitives, which is arguably another characteristic of the Balkan Sprachbund. We will not have many things to say concerning this but see Joseph, 1983 and Terzi, 1992 about unified discussion of this phenomenon in the Balkan languages.
nominative subject and have PRO subject instead. In this section we will present the relevant data that demonstrate this split and we will review the literature that discusses it. Finally, we will adopt the analyses where the split of na clauses is best theoretically expressed, by means of two types of Cs (Roussou, 2000 and 2001 and Alboiu, to appear) and which also resemble to an extent the analysis we put forward for AG infinitives.

5.4.2.1 Two types of na clauses?
The environments where na clauses are found in Modern Greek include them being complements of volitionals, verbs of saying and thinking, perception and impersonal verbs. These are all environments that in AG took infinitival clauses and therefore ‘na’ clauses are commonly assumed to be their descendants. However, the extensive uses of the infinitives have also been substituted by ‘oti’ clauses as well as some by adverbial ones. These clauses have been fairly straightforward to analyse, since they do not pose any serious questions with respect to their status or temporal properties, so we will focus on na clauses alone. Varlokosta & Hornstein, 1993 argue that there are two types of na clauses, ones that are essentially obligatorily controlled (OC) clauses and ones that allow both control and disjoint reference. The prototypical verbs that illustrate this distinction are ksero ‘know’ on the one hand and ‘elpizo ‘hope’ one the other. Consider the following examples:

(40) O Jhianis elpizi na erthi
    The John-nom hopes-3 sg na comes-3 sg
    ‘John hopes to come’

(41) O Jhianis kseri na diavazi
    The John-nom knows-3 sg na reads-3 sg
    ‘John knows how to read’

The main difference between the two constructions above is that the empty subject of the na clause in (40) can be both co-referential with John and distinct from it. In (41) however the only reading that is available is that the empty subject of the na clause is controlled by the subject of the main clause. This has led some researchers like Terzi,

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5 According to Holton, Mackridge & Philippaki, 2004 (Holton et al henceforth) verbs of saying and thinking followed by ‘na’ clauses have a slightly idiomatic meaning. Even so, ‘na’ clauses are widely and freely used in these environments.
1992 and Varlokosta, 1993 and Varlokosta & Hornstein, 1993 to argue (in somewhat different ways) that MG has OC although it does not have infinitival clauses. This is the phenomenon also known as finite control. Phillipaki-Warburton & Veloudis, 1994 and Phillipaki-Warburton, 1987 on the other hand argue that the null subject of na clauses is always pro and any kind of control interpretation can be attributed to the semantics of the matrix predicate that forces this interpretation. In their favour, one can give the following type of examples that argue that there are no straightforward obligatory control predicates in MG. Consider the following sets of examples.

(42) Prospatho na grapso
Try-1 sg na write-1 sg
‘I am trying to write’

(43) *Prospatho na grapsis
Try-1 sg na write-2 sg
‘I am trying (for) you to write’

But also:

(44) Prospatho na pari i Maria ti doulia
Try-1 sg na take-3 sg the Mary-nom the job-acc
‘I am trying for Mary to get the job’

(45) Iposchome na ertho
Promise-1 sg na come-1 sg
‘I promise to come’

(46) *Iposchome na erthis
Promise-1 sg na come-2 sg
‘*I promise you to come’

But also:

(47) Iposchome na ine omorfi i Maria apopse
Promise-1 sg na be-3 sg beautiful-nom the Mary-nom tonight
‘I promise that Mary will be beautiful tonight’

In the above examples, prima facie it seems that verbs like prospatho ‘try’ and iposchome ‘promise’ obligatorily control the subject of the na clause that they select. However examples like (44) and (47) show that there are some environments in which the same verbs do not need to take a clause with a controlled subject. This however
need not undermine the obligatoriness of control in (43), (46) and (41). What it can mean instead is either that verbs like *prospatho* and *iposchomai* have an extra available idiomatic reading that can allows a *na* clause which is an adjunct and can thus appear with a distinct subject. Along these lines is the argument given by Terzi, 1992 in order to account for this paradigm.

Keeping all this in mind it seems to us that the MG data can be accounted for in two ways: either by positing that (a) MG allows (obligatory) control in finite clauses or (b) what in appearance looks like OC is indeed NOC and this is not peculiar in finite contexts in the sense that it is a result of a *pro* in the embedded clause, co-referring accidentally with the main clause subject. We will come back with our thoughts on this matter in section 5.4.4, where we will discuss the analyses that account for this issue in the best way.

5.4.2.2 *Case for the subject?*

Related to the question of control into *na* clauses is the question of the availability of Nominative as the sole case for their subjects. Although *na* clauses have subject agreement that in principle should always allow them to license nominative subjects, there are some environments that show otherwise. Iatridou, 1988/1993 gives the following relevant paradigm:

(48) Vlepo ton Kosta na tiganizi psaria.
See-I the Kostas-Acc *na* fry-pres fish
‘I see Kostas fry fish.’

(49) *Ida ton Kosta na tiganize psaria.
Saw-I the Kostas-Acc *na* fry-past fish.
‘*I saw Kostas fried fish.’

(50) Elpizo o Kostas na tiganizi psaria.
Hope-I the Kostas-Nom *na* fry-pres fish.
‘I hope Kostas fries fish.’

(51) Elpizo o Kostas na tiganise psaria.
Hope-I the Kostas *na* fry-past fish.
‘I hope Kostas fried fish.’

Iatridou’s argument is that only *na* clauses with tense specification can license nominative subjects, so the relevant head for Nominative Case assignment in MG is
tense and not agreement. So in the above examples only the na clauses that can themselves be characterised as [+/- past], like (50) and (51) can license nominative for their subjects. Varlokosta & Hornstein, 1993 argue for a slight modification to Iatridou’s intuition of an anaphoric (dependent) T on na co-varying with an anaphoric null subject and an independent T co-varying with an overt nominative subject based on the case of thelo ‘want’.

(52) O Jhianis theli na diavasi (o Jiorgos)
‘John wants (George) to read’

(53)*O Jhianis theli na diavase o Jiorgos
The John-nom wants-3 sg na read-3 sg-pst the George-nom
‘John wants George to have read’

Thelo is a verb that allows for a na clause with a controlled but also with a distinct nominative subject like in (52). According to Iatridou, this property should be combined with the availability of [+past] specification on the na clause. This prediction however is not borne out by the data in (53) that show us that thelo cannot take a complement with a T specification. Varlokosta & Hornstein, 1993 however think that an analysis that is related to the T specification of na clauses is indeed on the right track. The modification that they propose is that the two types of na clauses can be distinguished based on whether they obey tense sequencing following Hornstein, 1990: na clauses that denote two independent events (like complements of elpizo ‘hope’) undergo tense sequencing, which requires V to C movement, while na clauses that denote only one event don’t undergo tense sequencing and do not allow V to C movement, because they are not CPs.

An issue which is related to subjects and case in na clauses concerns the existence or not of ECM in MG. This question arises by some na clauses not allowing for nominative subjects at all. Kotzoglou, 2002 argues that na clauses never allow ECM by showing that main verbs like thelo ‘want’ and perimeno ‘wait’ that take accusative ‘subjects’ of na clauses also take nominative ones, so there is no case where a na clause can only take an accusative subject. Moreover Kotzoglou also argues that in structures that look like ECM, the accusative argument stays in the matrix clause throughout the derivation.
To conclude, it seems safe to argue that all na clauses allow for nominative subjects, something which is probably a reflex of their subject agreement morphology. The split in the two types of na clauses that we discussed in the previous subsection most probably is not related to their T specification but must be linked to something else. The direction that we will move towards is that the split of two types on na clauses is what is behind the availability and the case for the subject.

5.4.2.3 Subjunctives?

Another characteristic of na clauses that is that they have a certain irrealis flavour. This has lead Philippaki-Warburton & Veloudis, 1994 and Philippaki-Warburton, 1987 to analyse them as subjunctives with na being the subjunctive marker located in MoodP. This is related to their aforementioned property of T defectiveness. Na clauses do not have a full tense specification in as far as they are not able to have temporal reference independent of the main clause and as a result they cannot freely refer to events in the past for example when the main verb that selects them is the present or in the future:

(58)*Thelo na efiga
   Want-1 sg na leave-1 sg pst
   ‘I want to have left’

(59)Thelo na figo
   Want-1 sg na leave-1 sg prs
‘I want to leave’

Similarly to other subjunctive-type clauses they do not have a future form because these forms crucially share the irrealis modality. On the other hand they can be found in present, past and perfect forms with further distinctions in aspect.

(60)Pistevo na efige apo to spiti
   Believe-1 sg na left-3 sg pst from the house
   ‘I believe that he has left the house’

(61)Pistevo na exi figi tora
   Believe na have-3 sg left now
   ‘I believe that he has left by now’

(62)Thelo na tragudao sinexia
   Want-1 sg na sing-1 sg-pres-imp all the time
   ‘I want to sing all the time’

(63)Thelo na tragudiso avrio
   Want-1 sg na sing-1 sg-pres-prf tomorrow
   ‘I want to sing tomorrow’

These aspectual distinctions are found in dependent forms of MG also after the future marker tha:

(64)Avrio tha tragudiso se mia sunavlia
   Tomorrow will sing-1 sg-prf in a concert
   ‘Tomorrow, I will sing in a concert’

(65)Tha tragudao se auto to magazi gia ton epomeno mina
   Will sing-1 sg-imp in this bar for the next month
   ‘I will be singing in this bar, for the next month’

Roberts & Roussou, 2003 capture the similarities in of na and tha by arguing that they are both in C, their difference being that tha is restricted to the low C head, namely ModP on the left periphery, while na can either surface in a high C head, like ForceP or in a low C head, in competition with tha (Roussou, 2000 and 2001). The crucial

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9 Aspectual distinctions in independent verbal forms are found in the past and in the imperative mood. However we will not discuss them now since an analysis of the aspectual system of Greek falls outside the scope of our work.
factor that regulates this difference is the presence of NegP on the left periphery between Force and ModP where if negation is merged it blocks movement of *na* from Mood to Force and forces it to merge directly in Force. This also accounts for the major difference between *na* and *tha* namely that the former precedes negation, while the latter follows it\(^\text{10}\):

\begin{enumerate}
\item (66) Thelo na min to paris
\begin{itemize}
\item Want-1 sg *na* neg it take-2 sg
\item ‘I want you not to take it’
\end{itemize}
\end{enumerate}

\begin{enumerate}
\item (67) Den tha figo
\begin{itemize}
\item Neg will leave-1 sg
\item ‘I will not go’
\end{itemize}
\end{enumerate}

\textbf{5.4.3 \textit{AG} infinitives vs. \textit{na} clauses}

In this section we will compare the distribution of *na* clauses to the environment of AG infinitives. The main paradigm of AG infinitives that we accounted for in Chapter 4 can be summarized as follows:

\begin{enumerate}
\item (a) AcI (disjoint reference and emphatic)
\item (b) CAAC in Control
\item (c) Accusative referential and arbitrary *pro*
\end{enumerate}

We want to argue that most of the differences between AG infinitives and *na* clauses can be attributed to their fundamental difference, namely that *na* clauses have subject agreement and consequently nominative subjects while AG infinitives do not have either. A series of properties of the *na* clauses that differentiate them from AG infinitives follow from this difference alone. For example we expect *na* clauses to be able to express disjoint reference even with a null subject, as well as a freer ability to license *pro*. This is all demonstrated below:

\begin{enumerate}
\item (68) Thelo na figis (*pro* referential)
\begin{itemize}
\item Want-1 sg *na* leave-2 sg
\item ‘I want you to leave’
\end{itemize}
\end{enumerate}

\(^\text{10}\) Notice that *na* and *tha* do not have the same kind of negation marker. This does not seem to play any significant role in this analysis.
(69) Thelo (o Jhianis) na figi (o Jhianis) (disjoint reference pro and overt)

Want-1 sg the John-nom na leave-3 sg
‘I want John to leave’

(70) An thes na bis sto panemistimio prepi na diavazis (arbitrary pro)

If want-2 sg na get-2 sg in the university must-3 sg na study-2 sg
‘If one wants to get into University, one must study’

The two most interesting questions are firstly whether control can still be instantiated through CAAC in na clauses, as well as whether focus plays any role in the licensing of the subject of na clauses. For the latter we don’t have much to say and it is an issue that we leave open to further research. We want to point out however that our analysis of AG infinitives does not make any predictions about na clauses because they have agreement inflection: our generalisation regarding focus and case-licensing was confined to non-finite clauses and it would need substantial modification for it to be applied to these data.

In order to test the first possibility, we will use the same mechanism as we did with AG clauses, namely a copular verb inside the na clause in order to test the case on the adjectival predicate, which in turn will reveal the case of its subject. As we already said, na clauses have subject agreement and nominative subjects, therefore we would not be able to test the source of the nominative on the predicate in examples with subject control like the following:

(71) Thelis na dithis monos su?

Want-2 sg na get dressed-2 sg alone-nom
‘Do you want to get dressed by yourself?’

In example (71) we cannot be sure that the source of the nominative on the predicate monos ‘alone’ is coming from the main verb or from the verb in the na clause and therefore this is not a revealing example at all. Consider however the following two examples, which are instances of object control:

(72) Episa to Jhiani na figi monos tu

Persuaded-1 sg the John-acc na leave-3 sg alone-nom

(73)* Episa to Jhiani na figi mono tu

Persuaded-1 sg the John-acc na leave-3 sg alone-acc
‘I persuaded John to leave by himself’
In examples (72) and (73) we see that the predicate of the *na* clause surfaces only in nominative case, agreeing with its null *pro* subject and thus not displaying CAAC agreeing with the object *to Jhiani*. In AG CAAC is blocked when the infinitival clause is a C* and can license its own subject. In MG however *na* clauses have two characteristics that may be crucial to the fact that CAAC is not an acceptable way to mark control: they have agreement and therefore nominative might always be allowed in the downstairs clause and thus never overridden and secondly they may have a lexical C, assuming that *na* is in C following Agouraki, 1991, Tsoulas, 1993, Roussou, 2000 and 2001 and Roberts & Roussou, 2003.

There are some predicates however that seem to allow for a different pattern:

(74) Vlepo ton Kosta na kathete monos tu

See-1 sg the Kostas-acc *na* sit-3 sg alone-nom

(75) Vlepo ton Kosta na kathete mono tu

See-1 sg the Kostas-acc *na* sit-3 sg alone-acc

*I see Kostas sitting by himself*’

In the above examples the main verb *vlepo* ‘see’ perhaps uniquely allows both for what seems to be CAAC and its opposite seen on the previous examples. So in example (74) the adjective *monos* surfaces in the nominative case, agreeing with the null *pro* subject of the *na* clause. In (75) however it appears in the accusative in a construction that resembles CAAC. In order to account for these facts we can posit one of the following, either *vlepo* takes two types of *na* complements, one that does not allow for CAAC and one that uniquely for MG does, or this is a dislocation structure. According to the latter idea, the accusative adjective *mono* is a modifier of the main verb’s object *ton Kosta* (which is also in accusative) and is not really a part of the *na* clause. Its position to the right of the *na* clause is that of a dislocated element, which is actually a part of the main clause and it is for this reason that it is found in the accusative. This idea is further supported by the fact that if we substitute the verb in the *na* clause with a transitive one, its object cannot follow the adjective when the latter is in the accusative but it can when it is in the nominative.\footnote{I want to thank Marios Mavrogioros for pointing out this diagnostic to me.}

This is illustrated in the following two examples:
MG does not allow hyperbaton, which results in discontinuity of the kind found in AG and therefore if an element is right-dislocated (like we argue *mono* is in example (75)) cannot be followed by an argument that unambiguously is part of the embedded clause, like the object is in the above examples. To conclude, we have shown that there are no instances of CAAC in MG and if control into finite clauses exists, it is not manifested through this mechanism.

5.4.4 A bit of history

In order to understand the structure and function of *na* clauses today it is important to briefly consider the gradual demise of AG infinitives and the generalisation of the already existing *hina* clauses, which turned into MG *na*. This section does not do justice to the vastness and the complexity of these developments and definitely does not offer any new insight on them *per se*. For the documentation of the change as well as valuable insights on the stages and the strategies involved that we will report here, we will heavily rely on Joseph, 1983, Horrocks, 2006 and Roberts & Roussou, 2003. Our main goal in this section is to reconsider the history and loss of the infinitive and the development of *na* clauses in the light of what we have discussed in this thesis.

The main characteristic of both AG infinitives and *na* clauses is that they are not homogeneous: the former ones demonstrate that clearly with the availability of distinct and emphatic accusative subjects in addition to CAAC in control. *Na* clauses on the other hand, display the dual paradigm that we discussed in examples (40) and (41) earlier in the chapter. The other main similarity of the two constructions as it emerges from the previous discussion is the status of both clauses as CPs and more importantly two types of CPs. In this section we will see that this claim also has a diachronic basis. A historical perspective on *na* clauses will shed some light on their synchronic properties and will help us conclude the discussion about them in the following and last section.
5.4.4.1 A brief history of the infinitive loss

The development and loss of the AG infinitive was a very lengthy process with various different stages. According to Joseph, 1983 it could be argued that it started as early as Thucydides with a slightly abnormal use of an articular infinitive instead of a verbal one. The last traces of (productive) infinitival use can be pinpointed at the 16th-17th century. Concerning the properties of infinitives in Classical times, Joseph, 1983 argues that semantically and syntactically they have neither tense nor aspect. Although he does not offer an articulated account for AcI, he attributes it either to a subject-to-object raising structure or to a null complementizer being responsible for the Case of the infinitival subject.

The stages of the loss of the infinitive can be summarised in the following way: after Classical times where the infinitive was extremely productive and found in various environments (as discussed at length in Chapter 2), post-Classical Greek (2nd BC to 6th century AD) saw an innovation in infinitival syntax, where infinitives could be introduced with complementizers like hina, hopo:s, hoti. In Koiné infinitives are found in a small number of environments often interchanging with other finite constructions, like hina+subjunctive that used to exist as purpose clauses but are now expanding in complement positions as well, as we will discuss in detail in the following section. During this time, very few verbs take exclusively infinitival complements, such as mello: ‘intend’, ofeilo: ‘owe’, dynamai ‘be able’ and archomai ‘begin’. However and crucially, co-ordination of infinitives and finite clauses is still found (as they did in AG, cf. ex. 12 In Chapter 4), as can be seen in the following example (Joseph, 1983: p. 53, ex. 38):

(78) thelo: de pantas humas lalein glossais
  want-I then all-acc you-acc to speak-prs tongues-dat
  mallon de hina propheteuete (1Cor. 14. 5)
  rather but comp preach-2 pl-subj
  ‘I want all of you to speak in tongues, rather than preach.’

The Medieval times was when the most morphological changes occurred and the infinitival paradigm was severely reduced. Independent developments in the history of future tense as they have been very well documented in Markopoulos, 2006 have lead to the elimination of the future infinitive and its morphological equation with the present one. The present perfect tense moreover has already been abandoned as a
formal class in late Hellenistic times and as a result the perfect infinitive was also lost. One way or another all infinitives came to end in –ein preceded by –s in the aorist and a –th in passive voice. At the same time, independent phonological changes were happening in Medieval Greek. The one that is relevant here is the dropping of the final ‘n’ wherever it was found, namely in the accusative case for nouns and the infinitive for verbs. These developments increased problems in the correct analysis of infinitives. For example, a typical control structure would look like this: thelo grafein ‘I want to write’. With the drop of final ‘n’ the structure would be thelo grafei. The latter form is exactly homophonous with the 3rd person singular of the present tense and as such this situation creates linguistic ambiguity and the construction is not transparent for the children who are learning the language. This situation therefore, which is in accordance with Lightfoot’s 1979 Transparency Principle, led to the reanalysis of these constructions as involving finite instead of infinitival complementation and consequently led to the full elimination of infinitives from Greek. We can also additionally point out that the development and the loss of infinitives in Greek are in accordance with Longobardi’s 2001 ‘Inertia’ theory of diachronic change. According to this, syntax is and remains inert in as far as it is not ‘pushed’ by changes in phonology or semantics. In the case of infinitives in Greek, the crucial step that led to their final elimination was a change in the phonology of Greek, namely the loss of the final ‘n’.

5.4.4.2 The development of na clauses
After the infinitives were lost, they were substituted with na clauses in their prototypical environments, the complementation structures. In a nutshell we can say that na clauses stemmed from already existing purpose clauses introduced with the complementizer hina, after they expanded their distribution to complementation structures. In this section we briefly discuss the history of their development, following mainly Roberts & Roussou, 2003 (R&R henceforth).

In AG purpose clauses introduced with hina clauses appeared in the subjunctive mood. Moreover, purpose in AG could also be expressed with infinitives, in the infinitival ho:ste clauses that we discussed extensively in Chapter 2. In this respect the use of hina clauses and infinitives overlapped to some extent in Classical times. R&R endorse Joseph’s, 1983 main claim that the complementation system of Greek changed from (mainly) non-finite to finite due to morpho-phonological
changes, like the ones we discussed in the previous section, which had to do with the overall reduction of infinitival forms and the loss of final ‘n’. In addition to that and maybe complementary to it, is the overall tendency of Greek from more synthetic, compact forms and structure to an overall analytic and spread out form, also found in the present and past perfect, the future etc.

Crucial to the history of *na* has also been the loss of morphological mood in Greek in general. From the four morphologically distinct moods of AG (indicative, subjunctive, optative and imperative) only two survive unambiguously in MG: the indicative and the imperative. According to R&R the distribution of *hina* with subjunctive is what formed the necessary background to the reanalysis of *hina* as the subjunctive (modal) particle. Regarding the position of *na* they argue that since it comes from a C element its development does not involve change in categorical status: *na*hina remained a complementizer throughout the history of Greek. Finally and regarding the changes in Greek mood, R& R argue against Philippaki-Warburton & Spyropoulos, 2000, who claim that the grammaticalization of *na* is not a distinct process but the reflex of the emergence of a functional category (Mood) in the clause structure. On the contrary R&R argue that what changed upon the loss of the morphological distinction was the position where ‘mood’ features were spelled out: in AG mood is inflected on the verb, and is thus located lower in the tree, while in MG it heads a (low) projection in C.

What can be understood from the above discussion is that *na* clauses that are synchronically complement subjunctive clauses, come from the purpose *hina* clauses that were reanalysed as such due to them taking subjunctive complements in AG in the first place. The spread of their distribution from adjunct to complement clauses was crucially related to the loss of the infinitives, which left a hole in the complementation of Greek. The absence of obviation effect in *na* clauses, unlike other Romance subjunctives is perhaps related to their relation with adjunct clauses, where there is no question of obviation.

5.4.5 A unified analysis of *na* clauses and AG infinitives
Let us recapitulate the situation so far concerning the similarities and the differences between AG infinitives and MG *na* clauses. AG infinitives on the one hand, have three types of subjects: overt accusatives, null accusatives and (caseless) PRO. These are found in environments of disjoint reference and emphasis, arbitrary and referential
pro and control (manifested as CAAC), respectively. In order to account for these data we argued that while all infinitives are CPs there exist two types of Cs, with distinct feature content. The relevant difference is that some non-finite Cs have focus features that license the overtness of infinitival subjects while other Cs do not. The former are considered strong phase CPs (aka C*Ps) and license overt subjects, while the others are weak phase CPs and allow OC and consequently CAAC. Our claim therefore is that phasehood in the (non-finite) C layer is linked to focus features. Morphologically rich non-finite T constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition for licensing of infinitival subjects. What is crucial is the presence of a C with focus feature content that can ‘assist’ non-finite T in argument licensing. The generalisation that emerged has the following form: EPP feature in non-finite contexts (when present) is a discourse feature. This clearly need not be the case in finite contexts, like na clauses, which albeit defective in some senses that we will discuss shortly, it is nonetheless agreement that makes them finite.

The diachrony of Greek shows that infinitives and na clauses are used in the same environments. However as we have seen the two constructions have differences but we want to argue that they are only superficial that stem from their only ‘true’ difference, namely the existence of agreement features in the latter but not the former. Other than that and crucially the existence of two types of Cs in these environments has been retained and we argue that it is responsible for the non-homogeneity of the constructions, expressed in different type of behaviour between control and non-control complements in both constructions. The existence of agreement however made na clauses finite and as such allowed a purely syntactic EPP feature, unlike AG infinitives, where it was discourse-related. The two types of Cs involved in na clauses need not be connected to focus, as arguably is the case with AG infinitives. Alboiu, to appear argues for two types of subjunctive clauses in Romanian, with two types of Cs, labelled \( C_{\text{HIGH}} \) and \( C_{\text{LOW}} \) respectively, the former being a strong and the latter a weak phase, which are further distinguished by the availability of OC in the latter but not former. She argues that OC Romanian subjunctives have properties typical of non-phrasal domains such as absence of lexical C\(^{12}\), temporally unsaturated T and incapacity of case valuation for the subject. Given that all these are properties of C as

\(^{12}\) Contrary to MG, in addition to the subjunctive marker \( sa \) some Romanian subjunctives can also be introduced by the complementizer \( ca \). Apparently this is not allowed in OC subjunctives. For an overview of Romanian complementation see Dobrovie-Sorin, 1994.
a phase head following Chomsky, 2005 and 2006, she takes them as arguments for the non-phasehood of OC complements. Finally, adopting a Hornstein-type approach to Romanian control, Alboiu equates control with raising. In a similar vein, Roussou, 2000 and 2001 argues that the two types of na clauses rely on two types of move/merge operations of the na element in a high C head, like Force or to a low one, like Fin/Mood. Watanabe, 1993 argues that the difference between the two types of na clauses is that only one kind has a C layer, which is the one that is responsible for the Case valuation of the subject. His proposal relies on a follow up process after ‘normal’ Case valuation from T, which is related to C. The common intuition behind all these analyses is that one way or another they locate the difference between the two types of na clauses to C and not to T. The T specification between AG infinitives and na clauses is one of the things that is by and large constant: both types of clauses are somewhat T-defective in the sense that they are dependent on matrix T for interpretation and anchoring on speech time (Enç, 1987). Analyses like Varlokosta, 1993, Varlokosta & Hornstein, 1993 and Iatridou, 1988/1993 that attribute the different characteristics of different types of na clauses to the difference in their morphological or semantic T specification, or to their inability of obeying SOT rules (in the sense of Hornstein, 1990) cannot adequately account for the data. On the other hand, the reason we cannot directly extend our analysis for AG infinitives and the relation of phasehood and focus in these non-finite environments is because we do not have a clear idea of the availability of focus and na clauses. The existence of phi-feature agreement and nominative subjects in na clauses do not leave enough room for relating focus features in C with argument licensing, the way we did in AG infinitives. Moreover, the status of Montalebetti effects that were crucial for our arguments in AG infinitives is not clear for MG and more specifically MG na clauses.

We think Montalbetti effects strengthen the argument that there exist two types of na clauses, with two distinct types of properties. Consider the following two examples:

(i) Elpizi autos na erthi (hopes he na leaves)
(ii) Kseri aftos na diavazi (knows he na swims)

In the former case, the otherwise ambiguous interpretation of the embedded subject (when that is null, cf. ex. 40) is lost in the favour of a disjoint reference interpretation between the two subjects and this is a clear Montalbetti effect. In the latter case however, the overt subject of the embedded clause is still interpreted as co-referential with the main clause (overtness does not block co-reference). Arguably the difference between this example and that in (41) is that in (2) above, the overt subject autos is emphatic in accordance with Larson & Luján’s 1984 claims concerning use of overt subjects in null subject languages. Also note that intonationally prominent overt subject in such contexts yield different interpretations and therefore we will not discuss them here.
As a result we leave this issue open for further research, which we think should concentrate on the aforementioned properties of na clauses.

Having said all this, there is a diachronic question that needs to be addressed regarding the change from infinitives to na clauses, namely how did the phi-feature agreement on the latter emerge. In Chapter 4 we argued extensively for the existence of pro in AG infinitives, whose content is not recovered from phi-feature agreement. We said that there exist both referential and arbitrary pro in AG infinitives that is visible through accusative morphology on the predicates of copular infinitives. This is in sharp contrast with CAAC when the infinitival subject is controlled. We attributed the existence of two types of null subjects of AG infinitives, distinguished by their case (or the lack thereof in the case of anaphoric, controlled PRO) to the different feature content of C. Small pro albeit null counts as a contrastive element due to the accusative morphology of the predicate. This situation however, of a null subject in a non-null subject construction is rare and even in AG it was indeed fairly restricted and licensed through a mechanism that is not readily available. Therefore, we want to argue that the existence of pro without agreement on the verbal form was another factor that lead towards the reanalysis (or ‘misanalysis’ as Roberts & Roussou, 2003 call it) of infinitives into finite clauses. Even before AG infinitives were morphologically ambiguous between infinitival and non-finite forms, the availability of pro, which is a characteristic of a null subject and finite construction was underlining this ambiguity, giving the impression that AG infinitives were not prototypically non-finite.

If we compare AG infinitives and MG na clauses we see that in both cases we have CPs that are non-homogeneous and as such better analysed as two types of CPs, a strong and a weak phase in accordance with recent approached to the v level (Chomsky, 1995, 2001 and subsequent work). The difference between infinitives on the one hand and na clauses on the other is that we clearly relate the strong phase to focus features on C. In na clauses this is not so straightforward and we remain agnostic to it.

Moreover we see that to a large extent the T specification of infinitives and na clauses is the same. They are both dependent clauses, whose dependency is by and large temporal. Not all na clauses have an irrealis interpretation, resembling subjunctives, the same way only final infinitives are characterised as such. Concerning na clauses what needed to be accounted for was the availability of
nominative in some cases but not in others. In AG infinitives on the other hand, the issue at stake is the licensing of accusative instead of nominative as a case for the subject. We have seen in relative detail the inadequacies of the analyses that attributed the case valuation of the subject of both these constructions to the properties of their Ts. As a result, we point out again that the only difference between AG infinitives and na clauses on their T levels has to do with agreement features. The exact details of the emergence of these features remain unclear to us, but we can attribute all the differences between the two constructions to that and not to their C level.

5.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter we discussed three constructions that are related to AG infinitives in different ways and we tried to see if and how the analysis that we provided for the infinitives can be extended to account for them as well. We first discuss Latin infinitival clauses that also display the AcI vs. CAAC split. However, since Latin does differ minimally from AG, we tentatively proposed that these differences could be related to differences in the infinitival left periphery in the two languages. Next, we discussed the absolute participle constructions in AG. We did so because these are also non-finite constructions with overt subjects. The conclusion we reached is that again the difference between them and AG infinitives must lie in their left peripheries, because morphologically they are otherwise similar. Finally we discussed MG na clauses that are by and large considered to have replaced AG infinitives. We briefly reviewed the relevant literature that highlights the dual nature of these clauses, which arguably allow both OC and NOC constructions. In order to account for that we adopted existing analyses in the literature that attributed the properties of na clauses to the availability of two types of Cs that are responsible for the split. We did not directly extend our claims about the role of focus, because more work needs to be done in the availability of focus movement and focus constructions in embedded na contexts of MG.
Chapter 6: Concluding remarks

6.1 General

In this thesis we discussed the properties of AG infinitives and their subjects. In a nutshell we argued for the following:

(a) That AG infinitives are two types of CPs, whose properties follow from the feature content of their Cs.
(b) That AG Accusative subjects are licensed by non-finite T and their overtness is regulated from C: more specifically AG non-finite T hosts the Case feature and if C is a strong phase head, it also licenses overt contrastive subjects.
(c) Phasehood in the non-finite (and possibly embedded finite-cf. MG na clauses) C level is regulated by discourse features.
(d) EPP in NSLs is a discourse feature and subjects in non-finite structures are licensed by syntax and discourse.
(e) Null subjects in AG infinitives are distinguished through their Case properties and are (i) Case marked PRO with a purely anaphoric character in cases of Control and (ii) accusative purely pronominal pro in cases with referential and arbitrary properties (including non-obligatory control).
(f) Control and Raising are both manifested through CAAC in AG. CAAC is allowed when infinitival CP is a weak phase with no discourse properties.
(g) Latin infinitives differ from AG ones in terms of the features hosted in their left periphery.

These claims are important for AG syntax, since they provide a better understanding of the phenomenon of AcI in relation to control. Therefore, contra traditional grammars we argued that (i) AG infinitival clauses do not have any overt nominative subjects (cf. chapter 2, section 2.6) and (ii) null infinitival subjects are clearly distinguished into two distinct elements (PRO and pro) by their Case properties. As we saw in Chapter 5 however, our claims can potentially be relevant also for other languages that exhibit similar alternations. In this brief concluding chapter we will try to put our claims in the more general context of theoretical syntax and see whether there are any more general conclusions to be drawn. We will briefly discuss two central issues, the notion of Case and finiteness and its relation to phenomena of obviation.
6.2 On Case

The phenomenon of Case and its cross-linguistic instantiations has given rise to various accounts in the literature. In a fairly oversimplifying manner we will now give a very brief overview of Case theory and we will finish off with the implication for it by our analysis of AG infinitives.

Case is a phenomenon that is linked to morphology, syntax and semantics. The existence of morphological Case, i.e. the fact that arguments in many languages are found in varying forms, depending on their syntactic role and position gave rise to Case theory. According to it, arguments enter the derivation somewhat defective and need to be licensed by entering into an appropriate relation with a predicate, which is done through Case licensing. A different way to implement this intuition is by positing the Visibility Condition (Chomsky, 1986a), whereby an argument can only be visible for theta-marking if it has Case. In previous instantiations of the theory this has been done through government of an argument by a head with a Case feature (a preposition or the verbal root) or through Spec-head agreement in the more special case of subject Case licensing, where the relevant head is Infl, or Agr. In this manner it was argued that even in languages where Case is not morphologically visible on an argument (for example English, except weak pronouns), it is still syntactically present as abstract Case. These are instances of what has traditionally been called structural Case, which is further contrasted with inherent Case that is linked to DPs associated with a specific theta-role, like bare adverbials in the example ‘I will come back Tuesday.’ The idea of argument licensing through Case has gone through various changes in terminology that mirror the theory’s attitude towards it: so Case (or Case-features) have been ‘assigned’, ‘licensed’, ‘checked’ and ‘valued’. In a major theoretical turn, Marantz, 1991 was the first to argue that arguments are not licensed through Case assignment: Case and licensing are two distinct (although sometimes related) mechanisms. Within minimalist assumptions, there are two predominant views: firstly the ‘classical’ Chomskyan view, whereby Case is a reflex of phi-feature agreement (Chomsky, 2001a). This way there is no longer the possibility of two distinct heads on the Infl domain being responsible for Case. Recall that in Chapter 3, where we saw the various analyses that discussed overt infinitival subjects, Case features could be attributed to Agr head alone (Raposo, 1987 for Portuguese) or to T

1 For a very interesting theory that completely eliminates Case theory from syntax, by arguing against that conceptual claim, namely that arguments enter the derivation defective see McFadden, 2004.
(Ledgeway, 2000 for Neapolitan). The other mainstream view is that of Pesetsky & Torrego, 2001 & 2004 whereby Case is an uninterpretable Tense feature on D ($uT$ on D). Case has always been the ‘prototypical’ uninterpretable feature but P&T’s innovation has to do with it being linked to T instead of Agr. This claim upholds the longstanding link of Tense with Case, as properties that co-vary, an argument that has also been extended to subjects of non-finite clauses, as we saw extensively in Chapter 3.

Quite apparently our analysis is not on a par with the aforementioned theories. Firstly regarding Case being a reflex of (subject) agreement, we have seen that this is not correct for AG infinitives, which exhibit no agreement but license Accusative for their subjects. Lack of this agreement can be related to the existence of Accusative instead of Nominative, the latter has been considered the Case of (finite) subjects par excellence. We could have tried to be more on the P&T side and argue that it is a reflex of (infinitival) tense, but we saw that the generalisations that came from the data do not support such a claim. Our analysis therefore takes a different stand on the Case issue.

In our analysis we argued that the Case feature on T is activated when there is a contrastive feature on infinitival strong phase C. We also argued that the contrastive feature resembles Chomsky’s, 2006 edge feature. We therefore want to tentatively propose that Case (at least in AG infinitives) is a reflex of an edge feature. In Chomsky’s 2006 system, C is the all powerful phase-head that starts off with both $\phi$ (A) and edge (A’) features. The A vs. A’ distinction is maintained because C inherits its $\phi$-features on T, while by holding on to its edge features it can still be the locus of discourse (A’) domain. Envisaging Case as a reflex of $\phi$-feature agreement is perhaps the most straightforward possibility but nothing prevents the other logical alternative to exist, namely the one that we are arguing for here. There are various languages that Case can be related to discourse phenomena: Blake, 2001 for example reports Australian languages Nyigina and Gooniyandi where this is true. These languages do not show Case concord within a noun phrase, where Case and number and person are marked on every constituent, i.e. the determiner, the noun, the adjective etc., but Case mark only one constituent, the final one, or the head etc. In some cases, they mark the one that is focalised, essentially using Case as a discourse marker. Miyagawa, 2005 argued that languages can either be agreement prominent (like most Indo-European ones) or focus-prominent (like Japanese), implying that
Agreement and Focus are the two sides of the same coin. Assuming that Case exists in both types of languages, it is not unreasonable to assume that it can be linked to Agreement and Focus respectively. On top of that nothing prevents us from arguing that there also exist mixed language types. We want to suggest that AG is a mixed language, being agreement prominent in finite clauses, where Case is linked to agreement, and being focus-prominent in non-finite clauses, where Case is linked to focus as we showed.

6.2 On finiteness and obviation

This brings us to the final point that we want to raise in this thesis, which has to do with a definition of finiteness and its relation with phenomena like obviation. Finiteness is a notion that has always been notoriously difficult to define and to an extent it is still an open issue in linguistic theory.

There are three notions that seem to be related to finiteness: subject agreement, semantic tense and nominative Case. However it is not clear the exact status of this relation and more importantly whether their absence can directly lead to non-finiteness. In our work we have focused on AG infinitives but we have seen various other forms that although are prototypically regarded non-finite, they demonstrate different properties and syntactic behaviour. For example, European Portuguese inflected infinitives have subject agreement but are still considered non-finite, Neapolitan infinitives have tense but are still considered non-finite and both of the above constructions have nominative subjects. This demonstrates that neither of the above notions can characterize finiteness when found in isolation. Vincent, 1988 argued that modality can only be found in finite forms but we argued against such a claim based on AG infinitives in section 4.3.3. Rizzi, 1997 argued that Finiteness heads a projection in the left periphery, placing it directly at the C system. Kayne, 2004 regarded overt (agreement) morphology vital for the definition of finiteness: ‘(…) (the verbal form) likes is necessarily finite, whereas like is not necessarily finite (and in fact must not be in certain cases)’ (Kayne, 2003:2). According to him, there can be differences within the same paradigm, in his case that of English verbs. Cowper, 2002 argues for a tripartite distinction among finite, non-finite and pseudofinite constructions. The latter are essentially infinitives with overt subjects in Romance languages, analysed as instances of Aux-to-Comp: ‘a non-finite Infl that acquires the properties associated with the finite node during syntactic computation
Finally George & Kornflit, 1981 argue that the notion of finiteness must be defined appropriately for each language, essentially pointing to a direction of a parametrized theory of finiteness.

The data we have discussed in this thesis, not only show how difficult it is to distinguish finite from non-finite forms in some cases, but also non-finite forms from each other. Regarding this last point, Joseph, 1983 argues that each non-finite form may be associated with a specific morpheme, and this way it can be distinguished from other non-finite forms of the same language (cf. difference between gerund, gerundive and supine in Latin). The reason for this is due to the fact that the aforementioned forms are usually found in similar syntactic environments (functioning like compact adjunct clauses for example) and share similar syntactic properties. Moreover, some non-finite forms are more verbal (infinitives) and some others are more nominal (gerunds) and differences between the two cannot be easily identifiable.

Obviation is the phenomenon associated with differences between finite and non-finite complements, the former being associated with biclausal structures with the possibility of overt distinct subjects while the latter have been associated with monoclausal and typically control structures (cf. the French paradigm in Chapter 2, ex. 18-21). As we have seen, AG, Latin, Romanian and MG do not have this effect and embedded subjects can be both distinct and co-referential to those of the main clause based on factors irrespective of whether the embedded clause is finite or non-finite. In order to account for this our proposal relied on two types of Cs, a strong and a weak phase that can be found on the finite domain (MG na clauses) and on the non-finite domain (AG infinitives), yielding the same effects (control or disjoint reference). If this is correct it shows that finiteness is better viewed as a continuum and not as a dichotomy (pace Sitaridou, 2000), where mechanisms such as obviation or control can be found throughout this space. There can be forms that are ‘entirely’ finite and ‘entirely’ non-finite, but most forms need further specification, are somewhere in between and are better characterized with a variety of features (+/- T, +/-Agr, +/-Mood, +/-N, +/-V etc) including discourse features found in the C domain. Therefore finite domains are not prerequisite for obviation and the opposite does not

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2 For an association of the phenomenon of obviation to a principle B effect see Avrutin & Babyonyshev, 1997. According to them, subjunctives in Russian do not show this effect because their temporal domain has been extended to include the main clause as well.
beg for specific and elaborate explanations. As we extensively argued for AG, phenomena like control are subject to a variety of language-internal factors that define their overall character and instantiation. Our work would have benefited by looking into a variety of other constructions that can further illuminate the properties of those structures that can be placed within the finiteness continuum: EP inflected infinitives in relation to Hungarian inflected infinitives, Modern Greek and English gerunds etc. We think that these are very fruitful open issues for further research.
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